{ "schema": "prokopton42-public-passage-v1", "id": "socrates.plato_gorgias", "canonical_url": "https://prokopton42.com/en/works/plato/plato-gorgias/reference-472/", "language": "en", "title": "Socrates in Plato’s Gorgias", "author": "Plato", "date": "c. 390-380 BCE", "summary": "Facing three defenders of rhetoric and power, Plato’s Socrates argues that speech without knowledge of justice is flattery. He prefers suffering injustice to deforming his soul by committing it.", "learning": "Compare Socrates’ strategies with three interlocutors, connect justice with the soul’s condition, and qualify Plato’s polemical mediation.", "long_summary": "With Gorgias Socrates asks what object and knowledge belong to rhetoric; with Polus he denies that a tyrant truly does what he wants; with Callicles he opposes ordered desire to justice claimed by the stronger.\n\nThe exchange’s increasing harshness constructs a Socrates ready to stand alone against opinion. Plato gives him arguments, medical analogies, and the final myth. This philosophical portrait reveals a Socratic ideal within dialogue, not an independent recording of controversies.", "historical_context": "The corpus manifests do not yet establish the precise place and circumstances of composition. The images below document the author’s world or the text’s transmission. They do not claim to show the exact scene of writing.", "material_world_label": "Classical Greek world, 5th century BCE", "material_world": { "technology": "Bronze, iron, pottery, simple cranes, and shipbuilding sustain cities. Power still comes mainly from people, animals, wind, and water.", "science": "Geometry, astronomy, inquiry into nature, and rational argument advance without modern measuring instruments or standardized experiments.", "medicine": "Practitioners observe symptoms, diet, and seasons; healing sanctuaries and ritual treatment also remain common.", "transport": "Walking and animals dominate on land. Sailing ships and triremes connect islands, ports, and colonies.", "agriculture": "Small farms, grain, vines, olives, goats, and sheep shape the diet; harvests remain vulnerable to weather and war.", "communication": "Public speech, messengers, and handwritten letters carry news. Theatre, the civic square, and the banquet are major social media.", "clothing": "Women and men drape wool or linen as chitons, peploi, and cloaks. Garments are pinned, belted, and shaped by status rather than tailored like modern clothes." }, "material_world_scenes": [ { "asset": "/assets/timeline/landmarks/03-431-bce/world-01.webp", "title": "Technology, science, and care", "description": "Bronze, iron, pottery, simple cranes, and shipbuilding sustain cities. Power still comes mainly from people, animals, wind, and water. Geometry, astronomy, inquiry into nature, and rational argument advance without modern measuring instruments or standardized experiments. Practitioners observe symptoms, diet, and seasons; healing sanctuaries and ritual treatment also remain common." }, { "asset": "/assets/timeline/landmarks/03-431-bce/world-02.webp", "title": "Travel and communication", "description": "Walking and animals dominate on land. Sailing ships and triremes connect islands, ports, and colonies. Public speech, messengers, and handwritten letters carry news. Theatre, the civic square, and the banquet are major social media." }, { "asset": "/assets/timeline/landmarks/03-431-bce/world-03.webp", "title": "Farming and food", "description": "Small farms, grain, vines, olives, goats, and sheep shape the diet; harvests remain vulnerable to weather and war." }, { "asset": "/assets/timeline/landmarks/03-431-bce/world-04.webp", "title": "Clothing, women and men", "description": "Women and men drape wool or linen as chitons, peploi, and cloaks. Garments are pinned, belted, and shaped by status rather than tailored like modern clothes." } ], "intellectual_tradition": { "id": "platonism", "label": "Socratic and Platonic thought" }, "period": { "id": "ancient", "label": "Antiquity" }, "languages": [ "grc", "en", "fr" ], "manifestations": [ { "coverage": "complete", "file": "data/corpus/normalized/socrates/plato_gorgias/representations/grc.ndjson", "language": "grc", "records": 81, "role": "original_carrier", "sha256": "6375206e2c0f5f63895c63ad84f2e4193caaf0e9b977b3ebbee150a974cdbb45", "source_id": "perseus-plato-gorgias-grc" }, { "coverage": "complete", "file": "data/corpus/normalized/socrates/plato_gorgias/representations/en.ndjson", "language": "en", "records": 