{ "schema": "prokopton42-public-passage-v1", "id": "plato.theaetetus", "canonical_url": "https://prokopton42.com/en/works/plato/theaetetus/reference-163/", "language": "en", "title": "Theaetetus", "author": "Plato", "date": "c. 369-360 BCE", "summary": "Socrates asks the young Theaetetus what knowledge is. Perception, true judgement, and true judgement with an account are examined and rejected, while midwifery describes inquiry able to deliver ideas without guaranteeing them.", "learning": "Compare three definitions of knowledge, follow models of error, and understand the positive function of methodical aporia.", "long_summary": "Identifying knowledge with perception leads to Protagoras, flux, and a long defence that Socrates later subjects to difficulty. The second part studies error, memory, and several possible meanings of an account.\n\nThe dialogue ends without definition just before Socrates goes to answer Meletus’ charge. Aporia is not empty: it separates often-confused problems and tests Theaetetus’ character. The reported frame adds distance between conversation and text.", "historical_context": "The corpus manifests do not yet establish the precise place and circumstances of composition. The images below document the author’s world or the text’s transmission. They do not claim to show the exact scene of writing.", "material_world_label": "Classical Greek world, 5th century BCE", "material_world": { "technology": "Bronze, iron, pottery, simple cranes, and shipbuilding sustain cities. Power still comes mainly from people, animals, wind, and water.", "science": "Geometry, astronomy, inquiry into nature, and rational argument advance without modern measuring instruments or standardized experiments.", "medicine": "Practitioners observe symptoms, diet, and seasons; healing sanctuaries and ritual treatment also remain common.", "transport": "Walking and animals dominate on land. Sailing ships and triremes connect islands, ports, and colonies.", "agriculture": "Small farms, grain, vines, olives, goats, and sheep shape the diet; harvests remain vulnerable to weather and war.", "communication": "Public speech, messengers, and handwritten letters carry news. Theatre, the civic square, and the banquet are major social media.", "clothing": "Women and men drape wool or linen as chitons, peploi, and cloaks. Garments are pinned, belted, and shaped by status rather than tailored like modern clothes." }, "material_world_scenes": [ { "asset": "/assets/timeline/landmarks/03-431-bce/world-01.webp", "title": "Technology, science, and care", "description": "Bronze, iron, pottery, simple cranes, and shipbuilding sustain cities. Power still comes mainly from people, animals, wind, and water. Geometry, astronomy, inquiry into nature, and rational argument advance without modern measuring instruments or standardized experiments. Practitioners observe symptoms, diet, and seasons; healing sanctuaries and ritual treatment also remain common." }, { "asset": "/assets/timeline/landmarks/03-431-bce/world-02.webp", "title": "Travel and communication", "description": "Walking and animals dominate on land. Sailing ships and triremes connect islands, ports, and colonies. Public speech, messengers, and handwritten letters carry news. Theatre, the civic square, and the banquet are major social media." }, { "asset": "/assets/timeline/landmarks/03-431-bce/world-03.webp", "title": "Farming and food", "description": "Small farms, grain, vines, olives, goats, and sheep shape the diet; harvests remain vulnerable to weather and war." }, { "asset": "/assets/timeline/landmarks/03-431-bce/world-04.webp", "title": "Clothing, women and men", "description": "Women and men drape wool or linen as chitons, peploi, and cloaks. Garments are pinned, belted, and shaped by status rather than tailored like modern clothes." } ], "intellectual_tradition": { "id": "platonism", "label": "Socratic and Platonic thought" }, "period": { "id": "ancient", "label": "Antiquity" }, "languages": [ "grc", "en", "fr" ], "manifestations": [ { "coverage": "complete", "file": "data/corpus/normalized/plato/theaetetus/representations/grc.ndjson", "language": "grc", "records": 