{
    "schema": "prokopton42-public-passage-v1",
    "id": "aristotle.metaphysics",
    "canonical_url": "https://prokopton42.com/en/works/aristotle/metaphysics/livre-8/passage-4/",
    "language": "en",
    "title": "Metaphysics",
    "author": "Aristotle",
    "date": "4th century BCE; transmitted as a layered collection",
    "summary": "Metaphysics proceeds through distinctions, objections, and causal inquiry. The surviving text has the density of a school treatise, not a transcribed conversation.",
    "learning": "Identify the exact question asked of being, distinguish substance, cause, potentiality, and actuality, then test which difficulty each distinction resolves.",
    "long_summary": "Canonical identity follows the CTS book and section. The critical Greek, historical English translation, and AI-generated French translation remain three aligned manifestations.\n\nThe books do not present a system cast in one piece: they revisit causes, being, substance, potentiality, and actuality through several inquiries. An isolated formula must not conceal those internal tensions.",
    "historical_context": "The corpus manifests do not yet establish the precise place and circumstances of composition. The images below document the author’s world or the text’s transmission. They do not claim to show the exact scene of writing.",
    "material_world_label": "World of 1989",
    "material_world": {
        "technology": "Personal computers, satellites, video, industrial robots, and expensive mobile phones exist, but the public Web does not yet.",
        "science": "Computing, genetics, climate science, cosmology, and medical imaging produce growing data and international collaboration.",
        "medicine": "CT, MRI, transplantation, vaccines, and intensive care advance; the AIDS epidemic exposes both medical capacity and its limits.",
        "transport": "Cars, high-speed rail, metros, aircraft, and containers globalize people and goods.",
        "agriculture": "Machinery, chemical inputs, breeding, and cold chains support high yields with increasingly debated social and environmental costs.",
        "communication": "Fixed telephones, fax, television, radio, and newspapers predominate. Email and computer networks remain mainly professional or academic.",
        "clothing": "Loose suits, jeans, trainers, women’s power suits, sportswear, and urban subcultures create highly varied silhouettes."
    },
    "material_world_scenes": [
        {
            "asset": "/assets/timeline/landmarks/30-1989-ce/world-01.webp",
            "title": "Technology, science, and care",
            "description": "Personal computers, satellites, video, industrial robots, and expensive mobile phones exist, but the public Web does not yet. Computing, genetics, climate science, cosmology, and medical imaging produce growing data and international collaboration. CT, MRI, transplantation, vaccines, and intensive care advance; the AIDS epidemic exposes both medical capacity and its limits."
        },
        {
            "asset": "/assets/timeline/landmarks/30-1989-ce/world-02.webp",
            "title": "Travel and communication",
            "description": "Cars, high-speed rail, metros, aircraft, and containers globalize people and goods. Fixed telephones, fax, television, radio, and newspapers predominate. Email and computer networks remain mainly professional or academic."
        },
        {
            "asset": "/assets/timeline/landmarks/30-1989-ce/world-03.webp",
            "title": "Farming and food",
            "description": "Machinery, chemical inputs, breeding, and cold chains support high yields with increasingly debated social and environmental costs."
        },
        {
            "asset": "/assets/timeline/landmarks/30-1989-ce/world-04.webp",
            "title": "Clothing, women and men",
            "description": "Loose suits, jeans, trainers, women’s power suits, sportswear, and urban subcultures create highly varied silhouettes."