81, "role": "historical_translation", "sha256": "9937810691c453868da6ec45248a969dae04575a84bebe600ec35a027685aa0c", "source_id": "perseus-plato-gorgias-en" }, { "coverage": "complete", "file": "data/corpus/normalized/socrates/plato_gorgias/representations/ai-generated/fr-gpt-5-6-sol-corpus-passage-translation-v1.ndjson", "generated_on": "2026-09-11", "language": "fr", "model": "gpt-5.6-sol", "official_status": "non_official", "prompt_version": "corpus-passage-translation-v1", "provider": "codex_subscription", "records": 81, "role": "ai_generated_translation_non_official", "sha256": "1672b73fb3bffbc60e73a797170f990f81f7705c94337417cbcdc6125e94649f", "source_id": "prokopton42-codex-translation:gpt-5.6-sol:corpus-passage-translation-v1", "translation_type": "ai_generated_translation" }, { "coverage": "complete", "file": "data/corpus/normalized/socrates/plato_gorgias_fr_carrier/representations/fr.ndjson", "language": "fr", "records": 1, "role": "historical_translation", "sha256": "4b9564c5c0a6b85cac39c19a5c63e22e96ec784408a36acb9bd633039e4474e7", "source_id": "wikisource-cousin-gorgias-fr-01" }, { "coverage": "complete", "file": "data/corpus/normalized/socrates/plato_gorgias_fr_carrier/representations/ai-generated/en-gpt-5-6-sol-corpus-passage-translation-v1.ndjson", "generated_on": "2026-09-11", "language": "en", "model": "gpt-5.6-sol", "official_status": "non_official", "prompt_version": "corpus-passage-translation-v1", "provider": "codex_subscription", "records": 1, "role": "ai_generated_translation_non_official", "sha256": "cf12413957fc07735d82d9845e2dd3a40ff64aaefde16714f85c1a63d0206994", "source_id": "prokopton42-codex-translation:gpt-5.6-sol:corpus-passage-translation-v1", "translation_type": "ai_generated_translation" } ], "concepts": [ { "id": "care_of_soul", "label": "Care of the soul" }, { "id": "elenchus", "label": "Elenchus" }, { "id": "ether_field", "label": "Ether and field" }, { "id": "family", "label": "Family" }, { "id": "forms", "label": "Intelligible forms" }, { "id": "friendship", "label": "Friendship" }, { "id": "god", "label": "God" }, { "id": "justice", "label": "Justice" }, { "id": "knowledge", "label": "Knowledge" }, { "id": "law", "label": "Law" }, { "id": "logos_nature", "label": "Logos of nature" }, { "id": "messiah", "label": "Messiah" }, { "id": "mode", "label": "Mode" }, { "id": "reason", "label": "Reason" }, { "id": "rhetoric", "label": "Rhetoric" }, { "id": "roles", "label": "Roles and relationships" }, { "id": "sin", "label": "Sin" }, { "id": "truth", "label": "Truth" }, { "id": "war_and_peace", "label": "War and peace" } ], "source_work_ids": [ "socrates.plato_gorgias", "socrates.plato_gorgias_fr_carrier" ], "passages": 81, "word_count": 42811, "word_counts_by_language": { "en": 42811, "fr": 43834, "grc": 27405 }, "editorial_status": "gpt_5_6_semantic_draft_v1", "structure": { "citation_scheme": "carrier-explicit-ancient-reference-v1", "kind": "native", "levels": [ { "key": "reference", "label_fr": "Référence", "label_en": "Reference" } ], "leaf_fr": "Passage", "leaf_en": "Passage" }, "canonical_passage_id": "passage:socrates.plato_gorgias:472", "canonical_ref": "472", "canonical_parent_ref": null, "canonical_parent_id": null, "representations": [ { "language": "grc", "text": "ΣΩ. ὦ μακάριε, ῥητορικῶς γάρ με ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐλέγχειν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἡγούμενοι ἐλέγχειν. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἕτεροι τοὺς ἑτέρους δοκοῦσιν ἐλέγχειν, ἐπειδὰν τῶν λόγων ὧν ἂν λέγωσι μάρτυρας πολλοὺς παρέχωνται καὶ εὐδοκίμους, ὁ δὲ τἀναντία λέγων ἕνα τινὰ παρέχηται ἢ μηδένα. οὗτος δὲ ὁ ἔλεγχος οὐδενὸς ἄξιός ἐστιν πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν· ἐνίοτε γὰρ ἂν καὶ καταψευδομαρτυρηθείη τις ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ δοκούντων εἶναί τι. καὶ νῦν περὶ ὧν σὺ λέγεις ὀλίγου σοι πάντες συμφήσουσιν ταὐτὰ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ξένοι, ἐὰν βούλῃ κατʼ ἐμοῦ μάρτυρας παρασχέσθαι ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγω· μαρτυρήσουσί σοι, ἐὰν μὲν βούλῃ, Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ μετʼ αὐτοῦ, ὧν οἱ τρίποδες οἱ ἐφεξῆς ἑστῶτές εἰσιν ἐν τῷ Διονυσίῳ, ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, Ἀριστοκράτης ὁ Σκελλίου, οὗ αὖ ἐστιν ἐν Πυθίου τοῦτο τὸ καλὸν ἀνάθημα, ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, ἡ Περικλέους ὅλη οἰκία ἢ ἄλλη συγγένεια ἥντινα ἂν βούλῃ τῶν ἐνθάδε ἐκλέξασθαι. ἀλλʼ ἐγώ σοι εἷς ὢν οὐχ ὁμολογῶ· οὐ γάρ με σὺ ἀναγκάζεις, ἀλλὰ ψευδομάρτυρας πολλοὺς κατʼ ἐμοῦ παρασχόμενος ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐκβάλλειν με ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. ἐγὼ δὲ ἂν μὴ σὲ αὐτὸν ἕνα ὄντα μάρτυρα παράσχωμαι ὁμολογοῦντα περὶ ὧν λέγω, οὐδὲν οἶμαι ἄξιον λόγου μοι πεπεράνθαι περὶ ὧν ἂν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ᾖ· οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ σοί, ἐὰν μὴ ἐγώ σοι μαρτυρῶ εἷς ὢν μόνος, τοὺς δʼ ἄλλους πάντας τούτους χαίρειν ἐᾷς. ἔστιν μὲν οὖν οὗτός τις τρόπος ἐλέγχου, ὡς σύ τε οἴει καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί· ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ἄλλος, ὃν ἐγὼ αὖ οἶμαι. παραβαλόντες οὖν παρʼ ἀλλήλους σκεψώμεθα εἴ τι διοίσουσιν ἀλλήλων. καὶ γὰρ καὶ τυγχάνει περὶ ὧν ἀμφισβητοῦμεν οὐ πάνυ σμικρὰ ὄντα, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ταῦτα περὶ ὧν εἰδέναι τε κάλλιστον μὴ εἰδέναι τε αἴσχιστον· τὸ γὰρ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἢ γιγνώσκειν ἢ ἀγνοεῖν ὅστις τε εὐδαίμων ἐστὶν καὶ ὅστις μή. αὐτίκα πρῶτον, περὶ οὗ νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, σὺ ἡγῇ οἷόν τε εἶναι μακάριον ἄνδρα ἀδικοῦντά τε καὶ ἄδικον ὄντα, εἴπερ Ἀρχέλαον ἄδικον μὲν ἡγῇ εἶναι, εὐδαίμονα δέ. ἄλλο τι ὡς οὕτω σου νομίζοντος διανοώμεθα; ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. ἐγὼ δέ φημι ἀδύνατον. ἓν μὲν τουτὶ ἀμφισβητοῦμεν. εἶεν· ἀδικῶν δὲ δὴ εὐδαίμων ἔσται ἆρʼ, ἂν τυγχάνῃ δίκης τε καὶ τιμωρίας; ΠΩΛ. ἥκιστά γε, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γʼ ἂν ἀθλιώτατος εἴη. ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἐὰν ἄρα μὴ τυγχάνῃ δίκης ὁ ἀδικῶν, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον εὐδαίμων ἔσται; ΠΩΛ. φημί. ΣΩ. κατὰ δέ γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὦ Πῶλε, ὁ ἀδικῶν τε καὶ ὁ ἄδικος πάντως μὲν ἄθλιος, ἀθλιώτερος μέντοι ἐὰν μὴ διδῷ δίκην μηδὲ τυγχάνῃ τιμωρίας ἀδικῶν, ἧττον δὲ ἄθλιος ἐὰν διδῷ δίκην καὶ τυγχάνῃ δίκης ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων.", "edition": "perseus-plato-gorgias-grc", "source_id": "perseus-plato-gorgias-grc", "translation_type": "original" }, { "language": "en", "text": "Soc. My gifted friend, that is because you attempt to refute me in rhetorical fashion, as they understand refuting in the law courts. For there, one party is supposed to refute the other when they bring forward a number of reputable witnesses to any statements they may make, whilst their opponent produces only one, or none. But this sort of refutation is quite worthless for getting at the truth; since occasionally a man may actually be crushed by the number and reputation of the false witnesses brought against him. And so now you will find almost everybody, Athenians and foreigners, in agreement with you on the points you state, if you like to bring forward witnesses against the truth of what I say: if you like, there is Nicias, son of Niceratus, with his brothers, whose tripods are standing in a row in the Dionysium; or else Aristocrates, son of Scellias, whose goodly offering again is well known at Delphi ; or if you choose, there is the whole house of Pericles or any other family you may like to select in this place. But I, alone here before you, do not admit it, for you fail to convince me: you only attempt, by producing a number of false witnesses against me, to oust me from my reality, the truth. But if on my part I fail to produce yourself as my one witness to confirm what I say, I consider I have achieved nothing of any account towards the matter of our discussion, whatever it may be; nor have you either, I conceive, unless I act alone as your one witness, and you have nothing to do with all these others. Well now, this is one mode of refutation, as you and many other people understand it; but there is also another which I on my side understand. Let us therefore compare them with each other and consider if there is a difference between them. For indeed the points which we have at issue are by no means of slight importance: rather, one might say, they are matters on which it is most honorable to have knowledge, and most disgraceful to lack it; for in sum they involve our knowing or not knowing who is happy and who is not. To start at once with the point we