Des bienfaits Chapitre 20

Illud solet quaeri: " Fratres duo dissident; si alterum servo, an dem beneficium ei, qui fratrem invisum non perisse moleste laturus est." Non est dubium, quin beneficium sit etiam invito prodesse, sicut non dedit beneficium, qui invitus profuit. " Beneficium," inquit, " vocas, quo ille offenditur, quo torquetur ? " Multa beneficia tristem frontem et asperam habent, quemadmodum secare et urere, ut sanes, et vinclis coercere. Non est spectandum, an doleat aliquis beneficio accepto, sed an gaudere debeat ; non est malus denarius, quem barbarus et ignarus formae publicae reiecit. Beneficium et odit et accepit, si modo id prodest, si is, qui dabat, ut prodesset, dedit. Nihil refert, an bonam rem malo animo quis accipiat. Agedum, hoc in contrarium verte. Odit fratrem suum, quem illi habere expedit ; hunc ego occidi: non est beneficium, quamvis ille dicat esse et gaudeat. Insidiosissime nocet, cui gratiae aguntur pro iniuria ! " Video : prodest aliqua res et ideo beneficium est ; nocet et ideo non est beneficium. Ecce, quod nec prosit nec noceat, dabo, et tamen beneficium erit. Patrem alicuius in solitudine exanimem inveni, corpus eius sepelivi. Nec ipsi profui (quid enim illius intererat, quo genere dilaberetur ?) nec filio (quid enim illi per hoc commodi accessit ?)." Dicam, quid consecutus sit : officio sollemni et necessario per me functus est ; praestiti patri eius, quod ipse praestare voluisset nec non et debuisset. Hoc tamen ita beneficium est, si non misericordiae et humanitati dedi, ut quodlibet cadaver absconderem, sed si corpus adgnovi, si filio tunc hoc praestare me cogitavi. At si terram ignoto mortuo inieci, nullum in hoc habeo huius officii debitorem in publicum humanus. Dicet aliquis : " Quid tanto opere quaeris, cui dederis beneficium, tamquam repetiturus aliquando ? Sunt, qui numquam iudicent esse repetendum, et has causas adferunt. Indignus etiam repetenti non reddet, dignus ipse per se referet. Praeterea, si bono viro dedisti, expecta, ne iniuriam illi facias appellando, tamquam sua sponte redditurus non fuisset. Si malo viro dedisti, plectere ; beneficium vero ne corruperis creditum faciendo. Praeterea lex, quod non iussit repeti, vetuit." Verba sunt ista. Quam diu me nihil urguet, quam diu fortuna nihil cogit, perdam potius beneficium quam repetam. Sed si de salute liberorum agitur, si in periculum uxor deducitur, si patriae salus ac libertas mittit me etiam, quo ire nollem, imperabo pudori meo et testabor omnia me fecisse, ne opus esset mihi auxilio hominis ingrati; novissime recipiendi beneficii necessitas repetendi verecundiam vincet. Deinde, eum bono viro beneficium do, sic do tamquam numquam repetiturus, nisi fuerit necesse.

A common question is, "Two brothers are at variance. If I save the life of one, do I confer a benefit upon the other, who will be sorry that his hated brother did not perish?" There can be no doubt that it is a benefit to do good to a man, even against that man's will, just as he, who against his own will does a man good, does not bestow a benefit upon him. "Do you," asks our adversary, "call that by which he is displeased and hurt a benefit?" Yes; many benefits have a harsh and forbidding appearance, such as cutting or burning to cure disease, or confining with chains. We must not consider whether a man is grieved at receiving a benefit, but whether he ought to rejoice: a coin is not bad because it is refused by a savage who is unacquainted with its proper stamp. A man receives a benefit even though he hates what is done, provided that it does him good, and that the giver bestowed it in order to do him good. It makes no difference if he receives a good thing in a bad spirit. Consider the converse of this. Suppose that a man hates his brother, though it is to his advantage to have a brother, and I kill this brother, this is not a benefit, though he may say that it is, and be glad of it. Our most artful enemies are those whom we thank for the wrongs which they do us. "I understand; a thing which does good is a benefit, a thing which does harm is not a benefit. Now I will suggest to you an act which neither does good nor harm, and yet is a benefit. Suppose that I find the corpse of some one's father in a wilderness, and bury it, then I certainly have done him no good, for what difference could it make to him in what manner his body decayed? Nor have I done any good to his son, for what advantage does he gain by my act?" I will tell you what he gains. He has by my means performed a solemn and necessary rite; I have performed a service for his father which he would have wished, nay, which it would have been his duty to have performed himself. Yet this act is not a benefit, if I merely yielded to those feelings of pity and kindliness which would make me bury any corpse whatever, but only if I recognized this body, and buried it, with the thought in my mind that I was doing this service to the son; but, by merely throwing earth over a dead stranger, I lay no one under an obligation for an act performed on general principles of humanity. It may be asked, "Why are you so careful in inquiring upon whom you bestow benefits, as though some day you meant to demand repayment of them? Some say that repayment should never be demanded; and they give the following reasons. An unworthy man will not repay the benefit which he has received, even if it be demanded of him, while a worthy man will do so of his own accord. Consequently, if you have bestowed it upon a good man, wait; do not outrage him by asking him for it, as though of his own accord he never would repay it. If you have bestowed it upon a bad man, suffer for it, but do not spoil your benefit by turning it into a loan. Moreover the law, by not authorizing you, forbids you, by implication, to demand the repayment of a benefit." All this is nonsense. As long as I am in no pressing need, as long as I am not forced by poverty, I will lose my benefits rather than ask for repayment; but if the lives of my children were at stake, if my wife were in danger, if my regard for the welfare of my country and for my own liberty were to force me to adopt a course which I disliked, I should overcome my delicacy, and openly declare that I had done all that I could to avoid the necessity of receiving help from an ungrateful man; the necessity of obtaining repayment of one's benefit will in the end overcome one's delicacy about asking for it. In the next place, when I bestow a benefit upon a good man, I do so with the intention of never demanding repayment, except in case of absolute necessity.

