{ "schema": "prokopton42-public-passage-v1", "id": "socrates.plato_gorgias", "canonical_url": "https://prokopton42.com/en/works/plato/plato-gorgias/reference-495/", "language": "en", "title": "Socrates in Plato’s Gorgias", "author": "Plato", "date": "c. 390-380 BCE", "summary": "Facing three defenders of rhetoric and power, Plato’s Socrates argues that speech without knowledge of justice is flattery. He prefers suffering injustice to deforming his soul by committing it.", "learning": "Compare Socrates’ strategies with three interlocutors, connect justice with the soul’s condition, and qualify Plato’s polemical mediation.", "long_summary": "With Gorgias Socrates asks what object and knowledge belong to rhetoric; with Polus he denies that a tyrant truly does what he wants; with Callicles he opposes ordered desire to justice claimed by the stronger.\n\nThe exchange’s increasing harshness constructs a Socrates ready to stand alone against opinion. Plato gives him arguments, medical analogies, and the final myth. This philosophical portrait reveals a Socratic ideal within dialogue, not an independent recording of controversies.", "historical_context": "The corpus manifests do not yet establish the precise place and circumstances of composition. The images below document the author’s world or the text’s transmission. They do not claim to show the exact scene of writing.", "material_world_label": "Classical Greek world, 5th century BCE", "material_world": { "technology": "Bronze, iron, pottery, simple cranes, and shipbuilding sustain cities. Power still comes mainly from people, animals, wind, and water.", "science": "Geometry, astronomy, inquiry into nature, and rational argument advance without modern measuring instruments or standardized experiments.", "medicine": "Practitioners observe symptoms, diet, and seasons; healing sanctuaries and ritual treatment also remain common.", "transport": "Walking and animals dominate on land. Sailing ships and triremes connect islands, ports, and colonies.", "agriculture": "Small farms, grain, vines, olives, goats, and sheep shape the diet; harvests remain vulnerable to weather and war.", "communication": "Public speech, messengers, and handwritten letters carry news. Theatre, the civic square, and the banquet are major social media.", "clothing": "Women and men drape wool or linen as chitons, peploi, and cloaks. Garments are pinned, belted, and shaped by status rather than tailored like modern clothes." }, "material_world_scenes": [ { "asset": "/assets/timeline/landmarks/03-431-bce/world-01.webp", "title": "Technology, science, and care", "description": "Bronze, iron, pottery, simple cranes, and shipbuilding sustain cities. Power still comes mainly from people, animals, wind, and water. Geometry, astronomy, inquiry into nature, and rational argument advance without modern measuring instruments or standardized experiments. Practitioners observe symptoms, diet, and seasons; healing sanctuaries and ritual treatment also remain common." }, { "asset": "/assets/timeline/landmarks/03-431-bce/world-02.webp", "title": "Travel and communication", "description": "Walking and animals dominate on land. Sailing ships and triremes connect islands, ports, and colonies. Public speech, messengers, and handwritten letters carry news. Theatre, the civic square, and the banquet are major social media." }, { "asset": "/assets/timeline/landmarks/03-431-bce/world-03.webp", "title": "Farming and food", "description": "Small farms, grain, vines, olives, goats, and sheep shape the diet; harvests remain vulnerable to weather and war." }, { "asset": "/assets/timeline/landmarks/03-431-bce/world-04.webp", "title": "Clothing, women and men", "description": "Women and men drape wool or linen as chitons, peploi, and cloaks. Garments are pinned, belted, and shaped by status rather than tailored like modern clothes." } ], "intellectual_tradition": { "id": "platonism", "label": "Socratic and Platonic thought" }, "period": { "id": "ancient", "label": "Antiquity" }, "languages": [ "grc", "en", "fr" ], "manifestations": [ { "coverage": "complete", "file": "data/corpus/normalized/socrates/plato_gorgias/representations/grc.ndjson", "language": "grc", "records": 