69, "role": "original", "sha256": "c0db0639eed082ad76edb4937a8b333e87fe2ad17ebac2e2ac28a39bf522510f", "source_id": "perseus-plato-theaetetus-grc" }, { "coverage": "complete", "file": "data/corpus/normalized/plato/theaetetus/representations/en.ndjson", "language": "en", "records": 69, "role": "historical_translation", "sha256": "5edebde70f179a0cc1eb228daf065e9d8e2b579b92b5ffbcf289d4735b8a9fb4", "source_id": "perseus-plato-theaetetus-en" }, { "coverage": "complete", "file": "data/corpus/normalized/plato/theaetetus/representations/ai-generated/fr-gpt-5-6-sol-corpus-passage-translation-v1.ndjson", "generated_on": "2026-09-11", "language": "fr", "model": "gpt-5.6-sol", "official_status": "non_official", "prompt_version": "corpus-passage-translation-v1", "provider": "codex_subscription", "records": 69, "role": "ai_generated_translation_non_official", "sha256": "8f03f03257c59e57306abb87f31e5b56d83bebfdcec3bf0d6c3e2af28f964e5f", "source_id": "prokopton42-codex-translation:gpt-5.6-sol:corpus-passage-translation-v1", "translation_type": "ai_generated_translation" }, { "coverage": "complete", "file": "data/corpus/normalized/plato/theaetetus_fr_carrier/representations/fr.ndjson", "language": "fr", "records": 1, "role": "historical_translation", "sha256": "c3a74081350f37adeca1cadf23f1eb59e45b611e04eb2f3a2376b5253c47253e", "source_id": "wikisource-cousin-theaetetus-fr-01" }, { "coverage": "complete", "file": "data/corpus/normalized/plato/theaetetus_fr_carrier/representations/ai-generated/en-gpt-5-6-sol-corpus-passage-translation-v1.ndjson", "generated_on": "2026-09-11", "language": "en", "model": "gpt-5.6-sol", "official_status": "non_official", "prompt_version": "corpus-passage-translation-v1", "provider": "codex_subscription", "records": 1, "role": "ai_generated_translation_non_official", "sha256": "2450e9bd6351d14e5668c869e79b3d5cd1ffd70c59fe5cbd84d73968eff0de2c", "source_id": "prokopton42-codex-translation:gpt-5.6-sol:corpus-passage-translation-v1", "translation_type": "ai_generated_translation" } ], "concepts": [ { "id": "beneficence", "label": "Beneficence" }, { "id": "care_of_soul", "label": "Care of the soul" }, { "id": "dialectic", "label": "Dialectic" }, { "id": "ether_field", "label": "Ether and field" }, { "id": "forms", "label": "Intelligible forms" }, { "id": "justice", "label": "Justice" }, { "id": "knowledge", "label": "Knowledge" }, { "id": "logos_nature", "label": "Logos of nature" }, { "id": "memory", "label": "Memory" }, { "id": "reason", "label": "Reason" }, { "id": "roles", "label": "Roles and relationships" }, { "id": "service", "label": "Service" }, { "id": "sin", "label": "Sin" }, { "id": "time", "label": "Time" }, { "id": "war_and_peace", "label": "War and peace" } ], "source_work_ids": [ "plato.theaetetus", "plato.theaetetus_fr_carrier" ], "passages": 69, "word_count": 34012, "word_counts_by_language": { "en": 34012, "fr": 33252, "grc": 23560 }, "editorial_status": "gpt_5_6_semantic_draft_v1", "structure": { "citation_scheme": "plato-stephanus-page-v1", "kind": "native", "levels": [ { "key": "stephanus_page", "label_fr": "Page Stephanus", "label_en": "Stephanus page" } ], "leaf_fr": "Passage", "leaf_en": "Passage" }, "canonical_passage_id": "passage:plato.theaetetus:163", "canonical_ref": "163", "canonical_parent_ref": null, "canonical_parent_id": null, "representations": [ { "language": "grc", "text": "ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλʼ οὐ δίκαιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὔτε σὺ οὔτε ἂν ἡμεῖς φαῖμεν. ΣΩ. ἄλλῃ δὴ σκεπτέον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὡς ὅ τε σὸς καὶ ὁ Θεοδώρου λόγος. ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἄλλῃ. ΣΩ. τῇδε δὴ σκοπῶμεν εἰ ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη τε καὶ αἴσθησις ταὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερον. εἰς γὰρ τοῦτό που πᾶς ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἔτεινεν, καὶ τούτου χάριν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα ταῦτα ἐκινήσαμεν. οὐ γάρ; ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. ἦ οὖν ὁμολογήσομεν, ἃ τῷ ὁρᾶν αἰσθανόμεθα ἢ τῷ ἀκούειν, πάντα ταῦτα ἅμα καὶ ἐπίστασθαι; οἷον τῶν βαρβάρων πρὶν μαθεῖν τὴν φωνὴν πότερον οὐ φήσομεν ἀκούειν ὅταν φθέγγωνται, ἢ ἀκούειν τε καὶ ἐπίστασθαι ἃ λέγουσι; καὶ αὖ γράμματα μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι, βλέποντες εἰς αὐτὰ πότερον οὐχ ὁρᾶν ἢ ἐπίστασθαι εἴπερ ὁρῶμεν διισχυριούμεθα; ΘΕΑΙ. αὐτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο αὐτῶν, ὅπερ ὁρῶμέν τε καὶ ἀκούομεν, ἐπίστασθαι φήσομεν· τῶν μὲν γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὸ χρῶμα ὁρᾶν τε καὶ ἐπίστασθαι, τῶν δὲ τὴν ὀξύτητα καὶ βαρύτητα ἀκούειν τε ἅμα καὶ εἰδέναι· ἃ δὲ οἵ τε γραμματισταὶ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ οἱ ἑρμηνῆς διδάσκουσιν, οὔτε αἰσθάνεσθαι τῷ ὁρᾶν ἢ ἀκούειν οὔτε ἐπίστασθαι. ΣΩ. ἄριστά γʼ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, καὶ οὐκ ἄξιόν σοι πρὸς ταῦτα ἀμφισβητῆσαι, ἵνα καὶ αὐξάνῃ. ἀλλʼ ὅρα δὴ καὶ τόδε ἄλλο προσιόν, καὶ σκόπει πῇ αὐτὸ διωσόμεθα. ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον δή; ΣΩ. τὸ τοιόνδε· εἴ τις ἔροιτο· ἆρα δυνατὸν ὅτου τις ἐπιστήμων γένοιτό ποτε, ἔτι ἔχοντα μνήμην αὐτοῦ τούτου καὶ σῳζόμενον, τότε ὅτε μέμνηται μὴ ἐπίστασθαι αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὃ μέμνηται; μακρολογῶ δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, βουλόμενος ἐρέσθαι εἰ μαθών τίς τι μεμνημένος μὴ οἶδε. ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες; τέρας γὰρ ἂν εἴη ὃ λέγεις. ΣΩ. μὴ οὖν ἐγὼ ληρῶ; σκόπει δέ. ἆρα τὸ ὁρᾶν οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι λέγεις καὶ τὴν ὄψιν αἴσθησιν; ΘΕΑΙ. ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὁ ἰδών τι ἐπιστήμων ἐκείνου γέγονεν ὃ εἶδεν κατὰ τὸν ἄρτι λόγον; ΘΕΑΙ. ναί. ΣΩ. τί δέ; μνήμην οὐ λέγεις μέντοι τι; ΘΕΑΙ. ναί. ΣΩ. πότερον οὐδενὸς ἢ τινός; ΘΕΑΙ. τινὸς δήπου. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὧν ἔμαθε καὶ ὧν ᾔσθετο, τοιουτωνί τινων; ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν; ΣΩ. ὃ δὴ εἶδέ τις, μέμνηταί που ἐνίοτε; ΘΕΑΙ. μέμνηται. ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ μύσας; ἢ τοῦτο δράσας ἐπελάθετο; ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ δεινόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτό γε φάναι.", "edition": "perseus-plato-theaetetus-grc", "source_id": "perseus-plato-theaetetus-grc", "translation_type": "original" }, { "language": "en", "text": "THEAET. That would not be right, Socrates; neither you nor we would think so. SOC. Apparently, then, you and Theodorus mean we must look at the matter in a different way. THEAET. Yes, certainly in a different way. SOC. Well, then, let us look at it in this way, raising the question whether knowledge is after all the same as perception, or different. For that is the object of all our discussion, and it was to answer that question than we stirred up all these strange doctrines, was it not? THEAET. Most assuredly. SOC. Shall we then agree that all that we perceive by sight or hearing we know? For instance, shall we say that before having learned the language of foreigners we do not hear them when they speak, or that we both hear and know what they say? And again, if we do not know the letters, shall we maintain that we do not see them when we look at them or that if we really see them we know them? THEAET. We shall say, Socrates, that we know just so much of them as we hear or see: in the case of the letters, we both see and know the form and color, and in the spoken language we both hear and at the same time know the higher and lower notes of the voice; but we do not perceive through sight or hearing, and we do not know, what the grammarians and interpreters teach about them. SOC. First-rate, Theaetetus! and it is a pity to dispute that, for I want you to grow. But look out for another trouble that is yonder coming towards us, and see how we can repel it. THEAET. What is it? SOC. It is like this: If anyone should ask, Is it possible, if a man has ever known a thing and still has and preserves a memory of that thing, that he does not, at the time when he remembers, know that very thing which he remembers? I seem to be pretty long winded; but I merely want to ask if a man who has learned a thing does not know it when he remembers it. THEAET. Of course he does, Socrates; for what you suggest would be monstrous. SOC. Am