        }
    ],
    "intellectual_tradition": {
        "id": "greek-roman-traditions",
        "label": "Greek and Roman traditions"
    },
    "period": {
        "id": "ancient",
        "label": "Antiquity"
    },
    "languages": [
        "grc",
        "en",
        "fr"
    ],
    "manifestations": [
        {
            "coverage": "complete",
            "file": "data/corpus/normalized/aristotle/metaphysics/representations/grc.ndjson",
            "language": "grc",
            "records": 142,
            "role": "complete_aligned_treatise",
            "sha256": "cc4a1af60112ea7f98b385f557ee598b87a62e2457ee288cae71f63f3cfdc02d",
            "source_id": "perseus-grc"
        },
        {
            "coverage": "complete",
            "file": "data/corpus/normalized/aristotle/metaphysics/representations/en.ndjson",
            "language": "en",
            "records": 142,
            "role": "complete_aligned_treatise",
            "sha256": "8da2bf9dc46a1f562c63821cf39ceb5a375ad60826feb518ca4479033d69be0e",
            "source_id": "perseus-en"
        },
        {
            "coverage": "complete",
            "file": "data/corpus/normalized/aristotle/metaphysics/representations/ai-generated/fr-gpt-5-6-sol-corpus-passage-translation-v1.ndjson",
            "generated_on": "2026-09-13",
            "language": "fr",
            "model": "gpt-5.6-sol",
            "official_status": "non_official",
            "prompt_version": "corpus-passage-translation-v1",
            "provider": "codex_subscription",
            "records": 142,
            "role": "ai_generated_translation_non_official",
            "sha256": "9ec0b903f1448863e575098ef9766536f16baf848e3e40d466639197fc1cf6b6",
            "source_id": "prokopton42-codex-translation:gpt-5.6-sol:corpus-passage-translation-v1",
            "translation_type": "ai_generated_translation"
        }
    ],
    "concepts": [
        {
            "id": "affects",
            "label": "Affects"
        },
        {
            "id": "care_of_soul",
            "label": "Care of the soul"
        },
        {
            "id": "family",
            "label": "Family"
        },
        {
            "id": "forms",
            "label": "Intelligible forms"
        },
        {
            "id": "knowledge",
            "label": "Knowledge"
        },
        {
            "id": "logos_nature",
            "label": "Logos of nature"
        },
        {
            "id": "nature",
            "label": "Nature"
        },
        {
            "id": "necessity",
            "label": "Necessity"
        },
        {
            "id": "philosophical_eros",
            "label": "Philosophical eros"
        },
        {
            "id": "reason",
            "label": "Reason"
        },
        {
            "id": "sin",
            "label": "Sin"
        },
        {
            "id": "substance",
            "label": "Substance"
        },
        {
            "id": "suffering",
            "label": "Suffering"
        },
        {
            "id": "virtue",
            "label": "Virtue"
        }
    ],
    "source_work_ids": [
        "aristotle.metaphysics"
    ],
    "passages": 142,
    "word_count": 109138,
    "word_counts_by_language": {
        "en": 109138,
        "fr": 113943,
        "grc": 78979
    },
    "editorial_status": "gpt_5_6_semantic_draft_v1",
    "structure": {
        "citation_scheme": "book-section-v1",
        "kind": "native",
        "levels": [
            {
                "key": "book",
                "label_fr": "Livre",
                "label_en": "Book"
            },
            {
                "key": "section",
                "label_fr": "Section",
                "label_en": "Section"
            }
        ],
        "leaf_fr": "Section",
