{
    "schema": "prokopton42-public-passage-v1",
    "id": "spinoza.ethics_fr",
    "canonical_url": "https://prokopton42.com/en/works/spinoza/ethics-fr/reference-section-0235/",
    "language": "en",
    "title": "Ethics, Émile Saisset’s French Translation",
    "author": "Baruch Spinoza",
    "date": "composed c. 1661-1675; published in 1677",
    "summary": "Émile Saisset’s translation gives the demonstrative architecture of Spinoza’s Ethics in French. God identified with Nature, mind-body parallelism, analysis of passions, and intellectual blessedness unfold through nineteenth-century terminology.",
    "learning": "Understand the Ethics’ five movements, recognize Saisset’s lexical mediation, and compare a proposition with its proof and scholium.",
    "long_summary": "Definitions, propositions, proofs, and scholia construct a system in which everything follows from divine and natural necessity. The individual strives to persist, encounters other powers, forms more or less adequate ideas, and can convert some passive affects into rational activity.\n\nThis manifestation is not a separate work composed in French by Spinoza. Saisset interprets the Latin through choices concerning substance, soul, understanding, and freedom. Comparing representations reveals mediation without assigning demonstrated claims to the translator.",
    "historical_context": "The corpus manifests do not yet establish the precise place and circumstances of composition. The images below document the author’s world or the text’s transmission. They do not claim to show the exact scene of writing.",
    "material_world_label": "Europe and the Atlantic, 15th-17th centuries",
    "material_world": {
        "technology": "Printing, artillery, clocks, ocean-going sail, and navigational instruments change the scale of states, trade, and travel.",
        "science": "Instrumented observation, calculation, anatomy, and astronomy gradually challenge inherited frameworks. Practice remains mixed with ancient authority.",
        "medicine": "Dissection, surgery, plants, and pharmacopoeias expand, but infection, pain, and epidemics remain poorly controlled.",
        "transport": "Walking, horses, coaches, river boats, and great sailing ships. Crossing an ocean takes weeks or months and remains dangerous.",
        "agriculture": "Grain, livestock, and gardens predominate; Atlantic exchange moves maize, potatoes, tomatoes, sugar, and animals with major consequences.",
        "communication": "Printed books, broadsheets, letters, and regular posts speed circulation without making it instant.",
        "clothing": "Doublets, breeches, structured dresses, caps, ruffs, and cloaks use wool, linen, silk, and lace; rank strongly controls silhouette."
    },
    "material_world_scenes": [
        {
            "asset": "/assets/timeline/landmarks/19-1610-ce/world-01.webp",
            "title": "Technology, science, and care",
            "description": "Printing, artillery, clocks, ocean-going sail, and navigational instruments change the scale of states, trade, and travel. Instrumented observation, calculation, anatomy, and astronomy gradually challenge inherited frameworks. Practice remains mixed with ancient authority. Dissection, surgery, plants, and pharmacopoeias expand, but infection, pain, and epidemics remain poorly controlled."
        },
        {
            "asset": "/assets/timeline/landmarks/19-1610-ce/world-02.webp",
            "title": "Travel and communication",
            "description": "Walking, horses, coaches, river boats, and great sailing ships. Crossing an ocean takes weeks or months and remains dangerous. Printed books, broadsheets, letters, and regular posts speed circulation without making it instant."
        },
        {
            "asset": "/assets/timeline/landmarks/19-1610-ce/world-03.webp",
            "title": "Farming and food",
            "description": "Grain, livestock, and gardens predominate; Atlantic exchange moves maize, potatoes, tomatoes, sugar, and animals with major consequences."
        },
        {
            "asset": "/assets/timeline/landmarks/19-1610-ce/world-04.webp",
            "title": "Clothing, women and men",
            "description": "Doublets, breeches, structured dresses, caps, ruffs, and cloaks use wool, linen, silk, and lace; rank strongly controls silhouette."
