Essai philosophique concernant l’entendement humain Section S13

Secondly, All propositions wherein a part of the complex idea which any term stands for is predicated of that term, are only verbal: v.g. to say that gold is a metal, or heavy. And thus all propositions wherein more comprehensive words, called genera, are affirmed of subordinate or less comprehensive, called species, or individuals, are barely verbal.

When by these two rules we have examined the propositions that make up the discourses we ordinarily meet with, both in and out of books, we shall perhaps find that a greater part of them than is usually suspected are purely about the signification of words, and contain nothing in them but the use and application of these signs.

This I think I may lay down for an infallible rule, That, wherever the distinct idea any word stands for is not known and considered, and something not contained in the idea is not affirmed or denied of it, there our thoughts stick wholly in sounds, and are able to attain no real truth or falsehood. This, perhaps, if well heeded, might save us a great deal of useless amusement and dispute; and very much shorten our trouble and wandering in the search of real and true knowledge.

En ſecond lieu, toutes les Propoſitions où une partie de l’idée complexe qu’un certain terme ſignifie, eſt affirmé de ce terme, ſont purement verbales, comme ſi je dis que l’Or eſt un metal ou qu’il eſt peſant. Et ainſi toute Propoſition où les Mots de la plus grande étenduë qu’on appelle Genres ſont affirmez de ceux qui leur ſont ſubordonnez ou qui ont moins d’étenduë, qu’on nomme Eſpèces ou Individus, eſt purement verbale.

Si nous examinons ſur ces deux Règles les Propoſitions qui compoſent les Diſcours écrits ou non écrits, nous trouverons peut-être qu’il y en a beaucoup plus qu’on ne croit communément qui ne roulent que ſur la ſignification des mots, & qui ne renferment rien que l’uſage & l’application de ces ſignes.