        "leaf_en": "Section"
    },
    "canonical_passage_id": "passage:aristotle.metaphysics:8.4",
    "canonical_ref": "8.4",
    "canonical_parent_ref": null,
    "canonical_parent_id": null,
    "representations": [
        {
            "language": "grc",
            "text": "περὶ δὲ τῆς ὑλικῆς οὐσίας δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι εἰ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πάντα πρώτου ἢ τῶν αὐτῶν ὡς πρώτων καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ὕλη ὡς ἀρχὴ τοῖς γιγνομένοις, ὅμως ἔστι τις οἰκεία ἑκάστου, οἷον φλέγματος ἐστι πρώτη ὕλη τὰ γλυκέα ἢ λιπαρά, χολῆς δὲ τὰ πικρὰ ἢ ἄλλʼ ἄττα· ἴσως δὲ ταῦτα ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ. γίγνονται δὲ πλείους ὗλαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὅταν θατέρου ἡ ἑτέρα ᾖ, οἷον φλέγμα ἐκ λιπαροῦ καὶ γλυκέος εἰ τὸ λιπαρὸν ἐκ τοῦ γλυκέος, ἐκ δὲ χολῆς τῷ ἀναλύεσθαι εἰς τὴν πρώτην ὕλην τὴν χολήν. διχῶς γὰρ τόδʼ ἐκ τοῦδε, ἢ ὅτι πρὸ ὁδοῦ ἔσται ἢ ὅτι ἀναλυθέντος εἰς τὴν ἀρχήν. ἐνδέχεται δὲ μιᾶς τῆς ὕλης οὔσης ἕτερα γίγνεσθαι διὰ τὴν κινοῦσαν αἰτίαν, οἷον ἐκ ξύλου καὶ κιβωτὸς καὶ κλίνη. ἐνίων δʼ ἑτέρα ἡ ὕλη ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἑτέρων ὄντων, οἷον πρίων οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἐκ ξύλου, οὐδʼ ἐπὶ τῇ κινούσῃ αἰτίᾳ τοῦτο· οὐ γὰρ ποιήσει πρίονα ἐξ ἐρίου ἢ ξύλου. εἰ δʼ ἄρα τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνδέχεται ἐξ ἄλλης ὕλης ποιῆσαι, δῆλον ὅτι ἡ τέχνη καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἡ ὡς κινοῦσα ἡ αὐτή· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἡ ὕλη ἑτέρα καὶ τὸ κινοῦν, καὶ τὸ γεγονός.—ὅταν δή τις ζητῇ τὸ αἴτιον, ἐπεὶ πλεοναχῶς τὰ αἴτια λέγεται, πάσας δεῖ λέγειν τὰς ἐνδεχομένας αἰτίας. οἷον ἀνθρώπου τίς αἰτία ὡς ὕλη; ἆρα τὰ καταμήνια; τί δʼ ὡς κινοῦν; ἆρα τὸ σπέρμα; τί δʼ ὡς τὸ εἶδος; τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. τί δʼ ὡς οὗ ἕνεκα; τὸ τέλος. ἴσως δὲ ταῦτα ἄμφω τὸ αὐτό. δεῖ δὲ τὰ ἐγγύτατα αἴτια λέγειν. τίς ἡ ὕλη; μὴ πῦρ ἢ γῆν ἀλλὰ τὴν ἴδιον. περὶ μὲν οὖν τὰς φυσικὰς οὐσίας καὶ γενητὰς ἀνάγκη οὕτω μετιέναι εἴ τις μέτεισιν ὀρθῶς, εἴπερ ἄρα αἴτιά τε ταῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτα καὶ δεῖ τὰ αἴτια γνωρίζειν· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν φυσικῶν μὲν ἀϊδίων δὲ οὐσιῶν ἄλλος λόγος. ἴσως γὰρ ἔνια οὐκ ἔχει ὕλην, ἢ οὐ τοιαύτην ἀλλὰ μόνον κατὰ τόπον κινητήν. οὐδʼ ὅσα δὴ φύσει μέν, μὴ οὐσίαι δέ, οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις ὕλη, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἡ οὐσία. οἷον τί αἴτιον ἐκλείψεως, τίς ὕλη; οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, ἀλλʼ ἡ σελήνη τὸ πάσχον. τί δʼ αἴτιον ὡς κινῆσαν καὶ φθεῖραν τὸ φῶς; ἡ γῆ. τὸ δʼ οὗ ἕνεκα ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν. τὸ δʼ ὡς εἶδος ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ ἄδηλος ἐὰν μὴ μετὰ τῆς αἰτίας ᾖ ὁ λόγος. οἷον τί ἔκλειψις; στέρησις φωτός. ἐὰν δὲ προστεθῇ τὸ ὑπὸ γῆς ἐν μέσῳ γιγνομένης, ὁ σὺν τῷ αἰτίῳ λόγος οὗτος. ὕπνου δʼ ἄδηλον τί τὸ πρῶτον πάσχον. ἀλλʼ ὅτι τὸ ζῷον; ναί, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο κατὰ τί, καὶ τί πρῶτον; καρδία ἢ ἄλλο τι. εἶτα ὑπὸ τίνος; εἶτα τί τὸ πάθος, τὸ ἐκείνου καὶ μὴ τοῦ ὅλου; ὅτι ἀκινησία τοιαδί; ναί, ἀλλʼ αὕτη τῷ τί πάσχειν τὸ πρῶτον;",
            "source_id": "perseus-grc",
            "translation_type": "critical_original_language"
        },
        {
            "language": "en",