        }
    ],
    "intellectual_tradition": {
        "id": "modern-philosophy",
        "label": "Modern and contemporary philosophy"
    },
    "period": {
        "id": "modern",
        "label": "Modern era"
    },
    "languages": [
        "fr",
        "en"
    ],
    "manifestations": [
        {
            "coverage": "complete",
            "file": "data/corpus/normalized/spinoza/ethics_fr/representations/fr.ndjson",
            "language": "fr",
            "records": 300,
            "role": "complete_source_selection",
            "sha256": "b7ea7c38a17ad498de6a5c1b70e08a735f3f8355aa8401b67550b5c0b693dfbf",
            "source_id": "ethics_fr"
        },
        {
            "coverage": "complete",
            "file": "data/corpus/normalized/spinoza/ethics_fr/representations/ai-generated/en-gpt-5-6-sol-corpus-passage-translation-v1.ndjson",
            "generated_on": "2026-09-11",
            "language": "en",
            "model": "gpt-5.6-sol",
            "official_status": "non_official",
            "prompt_version": "corpus-passage-translation-v1",
            "provider": "codex_subscription",
            "records": 300,
            "role": "ai_generated_translation_non_official",
            "sha256": "f4550f8b900e11b7c2e4e9204c8448d5010d66f8dbd78f621ef9c58a44728caa",
            "source_id": "prokopton42-codex-translation:gpt-5.6-sol:corpus-passage-translation-v1",
            "translation_type": "ai_generated_translation"
        }
    ],
    "concepts": [
        {
            "id": "adequate_idea",
            "label": "Adequate idea"
        },
        {
            "id": "affects",
            "label": "Affects"
        },
        {
            "id": "attribute",
            "label": "Attribute"
        },
        {
            "id": "care_of_soul",
            "label": "Care of the soul"
        },
        {
            "id": "conatus",
            "label": "Conatus"
        },
        {
            "id": "desire",
            "label": "Desire"
        },
        {
            "id": "family",
            "label": "Family"
        },
        {
            "id": "freedom",
            "label": "Freedom"
        },
        {
            "id": "honestum_and_utility",
            "label": "Moral rightness and utility"
        },
        {
            "id": "intellectual_love",
            "label": "Intellectual love of God"
        },
        {
            "id": "law",
            "label": "Law"
        },
        {
            "id": "liberation",
            "label": "Liberation"
        },
        {
            "id": "mode",
            "label": "Mode"
        },
        {
            "id": "nature",
            "label": "Nature"
        },
        {
            "id": "necessity",
            "label": "Necessity"
        },
        {
            "id": "power_to_act",
            "label": "Power to act"
        },
        {
            "id": "reason",
            "label": "Reason"
        },
        {
            "id": "substance",
            "label": "Substance"
        },
        {
            "id": "suffering",
            "label": "Suffering"
        },
        {
            "id": "virtue",
            "label": "Virtue"
        },
        {
            "id": "war_and_peace",
            "label": "War and peace"
        }
    ],
    "source_work_ids": [
        "spinoza.ethics_fr"
    ],
    "passages": 300,
    "word_count": 92036,
    "word_counts_by_language": {
        "en": 92036,
        "fr": 96231
    },
    "editorial_status": "gpt_5_6_semantic_draft_v1",
    "structure": {
        "citation_scheme": "source-section-v1",
        "kind": "native",
        "levels": [
            {
                "key": "section",
                "label_fr": "Section",
                "label_en": "Section"
            }
        ],
        "leaf_fr": "Section",
        "leaf_en": "Section"
    },
    "canonical_passage_id": "passage:spinoza.ethics_fr:section-0235",
    "canonical_ref": "section-0235",
    "canonical_parent_ref": null,
    "canonical_parent_id": null,
    "representations": [
        {
            "language": "fr",