81, "role": "original_carrier", "sha256": "6375206e2c0f5f63895c63ad84f2e4193caaf0e9b977b3ebbee150a974cdbb45", "source_id": "perseus-plato-gorgias-grc" }, { "coverage": "complete", "file": "data/corpus/normalized/socrates/plato_gorgias/representations/en.ndjson", "language": "en", "records": 81, "role": "historical_translation", "sha256": "9937810691c453868da6ec45248a969dae04575a84bebe600ec35a027685aa0c", "source_id": "perseus-plato-gorgias-en" }, { "coverage": "complete", "file": "data/corpus/normalized/socrates/plato_gorgias/representations/ai-generated/fr-gpt-5-6-sol-corpus-passage-translation-v1.ndjson", "generated_on": "2026-09-11", "language": "fr", "model": "gpt-5.6-sol", "official_status": "non_official", "prompt_version": "corpus-passage-translation-v1", "provider": "codex_subscription", "records": 81, "role": "ai_generated_translation_non_official", "sha256": "1672b73fb3bffbc60e73a797170f990f81f7705c94337417cbcdc6125e94649f", "source_id": "prokopton42-codex-translation:gpt-5.6-sol:corpus-passage-translation-v1", "translation_type": "ai_generated_translation" }, { "coverage": "complete", "file": "data/corpus/normalized/socrates/plato_gorgias_fr_carrier/representations/fr.ndjson", "language": "fr", "records": 1, "role": "historical_translation", "sha256": "4b9564c5c0a6b85cac39c19a5c63e22e96ec784408a36acb9bd633039e4474e7", "source_id": "wikisource-cousin-gorgias-fr-01" }, { "coverage": "complete", "file": "data/corpus/normalized/socrates/plato_gorgias_fr_carrier/representations/ai-generated/en-gpt-5-6-sol-corpus-passage-translation-v1.ndjson", "generated_on": "2026-09-11", "language": "en", "model": "gpt-5.6-sol", "official_status": "non_official", "prompt_version": "corpus-passage-translation-v1", "provider": "codex_subscription", "records": 1, "role": "ai_generated_translation_non_official", "sha256": "cf12413957fc07735d82d9845e2dd3a40ff64aaefde16714f85c1a63d0206994", "source_id": "prokopton42-codex-translation:gpt-5.6-sol:corpus-passage-translation-v1", "translation_type": "ai_generated_translation" } ], "concepts": [ { "id": "care_of_soul", "label": "Care of the soul" }, { "id": "courage", "label": "Courage" }, { "id": "elenchus", "label": "Elenchus" }, { "id": "ether_field", "label": "Ether and field" }, { "id": "faith", "label": "Faith" }, { "id": "family", "label": "Family" }, { "id": "friendship", "label": "Friendship" }, { "id": "justice", "label": "Justice" }, { "id": "knowledge", "label": "Knowledge" }, { "id": "logos_nature", "label": "Logos of nature" }, { "id": "memory", "label": "Memory" }, { "id": "pleasure", "label": "Pleasure" }, { "id": "prudent_choice", "label": "Prudent choice of pleasures" }, { "id": "reason", "label": "Reason" }, { "id": "sin", "label": "Sin" }, { "id": "time", "label": "Time" }, { "id": "truth", "label": "Truth" }, { "id": "wisdom", "label": "Wisdom" } ], "source_work_ids": [ "socrates.plato_gorgias", "socrates.plato_gorgias_fr_carrier" ], "passages": 81, "word_count": 42811, "word_counts_by_language": { "en": 42811, "fr": 43834, "grc": 27405 }, "editorial_status": "gpt_5_6_semantic_draft_v1", "structure": { "citation_scheme": "carrier-explicit-ancient-reference-v1", "kind": "native", "levels": [ { "key": "reference", "label_fr": "Référence", "label_en": "Reference" } ], "leaf_fr": "Passage", "leaf_en": "Passage" }, "canonical_passage_id": "passage:socrates.plato_gorgias:495", "canonical_ref": "495", "canonical_parent_ref": null, "canonical_parent_id": null, "representations": [ { "language": "grc", "text": "ΣΩ. ἦ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἄγω ἐνταῦθα, ὦ γενναῖε, ἢ ἐκεῖνος ὃς ἂν φῇ ἀνέδην οὕτω τοὺς χαίροντας, ὅπως ἂν χαίρωσιν, εὐδαίμονας εἶναι, καὶ μὴ διορίζηται τῶν ἡδονῶν ὁποῖαι ἀγαθαὶ καὶ κακαί; ἀλλʼ ἔτι καὶ νῦν λέγε πότερον φῂς εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἢ εἶναί τι τῶν ἡδέων ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν; ΚΑΛ. ἵνα δή μοι μὴ ἀνομολογούμενος ᾖ ὁ λόγος, ἐὰν ἕτερον φήσω εἶναι, τὸ αὐτό φημι εἶναι. ΣΩ. διαφθείρεις, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τοὺς πρώτους λόγους, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι μετʼ ἐμοῦ ἱκανῶς τὰ ὄντα ἐξετάζοις, εἴπερ παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα σαυτῷ ἐρεῖς. ΚΑΛ. καὶ γὰρ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. οὐ τοίνυν ὀρθῶς ποιῶ οὔτʼ ἐγώ, εἴπερ ποιῶ τοῦτο, οὔτε σύ. ἀλλʼ, ὦ μακάριε, ἄθρει μὴ οὐ τοῦτο ᾖ τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ πάντως χαίρειν· ταῦτά τε γὰρ τὰ νυνδὴ αἰνιχθέντα πολλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ φαίνεται συμβαίνοντα, εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά. ΚΑΛ. ὡς σύ γε οἴει, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. σὺ δὲ τῷ ὄντι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ταῦτα ἰσχυρίζῃ; ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἄρα τῷ λόγῳ ὡς σοῦ σπουδάζοντος; ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε σφόδρα. ΣΩ. ἴθι δή μοι, ἐπειδὴ οὕτω δοκεῖ, διελοῦ τάδε· ἐπιστήμην που καλεῖς τι; ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. οὐ καὶ ἀνδρείαν νυνδὴ ἔλεγές τινα εἶναι μετὰ ἐπιστήμης; ΚΑΛ. ἔλεγον γάρ. ΣΩ. ἄλλο τι οὖν ὡς ἕτερον τὴν ἀνδρείαν τῆς ἐπιστήμης δύο ταῦτα ἔλεγες; ΚΑΛ. σφόδρα γε. ΣΩ. τί δέ; ἡδονὴν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ταὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερον; ΚΑΛ. ἕτερον δήπου, ὦ σοφώτατε σύ. ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ ἀνδρείαν ἑτέραν ἡδονῆς; ΚΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΣΩ. φέρε δὴ ὅπως μεμνησόμεθα ταῦτα, ὅτι Καλλικλῆς ἔφη Ἀχαρνεὺς ἡδὺ μὲν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ταὐτὸν εἶναι, ἐπιστήμην δὲ καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ ἀλλήλων καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕτερον. ΚΑΛ. Σωκράτης δέ γε ἡμῖν ὁ Ἀλωπεκῆθεν οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ ταῦτα. ἢ ὁμολογεῖ; ΣΩ. οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ· οἶμαι δέ γε οὐδὲ Καλλικλῆς, ὅταν αὐτὸς αὑτὸν θεάσηται ὀρθῶς. εἰπὲ γάρ μοι, τοὺς εὖ πράττοντας τοῖς κακῶς πράττουσιν οὐ τοὐναντίον ἡγῇ πάθος πεπονθέναι; ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν, εἴπερ ἐναντία ἐστὶν ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις, ἀνάγκη περὶ αὐτῶν ἔχειν ὥσπερ περὶ ὑγιείας ἔχει καὶ νόσου; οὐ γὰρ ἅμα δήπου ὑγιαίνει τε καὶ νοσεῖ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲ ἅμα ἀπαλλάττεται ὑγιείας τε καὶ νόσου. ΚΑΛ. πῶς λέγεις;", "edition": "perseus-plato-gorgias-grc", "source_id": "perseus-plato-gorgias-grc", "translation_type": "original" }, { "language": "en", "text": "Soc. What, is it I who am leading it there, noble sir, or the person who says outright that those who enjoy themselves, with whatever kind of enjoyment, are happy, and draws no distinction between the good and bad sorts of pleasure? But come, try again now and tell me whether you say that pleasant and good are the same thing, or that there is some pleasure which is not good. Call. Then, so that my statement may not be inconsistent through my saying they are different, I say they are the same. Soc. You are spoiling your first statements, Callicles, and you can no longer be a fit partner with me in probing the truth, if you are going to speak against your own convictions. Call. Why, you do the same, Socrates. Soc. Then I am just as much in the wrong if I do, as you are. But look here, my gifted friend, perhaps the good is not mere unconditional enjoyment: for if it is, we have to face not only that string of shameful consequences I have just shadowed forth, but many more besides. Call. In your opinion, that is, Socrates. Soc. And do you, Callicles, really maintain that it is? Call. I do. Soc. Then are we to set about discussing it as your serious view? Call. Oh yes, to be sure. Soc. Come then, since that is your opinion, resolve me this: there is something, I suppose, that you call knowledge? Call. Yes. Soc. And were you not saying just now that knowledge can have a certain courage coupled with it? Call. Yes, I was. Soc. And you surely meant that they were two things, courage being distinct from knowledge? Call. Quite so. Soc. Well now, are pleasure and knowledge the same thing, or different? Call. Different, I presume, O sage of sages. Soc. And courage