            "text": "As regards material substance, we must not fail to realize that even if all things are derived from the same primary cause, or from the same things as primary causes ; i.e. even if all things that are generated have the same matter for their first principle, nevertheless each thing has some matter peculiar to it; e.g., the sweet or the viscous is the proximate matter of mucus, and the bitter or some such thing is that of bile— although probably mucus and bile are derived from the same ultimate matter. The result is that there is more than one matter of the same thing, when one thing is the matter of the other; e.g., mucus is derived from the viscous ; and from the sweet, if the viscous is derived from the sweet ; and from bile, by the analysis of bile into its ultimate matter. For there are two senses in which X comes from Y; either because X will be found further on than Y in the process of development, or because X is produced when Y is analyzed into its original constituents. And different things can be generated by the moving cause when the matter is one and the same, e.g. a chest and a bed from wood. But some different things must necessarily have different matter; e.g., a saw cannot be generated from wood, nor does this lie in the power of the moving cause, for it cannot make a saw of wool or wood. If, then, it is possible to make the same thing from different matter, clearly the art, i.e. the moving principle, is the same; for if both the matter and the mover are different, so too is the product. So whenever we inquire what the cause is, since there are causes in several senses, we must state all the possible causes. E.g., what is the material cause of a man? The menses. What is the moving cause? The semen. What is the formal cause? The essence. What is the final cause? The end. (But perhaps both the latter are the same.) We must, however, state the most proximate causes. What is the matter? Not fire or earth, but the matter proper to man. Thus as regards generable natural substances we must proceed in this manner, if we are to proceed correctly; that is, if the causes are these and of this number, and it is necessary to know the causes. But in the case of substances which though natural are eternal the principle is different. For presumably some of them have no matter; or no matter of this kind, but only such as is spatially mobile. Moreover, things which exist by nature but are not substances have no matter; their substrate is their substance. E.g., what is the cause of an eclipse; what is its matter? It has none; it is the moon which is affected. What is the moving cause which destroys the light? The earth. There is probably no final cause. The formal cause is the formula; but this is obscure unless it includes the efficient cause. E.g., what is an eclipse? A privation of light; and if we add caused by the earth’s intervention, this is the definition which includes the 〈efficient〉 cause. In the case of sleep it is not clear what it is that is proximately affected. Is it the animal? Yes; but in respect of what, and of what proximately? The heart, or some other part. Again, by what is it affected? Again, what is the affection which affects that part, and not the whole animal? A particular kind of immobility? Yes; but in virtue of what affection of the proximate subject is it this?",
            "translator": "Hugh Tredennick, 1933-1935",
            "source_id": "perseus-en",
            "translation_type": "historical_translation"
        },
        {
            "language": "fr",
            "text": "En ce qui concerne la substance matérielle, nous ne devons pas manquer de reconnaître que, même si toutes choses dérivent de la même cause première, ou des mêmes choses prises comme causes premières, c’est-à-dire même si toutes les choses engendrées ont la même matière pour premier principe, chacune possède néanmoins une matière qui lui est propre. Par exemple, le doux ou le visqueux est la matière prochaine du mucus, et l’amer ou quelque qualité semblable celle de la bile, bien que le mucus et la bile dérivent probablement de la même matière ultime. Il en résulte qu’une même chose a plus d’une matière, lorsque l’une est la matière de l’autre. Par exemple, le mucus dérive du visqueux; et du doux, si le visqueux dérive du doux; et de la bile, par l’analyse de la bile en sa matière ultime. Car il y a deux sens dans lesquels X provient de Y: soit parce que X se trouvera plus loin que Y dans le processus de développement, soit parce que X est produit lorsque Y est analysé en ses constituants originels.