I crazy, then? Look here. Do you not say that seeing is perceiving and that sight is perception? THEAET. I do. SOC. Then, according to what we have just said, the man who has seen a thing has acquired knowledge of that which he has seen? THEAET. Yes. SOC. Well, then, do you not admit that there is such a thing as memory? THEAET. Yes. SOC. Memory of nothing or of something? THEAET. Of something, surely. SOC. Of things he has learned and perceived—that sort of things? THEAET. Of course. SOC. A man sometimes remembers what he has seen, does he not? THEAET. He does. SOC. Even when he shuts his eyes, or does he forget if he does that? THEAET. It would be absurd to say that, Socrates.", "translator": "Benjamin Jowett", "edition": "perseus-plato-theaetetus-en", "source_id": "perseus-plato-theaetetus-en", "translation_type": "historical_human_translation" }, { "language": "fr", "text": "THÉÉT. Ce ne serait pas juste, Socrate. Ni toi ni nous ne le penserions. SOC. Apparemment, toi et Théodore voulez donc dire qu’il nous faut examiner la question d’une autre manière. THÉÉT. Oui, certainement d’une autre manière. SOC. Eh bien donc, examinons-la ainsi, en demandant si la connaissance est après tout identique à la perception, ou si elle en diffère. Car tel est le but de toute notre discussion, et c’est pour répondre à cette question que nous avons soulevé toutes ces étranges doctrines, n’est-ce pas ? THÉÉT. Très certainement. SOC. Conviendrons-nous donc que tout ce que nous percevons par la vue ou l’ouïe, nous le connaissons ? Par exemple, dirons-nous qu’avant d’avoir appris la langue des étrangers, nous ne les entendons pas lorsqu’ils parlent, ou que nous entendons et connaissons à la fois ce qu’ils disent ? Et encore, si nous ne connaissons pas les lettres, soutiendrons-nous que nous ne les voyons pas lorsque nous les regardons, ou que, si nous les voyons réellement, nous les connaissons ? THÉÉT. Nous dirons, Socrate, que nous en connaissons précisément ce que nous en entendons ou voyons. Dans le cas des lettres, nous voyons et connaissons à la fois leur forme et leur couleur. Dans le langage parlé, nous entendons et connaissons en même temps les sons plus aigus et plus graves de la voix. Mais ce que les grammairiens et les interprètes nous enseignent à leur sujet, nous ne le percevons pas par la vue ou l’ouïe et nous ne le connaissons pas. SOC. Parfait, Théétète ! Et il serait dommage de contester cela, car je veux que tu progresses. Mais prends garde à une autre difficulté qui s’avance là-bas vers nous, et vois comment nous pouvons la repousser. THÉÉT. Quelle est-elle ? SOC. La voici : si quelqu’un demandait s’il est possible qu’un homme, après avoir connu une chose et alors qu’il en possède et en conserve encore le souvenir, ne connaisse pas, au moment où il se la rappelle, cette chose même dont il se souvient. J’ai l’air, semble-t-il, assez prolixe, mais je veux simplement demander si un homme qui a appris une chose ne la connaît pas lorsqu’il s’en souvient. THÉÉT. Bien sûr qu’il la connaît, Socrate. Car ce que tu suggères serait monstrueux. SOC. Suis-je donc fou ? Regarde. Ne dis-tu pas que voir, c’est percevoir, et que la vue est une perception ? THÉÉT. Si. SOC. Selon ce que nous venons de dire, l’homme qui a vu une chose a donc acquis la connaissance de ce qu’il a vu ? THÉÉT. Oui. SOC. Eh bien donc, n’admets-tu pas qu’il existe quelque chose qu’on appelle mémoire ? THÉÉT. Si. SOC. Mémoire de rien, ou de quelque chose ? THÉÉT. De quelque chose, assurément. SOC. Des choses qu’il a apprises et perçues, de choses de cette sorte ? THÉÉT. Bien sûr. SOC. Un homme se souvient parfois de ce qu’il a vu, n’est-ce pas ? THÉÉT. Oui. SOC. Même lorsqu’il ferme les yeux, ou bien l’oublie-t-il s’il le fait ? THÉÉT. Il serait absurde de le dire, Socrate.", "translator": "Codex gpt-5.6-sol", "edition": "Prokopton42 non-official AI translation, 2026-09-11", "source_id": "prokopton42-codex-translation:gpt-5.6-sol:corpus-passage-translation-v1", "translation_type": "ai_generated_translation", "official_status": "non_official", "generation_model": "gpt-5.6-sol" } ], "content_checksum": "aaa4f6f3745d2324b45ed9b18c77017a477b4b7ce99140d9bab3992b4667bbe8" }