{ "schema": "prokopton42-public-passage-v1", "id": "plato.theaetetus", "canonical_url": "https://prokopton42.com/en/works/plato/theaetetus/reference-160/", "language": "en", "title": "Theaetetus", "author": "Plato", "date": "c. 369-360 BCE", "summary": "Socrates asks the young Theaetetus what knowledge is. Perception, true judgement, and true judgement with an account are examined and rejected, while midwifery describes inquiry able to deliver ideas without guaranteeing them.", "learning": "Compare three definitions of knowledge, follow models of error, and understand the positive function of methodical aporia.", "long_summary": "Identifying knowledge with perception leads to Protagoras, flux, and a long defence that Socrates later subjects to difficulty. The second part studies error, memory, and several possible meanings of an account.\n\nThe dialogue ends without definition just before Socrates goes to answer Meletus’ charge. Aporia is not empty: it separates often-confused problems and tests Theaetetus’ character. The reported frame adds distance between conversation and text.", "historical_context": "The corpus manifests do not yet establish the precise place and circumstances of composition. The images below document the author’s world or the text’s transmission. They do not claim to show the exact scene of writing.", "material_world_label": "Classical Greek world, 5th century BCE", "material_world": { "technology": "Bronze, iron, pottery, simple cranes, and shipbuilding sustain cities. Power still comes mainly from people, animals, wind, and water.", "science": "Geometry, astronomy, inquiry into nature, and rational argument advance without modern measuring instruments or standardized experiments.", "medicine": "Practitioners observe symptoms, diet, and seasons; healing sanctuaries and ritual treatment also remain common.", "transport": "Walking and animals dominate on land. Sailing ships and triremes connect islands, ports, and colonies.", "agriculture": "Small farms, grain, vines, olives, goats, and sheep shape the diet; harvests remain vulnerable to weather and war.", "communication": "Public speech, messengers, and handwritten letters carry news. Theatre, the civic square, and the banquet are major social media.", "clothing": "Women and men drape wool or linen as chitons, peploi, and cloaks. Garments are pinned, belted, and shaped by status rather than tailored like modern clothes." }, "material_world_scenes": [ { "asset": "/assets/timeline/landmarks/03-431-bce/world-01.webp", "title": "Technology, science, and care", "description": "Bronze, iron, pottery, simple cranes, and shipbuilding sustain cities. Power still comes mainly from people, animals, wind, and water. Geometry, astronomy, inquiry into nature, and rational argument advance without modern measuring instruments or standardized experiments. Practitioners observe symptoms, diet, and seasons; healing sanctuaries and ritual treatment also remain common." }, { "asset": "/assets/timeline/landmarks/03-431-bce/world-02.webp", "title": "Travel and communication", "description": "Walking and animals dominate on land. Sailing ships and triremes connect islands, ports, and colonies. Public speech, messengers, and handwritten letters carry news. Theatre, the civic square, and the banquet are major social media." }, { "asset": "/assets/timeline/landmarks/03-431-bce/world-03.webp", "title": "Farming and food", "description": "Small farms, grain, vines, olives, goats, and sheep shape the diet; harvests remain vulnerable to weather and war." }, { "asset": "/assets/timeline/landmarks/03-431-bce/world-04.webp", "title": "Clothing, women and men", "description": "Women and men drape wool or linen as chitons, peploi, and cloaks. Garments are pinned, belted, and shaped by status rather than tailored like modern clothes." } ], "intellectual_tradition": { "id": "platonism", "label": "Socratic and Platonic thought" }, "period": { "id": "ancient", "label": "Antiquity" }, "languages": [ "grc", "en", "fr" ], "manifestations": [ { "coverage": "complete", "file": "data/corpus/normalized/plato/theaetetus/representations/grc.ndjson", "language": "grc", "records": 