\n\nDes choses différentes peuvent être engendrées par la cause motrice lorsque la matière est une et identique, par exemple un coffre et un lit à partir du bois. Mais certaines choses différentes doivent nécessairement avoir des matières différentes. Par exemple, une scie ne peut être engendrée à partir du bois, et cela ne relève pas non plus du pouvoir de la cause motrice, car elle ne peut fabriquer une scie avec de la laine ou du bois. Si donc il est possible de fabriquer la même chose à partir de matières différentes, il est clair que l’art, c’est-à-dire le principe moteur, est le même; car, si la matière et le moteur sont tous deux différents, le produit l’est aussi.\n\nAinsi, chaque fois que nous recherchons quelle est la cause, puisque les causes se disent en plusieurs sens, nous devons énoncer toutes les causes possibles. Par exemple, quelle est la cause matérielle d’un homme? Les menstrues. Quelle est la cause motrice? La semence. Quelle est la cause formelle? L’essence. Quelle est la cause finale? La fin. Mais peut-être les deux dernières sont-elles identiques. Nous devons toutefois énoncer les causes les plus prochaines. Quelle est la matière? Non le feu ou la terre, mais la matière propre à l’homme. Ainsi, pour les substances naturelles susceptibles d’être engendrées, nous devons procéder de cette manière si nous voulons procéder correctement, c’est-à-dire si les causes sont celles-ci et en ce nombre, et s’il est nécessaire de connaître les causes.\n\nMais, dans le cas des substances qui, tout en étant naturelles, sont éternelles, le principe est différent. Car certaines d’entre elles n’ont vraisemblablement pas de matière, ou du moins pas de matière de cette sorte, mais seulement une matière susceptible de mouvement spatial. En outre, les choses qui existent par nature mais ne sont pas des substances n’ont pas de matière; leur substrat est leur substance. Par exemple, quelle est la cause d’une éclipse, quelle est sa matière? Elle n’en a pas; c’est la lune qui est affectée. Quelle est la cause motrice qui détruit la lumière? La terre. Il n’y a probablement pas de cause finale. La cause formelle est l’énoncé, mais celui-ci est obscur s’il n’inclut pas la cause efficiente. Par exemple, qu’est-ce qu’une éclipse? Une privation de lumière; et si nous ajoutons «causée par l’interposition de la terre», voilà la définition qui inclut la cause 〈efficiente〉.\n\nDans le cas du sommeil, on ne voit pas clairement ce qui est affecté de manière prochaine. Est-ce l’animal? Oui, mais sous quel rapport, et quelle partie l’est de manière prochaine? Le cœur, ou quelque autre partie. Ensuite, par quoi est-elle affectée? Et encore, quelle est l’affection qui affecte cette partie, et non l’animal tout entier? Une certaine sorte d’immobilité? Oui, mais en vertu de quelle affection du sujet prochain est-ce cela?",
            "translator": "Codex gpt-5.6-sol",
            "edition": "Prokopton42 non-official AI translation, 2026-09-13",
            "source_id": "prokopton42-codex-translation:gpt-5.6-sol:corpus-passage-translation-v1",
            "translation_type": "ai_generated_translation",
            "official_status": "non_official",
            "generation_model": "gpt-5.6-sol"
        }
    ],
    "content_checksum": "9fb42a47c7ecd1c5117a9fef368461374b3cac79981b99b11de68fe30f06f8fe"
}