« Tu te dis bienfaiteur, m’objectera-t-on, de ceux que tu choques, que tu tortures ? » Eh ! que de bienfaits ont l’abord fâcheux et révoltant, par exemple trancher et brûler pour guérir, et garrotter les membres ? Il s’agit de voir, non si le bienfait chagrine qui le reçoit, mais s’il ne devrait pas le réjouir. Un denier n’est pas de mauvais aloi parce qu’un barbare, ignorant l’empreinte romaine, n’en a pas voulu. On déteste le bienfait et on le reçoit, si toutefois il est utile, s’il est donné dans l’intention qu’il soit utile. Qu’importe, si la chose est bonne, qu’elle soit reçue de mauvaise grâce ? Mais voyons prends l’hypothèse contraire : cet homme déteste son frère qu’il est de son intérêt de conserver : j’ai tué ce frère. Est-ce là un bienfait, quoique l’autre le dise et s’en félicite ? c’est nuire bien traîtreusement que de se faire remercier du tort qu’on a fait. « Je comprends : une chose utile, c’est un bienfait ; une chose nuisible, oe n’en est pas un. » En voici une pourtant qui n’est ni utile ni nuisible et qui ne laisse pas d’être un bienfait. J’ai trouvé ton père sans vie dans un lieu désert, et je l’ai enseveli : cela n’a fait de bien ni à lui (que lui importait de quelle manière son corps allait se dissoudre ?) ni à son fils : car quel avantage en a-t-il recueilli ? Voici néanmoins ce qu’il y a gagné : il n’a pas manqué, grâce à moi, à un devoir solennel et imposé par la nature. J’ai fait pour son père ce qu'il eût voulu, ce qu'il eût dû faire lui-même. Ceci toutefois n'est un bienfait qu'autant qu'il ne vient point de ce sentiment de pitié et d'humanité qui me ferait ensevelir les restes du premier venu : il faut que j'aie reconnu la personne et songé qu'alors, j'obligeais le fils. Mais que je recouvre de terre le cadavre d'un inconnu, nul ne m'est obligé d'avoir pris ce soin : c'est là une charité banale. On me dira : « Pourquoi rechercher si scrupuleusement qui tu as obligé? Est-ce pour réclamer plus tard? Il est des gens qui pensent qu'il ne faut jamais redemander, et voici leurs motifs : l'ingrat, quand tu lui réclamerais, ne rendra point; l'homme reconnaissant rendra de lui-même. D'ailleurs, si tu as donné à un honnête homme, attends : point d'injurieuse sommation, comme s'il n'était pas disposé à s'acquitter; si c'est un malhonnête homme, portes-en la peine. Ne gâte pas le beau nom de bienfait, n'en fais pas une créance. Et puis, où la loi n'ordonne pas de répéter, elle le défend. » Tout cela est vrai, tant que rien ne me presse, tant que la Fortune ne me contraint point ; je demanderai plutôt un service que je ne le redemanderai. Mais s'il s'agit de la vie de mes enfants, si ma femme court quelque danger, si le salut, si la liberté de mon pays m'envoient où je ne voudrais pas aller, je surmonterai ma répugnance et protesterai que j'avais tout fait pour me passer des secours d'un ingrat. Et en somme, la nécessité de rentrer dans mes avances l'emportera sur la honte de redemander. Au reste, quand j'oblige un honnête homme, c'est à condition de ne rien réclamer que dans le cas d'impérieux besoins.