69, "role": "original", "sha256": "c0db0639eed082ad76edb4937a8b333e87fe2ad17ebac2e2ac28a39bf522510f", "source_id": "perseus-plato-theaetetus-grc" }, { "coverage": "complete", "file": "data/corpus/normalized/plato/theaetetus/representations/en.ndjson", "language": "en", "records": 69, "role": "historical_translation", "sha256": "5edebde70f179a0cc1eb228daf065e9d8e2b579b92b5ffbcf289d4735b8a9fb4", "source_id": "perseus-plato-theaetetus-en" }, { "coverage": "complete", "file": "data/corpus/normalized/plato/theaetetus/representations/ai-generated/fr-gpt-5-6-sol-corpus-passage-translation-v1.ndjson", "generated_on": "2026-09-11", "language": "fr", "model": "gpt-5.6-sol", "official_status": "non_official", "prompt_version": "corpus-passage-translation-v1", "provider": "codex_subscription", "records": 69, "role": "ai_generated_translation_non_official", "sha256": "8f03f03257c59e57306abb87f31e5b56d83bebfdcec3bf0d6c3e2af28f964e5f", "source_id": "prokopton42-codex-translation:gpt-5.6-sol:corpus-passage-translation-v1", "translation_type": "ai_generated_translation" }, { "coverage": "complete", "file": "data/corpus/normalized/plato/theaetetus_fr_carrier/representations/fr.ndjson", "language": "fr", "records": 1, "role": "historical_translation", "sha256": "c3a74081350f37adeca1cadf23f1eb59e45b611e04eb2f3a2376b5253c47253e", "source_id": "wikisource-cousin-theaetetus-fr-01" }, { "coverage": "complete", "file": "data/corpus/normalized/plato/theaetetus_fr_carrier/representations/ai-generated/en-gpt-5-6-sol-corpus-passage-translation-v1.ndjson", "generated_on": "2026-09-11", "language": "en", "model": "gpt-5.6-sol", "official_status": "non_official", "prompt_version": "corpus-passage-translation-v1", "provider": "codex_subscription", "records": 1, "role": "ai_generated_translation_non_official", "sha256": "2450e9bd6351d14e5668c869e79b3d5cd1ffd70c59fe5cbd84d73968eff0de2c", "source_id": "prokopton42-codex-translation:gpt-5.6-sol:corpus-passage-translation-v1", "translation_type": "ai_generated_translation" } ], "concepts": [ { "id": "care_of_soul", "label": "Care of the soul" }, { "id": "dialectic", "label": "Dialectic" }, { "id": "education", "label": "Education" }, { "id": "judgment", "label": "Judgment" }, { "id": "knowledge", "label": "Knowledge" }, { "id": "law", "label": "Law" }, { "id": "logos_nature", "label": "Logos of nature" }, { "id": "political_union", "label": "Political union" }, { "id": "reason", "label": "Reason" }, { "id": "roles", "label": "Roles and relationships" }, { "id": "sin", "label": "Sin" }, { "id": "wisdom", "label": "Wisdom" } ], "source_work_ids": [ "plato.theaetetus", "plato.theaetetus_fr_carrier" ], "passages": 69, "word_count": 34012, "word_counts_by_language": { "en": 34012, "fr": 33252, "grc": 23560 }, "editorial_status": "gpt_5_6_semantic_draft_v1", "structure": { "citation_scheme": "plato-stephanus-page-v1", "kind": "native", "levels": [ { "key": "stephanus_page", "label_fr": "Page Stephanus", "label_en": "Stephanus page" } ], "leaf_fr": "Passage", "leaf_en": "Passage" }, "canonical_passage_id": "passage:plato.theaetetus:160", "canonical_ref": "160", "canonical_parent_ref": null, "canonical_parent_id": null, "representations": [ { "language": "grc", "text": "ΣΩ. οὔκουν ἐγώ τε οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποτὲ γενήσομαι οὕτως αἰσθανόμενος· τοῦ γὰρ ἄλλου ἄλλη αἴσθησις, καὶ ἀλλοῖον καὶ ἄλλον ποιεῖ τὸν αἰσθανόμενον· οὔτʼ ἐκεῖνο τὸ ποιοῦν ἐμὲ μήποτʼ ἄλλῳ συνελθὸν ταὐτὸν γεννῆσαν τοιοῦτον γένηται· ἀπὸ γὰρ ἄλλου ἄλλο γεννῆσαν ἀλλοῖον γενήσεται. ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστι ταῦτα. ΣΩ. οὐδὲ μὴν ἔγωγε ἐμαυτῷ τοιοῦτος, ἐκεῖνό τε ἑαυτῷ τοιοῦτον γενήσεται. ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ΣΩ. ἀνάγκη δέ γε ἐμέ τε τινὸς γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν αἰσθανόμενος γίγνωμαι· αἰσθανόμενον γάρ, μηδενὸς δὲ αἰσθανόμενον, ἀδύνατον γίγνεσθαι· ἐκεῖνό τε τινὶ γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν γλυκὺ ἢ πικρὸν ἤ τι τοιοῦτον γίγνηται· γλυκὺ γάρ, μηδενὶ δὲ γλυκὺ ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι. ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. λείπεται δὴ οἶμαι ἡμῖν ἀλλήλοις, εἴτʼ ἐσμέν, εἶναι, εἴτε γιγνόμεθα, γίγνεσθαι, ἐπείπερ ἡμῶν ἡ ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν συνδεῖ μέν, συνδεῖ δὲ οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδʼ αὖ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. ἀλλήλοις δὴ λείπεται συνδεδέσθαι. ὥστε εἴτε τις εἶναί τι ὀνομάζει, τινὶ εἶναι ἢ τινὸς ἢ πρός τι ῥητέον αὐτῷ, εἴτε γίγνεσθαι· αὐτὸ δὲ ἐφʼ αὑτοῦ τι ἢ ὂν ἢ γιγνόμενον οὔτε αὐτῷ λεκτέον οὔτʼ ἄλλου λέγοντος ἀποδεκτέον, ὡς ὁ λόγος ὃν διεληλύθαμεν σημαίνει. ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὅτε δὴ τὸ ἐμὲ ποιοῦν ἐμοί ἐστιν καὶ οὐκ ἄλλῳ, ἐγὼ καὶ αἰσθάνομαι αὐτοῦ, ἄλλος δʼ οὔ; ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΣΩ. ἀληθὴς ἄρα ἐμοὶ ἡ ἐμὴ αἴσθησις—τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς οὐσίας ἀεί ἐστιν—καὶ ἐγὼ κριτὴς κατὰ τὸν Πρωταγόραν τῶν τε ὄντων ἐμοὶ ὡς ἔστι, καὶ τῶν μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν. ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν. ΣΩ. πῶς ἂν οὖν ἀψευδὴς ὢν καὶ μὴ πταίων τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ τὰ ὄντα ἢ γιγνόμενα οὐκ ἐπιστήμων ἂν εἴην ὧνπερ αἰσθητής; ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδαμῶς ὅπως οὔ. ΣΩ. παγκάλως ἄρα σοι εἴρηται ὅτι ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἢ αἴσθησις, καὶ εἰς ταὐτὸν συμπέπτωκεν, κατὰ μὲν Ὅμηρον καὶ Ἡράκλειτον καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον φῦλον οἷον ῥεύματα κινεῖσθαι τὰ πάντα, κατὰ δὲ Πρωταγόραν τὸν σοφώτατον πάντων χρημάτων ἄνθρωπον μέτρον εἶναι, κατὰ δὲ Θεαίτητον τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων αἴσθησιν ἐπιστήμην γίγνεσθαι. ἦ γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε; φῶμεν τοῦτο σὸν μὲν εἶναι οἷον νεογενὲς παιδίον, ἐμὸν δὲ μαίευμα; ἢ πῶς λέγεις; ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.", "edition": "perseus-plato-theaetetus-grc", "source_id": "perseus-plato-theaetetus-grc", "translation_type": "original" }, { "language": "en", "text": "SOC. Then I shall never have this perception of any other thing; for a perception of another thing is another perception, and makes the percipient different and other: nor can that which acts on me ever by union with another produce the same result or become the same in kind; for by producing another result from another passive element it will become different in kind. THEAET. That is true. SOC. And neither shall I, furthermore, ever again become the same as I am, nor will that ever become the same as it is. THEAET. No. SOC. And yet, when I become percipient, I must necessarily become percipient of something, for it is impossible to become percipient and perceive nothing; and that which is perceived must become so to someone, when it becomes sweet or bitter or the like; for to become sweet, but sweet to no one, is impossible. THEAET. Perfectly true. SOC. The result, then, I think, is that we (the active and the passive elements) are or become, whichever is the case, in relation to one another, since we are bound to one another by the inevitable law of our being, but to nothing else, not even to ourselves. The result, then, is that we are bound to one another; and so if a man says anything is, he must say it is to or of or in relation to something, and similarly if he says it becomes ; but he must not say it is or becomes absolutely, nor can he accept such a statement from anyone else. That is the meaning of the doctrine we have been describing. THEAET. Yes, quite so, Socrates. SOC. Then, since that which acts on me is to me and to me only, it is also the case that I perceive it, and I only? THEAET. Of course. SOC. Then to me my perception is true; for in each case it is always part of my being; and I am, as Protagoras says, the judge of the existence of the things that are to me and of the non-existence of those that are not to me. THEAET. So it seems. SOC. How, then, if I am an infallible judge and my mind never stumbles in regard to the things that are or that become, can I fail to know that which I perceive? THEAET. You cannot possibly fail. SOC. Therefore