            "text": "Démonstration : En effet, la pitié est une sorte de tristesse (par la Déf. 18 des pass.), et partant elle est, de soi, mauvaise (par la Propos. 41, part. 4). Quant au bien qui en résulte, je veux dire celui que nous faisons en nous efforçant de délivrer de sa misère l’objet de notre pitié (par le Coroll. 3 de la propos. 27, part. 3), la raison seule nous porte à désirer de l’accomplir (par la Propos. 37, part. 4), et ce n’est même que par la raison (par la propos. 27, part. 4) que nous pouvons faire le bien, en sachant certainement que nous faisons le bien ; d’où il suit que la pitié est, de soi, mauvaise et inutile dans une âme qui vit selon la raison.\n\nCorollaire : Il résulte aussi de là que celui qui vit selon la raison s’efforce, autant qu’il est en lui, de ne pas être touché par la pitié.\n\nScholie : Celui qui a bien compris que toutes choses résultent de la nécessité de la nature divine, et se font suivant les lois et les règles éternelles de la nature, ne rencontrera jamais rien qui soit digne de haine, de moquerie ou de mépris, et personne ne lui inspirera jamais de pitié ; il s’efforcera toujours au contraire, autant que le comporte l’humaine vertu, de bien agir et, comme on dit, de se tenir en joie. J’ajoute que l’homme qui est aisément touché de pitié et remué par la misère ou les larmes d’autrui agit souvent de telle sorte qu’il en éprouve ensuite du regret ; ce qui s’explique, soit parce que nous ne faisons jamais le bien avec certitude quand c’est la passion qui nous conduit, soit encore parce que nous sommes aisément trompés par de fausses larmes. Il est expressément entendu que je parle ici de l’homme qui vit selon la raison. Car si un homme n’est jamais conduit, ni par la raison, ni par la pitié, à venir au secours d’autrui, il mérite assurément le nom d’inhumain, puisqu’il ne garde plus avec l’homme aucune ressemblance (par la Propos. 27, part. 3).\n\nUn penchant favorable pour une personne n’est pas contraire à la raison ; il peut s’accorder avec et en provenir.",
            "translator": "Émile Saisset or Paul Janet",
            "source_id": "source-1",
            "translation_type": "historical_translation"
        },
        {
            "language": "en",
            "text": "Demonstration: Indeed, pity is a kind of sadness (by Def. 18 of the passions), and therefore is in itself evil (by Prop. 41, part 4). As for the good resulting from it, I mean the good we do by striving to deliver the object of our pity from his misery (by Coroll. 3 to Prop. 27, part 3), reason alone leads us to desire to accomplish it (by Prop. 37, part 4), and it is only by reason (by Prop. 27, part 4) that we can do good while knowing with certainty that we are doing good. It follows that pity is, in itself, evil and useless in a mind that lives according to reason.\n\nCorollary: It also follows from this that he who lives according to reason strives, as far as lies in him, not to be moved by pity.\n\nScholium: He who has rightly understood that all things result from the necessity of the divine nature and occur according to the eternal laws and rules of nature will never encounter anything worthy of hatred, mockery, or contempt, and no one will ever inspire pity in him. On the contrary, he will always strive, as far as human virtue permits, to act well and, as they say, to remain joyful. I add that the man who is easily moved by pity and stirred by another's misery or tears often acts in such a way that he afterward regrets it. This is explained either because we never do good with certainty when passion guides us, or because we are easily deceived by false tears. It is expressly understood that I am speaking here of the man who lives according to reason. For if a man is never led, either by reason or by pity, to come to another's aid, he certainly deserves to be called inhuman, since he no longer retains any resemblance to man (by Prop. 27, part 3).\n\nA favorable disposition toward a person is not contrary to reason; it can accord with reason and arise from it.",
            "translator": "Codex gpt-5.6-sol",
            "edition": "Prokopton42 non-official AI translation, 2026-09-11",
            "source_id": "prokopton42-codex-translation:gpt-5.6-sol:corpus-passage-translation-v1",
            "translation_type": "ai_generated_translation",
            "official_status": "non_official",
            "generation_model": "gpt-5.6-sol"
        }
    ],
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}