are now debating, you consider it possible for a man to be happy while doing wrong, and as a wrongdoer, since you regard Archelaus as a wrongdoer, and yet happy. We are to conclude, are we not, that this is your opinion? Pol. Certainly. Soc. And I say it is impossible. There we have one point at issue. Very good but then, will a man be happy in wrongdoing if he comes in for requital and punishment? Pol. Not at all, since in that case he would be most wretched. Soc. But if the wrongdoer escapes requital, by your account he will be happy? Pol. Yes. Soc. Whereas in my opinion, Polus, the wrongdoer or the unjust is wretched anyhow; more wretched, however, if he does not pay the penalty and gets no punishment for his wrongdoing, but less wretched if he pays the penalty and meets with requital from gods and men.", "translator": "Benjamin Jowett", "edition": "perseus-plato-gorgias-en", "source_id": "perseus-plato-gorgias-en", "translation_type": "historical_human_translation" }, { "language": "fr", "text": "Soc. Mon excellent ami, c'est que tu entreprends de me réfuter à la manière des orateurs, comme on entend la réfutation devant les tribunaux. Là, en effet, on estime qu'une partie réfute l'autre lorsqu'elle produit, à l'appui de ses affirmations, de nombreux témoins réputés, tandis que l'adversaire n'en produit qu'un seul, ou aucun. Mais cette sorte de réfutation ne vaut absolument rien pour atteindre la vérité, car il arrive qu'un homme soit accablé par le nombre et la réputation des faux témoins produits contre lui. Ainsi, à présent, tu trouveras presque tout le monde, Athéniens et étrangers, d'accord avec toi sur les points que tu avances, si tu veux produire des témoins contre la vérité de ce que je dis. Tu peux, si tu veux, citer Nicias, fils de Nicératos, avec ses frères, dont les trépieds se dressent en rang dans le sanctuaire de Dionysos, ou encore Aristocrate, fils de Scellias, dont la belle offrande est bien connue à Delphes, ou, si tu préfères, toute la maison de Périclès, ou telle autre famille de cette ville qu'il te plaira de choisir. Mais moi, seul ici devant toi, je ne l'admets pas, car tu ne réussis pas à me convaincre. Tu t'efforces seulement, en produisant contre moi une foule de faux témoins, de me chasser de mon bien, la vérité. Quant à moi, si je ne réussis pas à te produire toi-même comme mon unique témoin pour confirmer ce que je dis, je considère que je n'ai rien accompli qui compte pour la question dont nous discutons, quelle qu'elle soit. Et toi non plus, je pense, à moins que je ne sois seul à témoigner pour toi et que tu ne laisses de côté tous ces autres. Voilà donc une manière de réfuter, telle que toi et beaucoup d'autres la concevez. Mais il en est aussi une autre, telle que je la conçois pour ma part. Comparons-les donc et examinons si elles diffèrent. Car les points qui nous opposent ne sont nullement de peu d'importance. On pourrait même dire qu'il est souverainement honorable de les connaître et souverainement honteux de les ignorer, puisqu'en somme il s'agit de savoir ou de ne pas savoir qui est heureux et qui ne l'est pas. Pour commencer aussitôt par le point dont nous débattons maintenant, tu estimes qu'un homme peut être heureux tout en commettant l'injustice et en étant injuste, puisque tu tiens Archélaos pour injuste et néanmoins heureux. Ne devons-nous pas conclure que telle est ton opinion ? Pol. Certainement. Soc. Et moi, je dis que c'est impossible. Voilà un premier point de désaccord. Fort bien. Mais un homme sera-t-il heureux dans l'injustice s'il subit le châtiment et la peine ? Pol. Nullement, car alors il serait tout à fait misérable. Soc. Mais si l'homme injuste échappe au châtiment, il sera heureux selon toi ? Pol. Oui. Soc. Selon moi, au contraire, Polos, celui qui commet l'injustice, l'homme injuste, est misérable dans tous les cas. Il est toutefois plus misérable s'il n'acquitte pas sa peine et ne reçoit aucun châtiment pour son injustice, et moins misérable s'il l'acquitte et reçoit son dû des dieux et des hommes.", "translator": "Codex gpt-5.6-sol", "edition": "Prokopton42 non-official AI translation, 2026-09-11", "source_id": "prokopton42-codex-translation:gpt-5.6-sol:corpus-passage-translation-v1", "translation_type": "ai_generated_translation", "official_status": "non_official", "generation_model": "gpt-5.6-sol" } ], "content_checksum": "2ad6c825004f52b81a573b1248c61b738c522c9476a1f3ab74a6d20b91cf90a8" }