you were quite right in saying that knowledge is nothing else than perception, and there is complete identity between the doctrine of Homer and Heracleitus and all their followers—that all things are in motion, like streams—the doctrine of the great philosopher Protagoras that man is the measure of all things—and the doctrine of Theaetetus that, since these things are true, perception is knowledge. Eh, Theaetetus? Shall we say that this is, so to speak, your new-born child and the result of my midwifery? Or what shall we say? THEAET. We must say that, Socrates.", "translator": "Benjamin Jowett", "edition": "perseus-plato-theaetetus-en", "source_id": "perseus-plato-theaetetus-en", "translation_type": "historical_human_translation" }, { "language": "fr", "text": "SOC. Je n’aurai donc jamais cette perception d’une autre chose, car la perception d’une autre chose est une autre perception et rend celui qui perçoit différent et autre. De même, ce qui agit sur moi ne pourra jamais, par son union avec autre chose, produire le même résultat ni devenir de même nature, car, en produisant un autre résultat à partir d’un autre élément passif, cela deviendra d’une nature différente. THÉÉT. C’est vrai. SOC. Et moi non plus, en outre, je ne redeviendrai jamais identique à ce que je suis, ni cela identique à ce que cela est. THÉÉT. Non. SOC. Pourtant, lorsque je deviens capable de percevoir, je dois nécessairement percevoir quelque chose, car il est impossible de devenir capable de percevoir sans rien percevoir. Et ce qui est perçu doit le devenir pour quelqu’un lorsque cela devient doux, amer ou semblable, car il est impossible de devenir doux sans être doux pour personne. THÉÉT. C’est parfaitement vrai. SOC. Le résultat, je pense, est donc que nous, c’est-à-dire les éléments actif et passif, sommes ou devenons, selon le cas, l’un par rapport à l’autre, puisque nous sommes liés l’un à l’autre par la loi inévitable de notre être, mais que nous ne le sommes par rapport à rien d’autre, pas même à nous-mêmes. Il en résulte donc que nous sommes liés l’un à l’autre. Ainsi, si quelqu’un dit qu’une chose est, il doit dire qu’elle est pour quelque chose, de quelque chose ou par rapport à quelque chose, et de même s’il dit qu’elle devient. Mais il ne doit pas dire qu’elle est ou devient absolument, ni accepter d’un autre une telle affirmation. Tel est le sens de la doctrine que nous décrivons. THÉÉT. Oui, tout à fait, Socrate. SOC. Alors, puisque ce qui agit sur moi est pour moi et pour moi seul, il s’ensuit aussi que je le perçois, et moi seul ? THÉÉT. Bien sûr. SOC. Ma perception est donc vraie pour moi, car elle fait toujours, dans chaque cas, partie de mon être. Et je suis, comme le dit Protagoras, juge de l’existence des choses qui sont pour moi et de la non-existence de celles qui ne sont pas pour moi. THÉÉT. Il semble bien. SOC. Comment donc, si je suis un juge infaillible et si mon esprit ne trébuche jamais au sujet des choses qui sont ou deviennent, pourrais-je ne pas connaître ce que je perçois ? THÉÉT. Tu ne peux absolument pas ne pas le connaître. SOC. Tu avais donc parfaitement raison de dire que la connaissance n’est rien d’autre que la perception. Il existe une identité complète entre la doctrine d’Homère, d’Héraclite et de tous leurs disciples, selon laquelle toutes choses sont en mouvement comme des courants, celle du grand philosophe Protagoras, selon laquelle l’homme est la mesure de toutes choses, et celle de Théétète, selon laquelle, puisque ces doctrines sont vraies, la perception est connaissance. Eh bien, Théétète ? Dirons-nous que c’est là, pour ainsi dire, ton nouveau-né et le résultat de mon art obstétrical ? Ou que dirons-nous ? THÉÉT. Il nous faut le dire, Socrate.", "translator": "Codex gpt-5.6-sol", "edition": "Prokopton42 non-official AI translation, 2026-09-11", "source_id": "prokopton42-codex-translation:gpt-5.6-sol:corpus-passage-translation-v1", "translation_type": "ai_generated_translation", "official_status": "non_official", "generation_model": "gpt-5.6-sol" } ], "content_checksum": "2568f2effe302cb7ceee1262c4da54afd75ef65a23a678a0b75bd237e564853b" }