Passage potentiellement protégé En consultant ce texte, vous reconnaissez disposer du droit de l’utiliser à titre personnel et éducatif. Ne reproduisez pas son contenu. Si ce livre vous accompagne, achetez-le pour soutenir l’auteur ou ses ayants droit.

John Locke

Essai philosophique concernant l’entendement humain Section S73

Section 418 sur 1 114

Référence canonique B2.C21.S73

Anglais

Project Gutenberg transcription of Locke author text

To conclude this inquiry into human liberty, which, as it stood before, I myself from the beginning fearing, and a very judicious friend of mine, since the publication, suspecting to have some mistake in it, though he could not particularly show it me, I was put upon a stricter review of this chapter. Wherein lighting upon a very easy and scarce observable slip I had made, in putting one seemingly indifferent word for another that discovery opened to me this present view, which here, in this second edition, I submit to the learned world, and which, in short, is this: LIBERTY is a power to act or not to act, according as the mind directs. A power to direct the operative faculties to motion or rest in particular instances is that which we call the WILL. That which in the train of our voluntary actions determines the will to any change of operation is SOME PRESENT UNEASINESS, which is, or at least is always accompanied with that of DESIRE. Desire is always moved by evil, to fly it: because a total freedom from pain always makes a necessary part of our happiness: but every good, nay, every greater good, does not constantly move desire, because it may not make, or may not be taken to make, any necessary part of our happiness. For all that we desire, is only to be happy. But, though this general desire of happiness operates constantly and invariably, yet the satisfaction of any particular desire CAN BE SUSPENDED from determining the will to any subservient action, till we have maturely examined whether the particular apparent good which we then desire makes a part of our real happiness, or be consistent or inconsistent with it. The result of our judgment upon that examination is what ultimately determines the man; who could not be FREE if his will were determined by anything but his own desire, guided by his own judgment.

Français

Pierre Coste · Pierre Mortier, Amsterdam, 1735, third edition

Juſqu’ici j’ai expoſé comme dans un petit Tableau nos Idées Originales d’où toutes les autres viennent, & dont elles ſont compoſées. De ſorte que, ſi l’on vouloit examiner ces dernieres en Philoſophe, & voir quelles en ſont les cauſes & la matiére, je croi qu’on pourroit les reduire à ce petit nombre d’Idées primitives & originales, ſavoir,

L’Etenduë, La Solidité, La Mobilité ou la Puiſſance d’être mû : Idées que nous recevons du Corps par le moyen des Sens : La Perceptivité, ou la Puiſſance d’appercevoir ou de penſer, La Motivité, ou la Puiſſance de mouvoir. (Qu’on me

Ces deux derniéres Idées nous viennent dans l’Eſprit par voye de Reflexion. Si nous leur joignons

L’Exiſtence, La Durée, & le Nombre,

Concepts de ce passage

Avant de lire

Ce que vous allez apprendre

Voir la fiche complète