too, is that different from pleasure? Call. Of course it is. Soc. Come now, let us be sure to remember this, that Callicles the Acharnian said pleasant and good were the same, but knowledge and courage were different both from each other and from the good. Call. And Socrates of Alopece refuses to grant us this; or does he grant it? Soc. He does not; nor, I believe, will Callicles either, when he has rightly considered himself. For tell me, do you not regard people who are well off as being in the opposite condition to those who are badly off? Call. I do. Soc. Then if these conditions are opposite to each other, must not the same hold of them as of health and disease? For, you know, a man is never well and ill at the same time, nor gets rid of health and disease together. Call. How do you mean?", "translator": "Benjamin Jowett", "edition": "perseus-plato-gorgias-en", "source_id": "perseus-plato-gorgias-en", "translation_type": "historical_human_translation" }, { "language": "fr", "text": "Soc. Quoi ? Est-ce moi qui l'y entraîne, noble ami, ou celui qui affirme sans détour que les hommes qui jouissent, quel que soit le genre de leur jouissance, sont heureux, et qui n'établit aucune distinction entre les bons et les mauvais plaisirs ? Mais allons, essaie encore une fois et dis-moi si tu affirmes que l'agréable et le bon sont une seule et même chose, ou qu'il existe quelque plaisir qui ne soit pas bon. Cal. Afin que ma thèse ne devienne pas contradictoire si je dis qu'ils sont différents, j'affirme qu'ils sont identiques. Soc. Tu gâtes tes premières déclarations, Calliclès, et tu ne peux plus être pour moi un partenaire convenable dans la recherche de la vérité si tu dois parler contre tes propres convictions. Cal. Mais tu fais la même chose, Socrate. Soc. Si je le fais, j'ai donc exactement aussi tort que toi. Mais considère ceci, mon excellent ami : peut-être le bien ne consiste-t-il pas simplement à jouir sans aucune réserve. Car s'il en est ainsi, nous devons faire face non seulement à cette suite de conséquences honteuses que je viens d'esquisser, mais à beaucoup d'autres encore. Cal. Selon ton opinion, Socrate. Soc. Et toi, Calliclès, soutiens-tu réellement cette thèse ? Cal. Oui. Soc. Devons-nous donc entreprendre de la discuter comme exprimant ton opinion sérieuse ? Cal. Oui, assurément. Soc. Allons donc, puisque telle est ton opinion, explique-moi ceci : il y a, je suppose, quelque chose que tu appelles la connaissance ? Cal. Oui. Soc. Et ne disais-tu pas à l'instant qu'un certain courage peut être joint à la connaissance ? Cal. Oui, je le disais. Soc. Tu voulais assurément dire qu'il s'agissait de deux choses, le courage étant distinct de la connaissance ? Cal. Tout à fait. Soc. Maintenant, le plaisir et la connaissance sont-ils la même chose, ou sont-ils différents ? Cal. Différents, je présume, ô sage des sages. Soc. Et le courage aussi est-il différent du plaisir ? Cal. Bien sûr. Soc. Allons, veillons à nous souvenir de ceci : Calliclès d'Acharnes a dit que l'agréable et le bon étaient identiques, mais que la connaissance et le courage étaient différents tant l'un de l'autre que du bien. Cal. Et Socrate d'Alopèce refuse de nous l'accorder, ou bien l'accorde-t-il ? Soc. Il ne l'accorde pas, et je crois que Calliclès non plus ne l'accordera plus lorsqu'il se sera correctement examiné lui-même. Car dis-moi : ne considères-tu pas que ceux qui se trouvent bien sont dans l'état opposé de ceux qui se trouvent mal ? Cal. Si. Soc. Alors, si ces états sont opposés l'un à l'autre, ne doit-il pas en aller pour eux comme pour la santé et la maladie ? Car, tu le sais, un homme ne peut jamais être en même temps bien portant et malade, ni se défaire en même temps de la santé et de la maladie. Cal. Que veux-tu dire ?", "translator": "Codex gpt-5.6-sol", "edition": "Prokopton42 non-official AI translation, 2026-09-11", "source_id": "prokopton42-codex-translation:gpt-5.6-sol:corpus-passage-translation-v1", "translation_type": "ai_generated_translation", "official_status": "non_official", "generation_model": "gpt-5.6-sol" } ], "content_checksum": "2f50acb5fea747621efafeaa5aead8e91640016dcb60e31e4c8974a2a525b42e" }