Essai philosophique concernant l’entendement humain Section S23

To conclude: some ideas forwardly offer themselves to all men’s understanding; and some sorts of truths result from any ideas, as soon as the mind puts them into propositions: other truths require a train of ideas placed in order, a due comparing of them, and deductions made with attention, before they can be discovered and assented to. Some of the first sort, because of their general and easy reception, have been mistaken for innate: but the truth is, ideas and notions are no more born with us than arts and sciences; though some of them indeed offer themselves to our faculties more readily than others; and therefore are more generally received: though that too be according as the organs of our bodies and powers of our minds happen to be employed; God having fitted men with faculties and means to discover, receive, and retain truths, according as they are employed. The great difference that is to be found in the notions of mankind is, from the different use they put their faculties to. Whilst some (and those the most) taking things upon trust, misemploy their power of assent, by lazily enslaving their minds to the dictates and dominion of others, in doctrines which it is their duty carefully to examine, and not blindly, with an implicit faith, to swallow; others, employing their thoughts only about some few things, grow acquainted sufficiently with them, attain great degrees of knowledge in them, and are ignorant of all other, having never let their thoughts loose in the search of other inquiries. Thus, that the three angles of a triangle are quite equal to two right ones is a truth as certain as anything can be, and I think more evident than many of those propositions that go for principles; and yet there are millions, however expert in other things, who know not this at all, because they never set their thoughts on work about such angles. And he that certainly knows this proposition may yet be utterly ignorant of the truth of other propositions, in mathematics itself, which are as clear and evident as this; because, in his search of those mathematical truths, he stopped his thoughts short and went not so far. The same may happen concerning the notions we have of the being of a Deity. For, though there be no truth which a man may more evidently make out to himself than the existence of a God, yet he that shall content himself with things as he finds them in this world, as they minister to his pleasures and passions, and not make inquiry a little further into their causes, ends, and admirable contrivances, and pursue the thoughts thereof with diligence and attention, may live long without any notion of such a Being. And if any person hath by talk put such a notion into his head, he may perhaps believe it; but if he hath never examined it, his knowledge of it will be no perfecter than his, who having been told, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, takes it upon trust, without examining the demonstration; and may yield his assent as a probable opinion, but hath no knowledge of the truth of it; which yet his faculties, if carefully employed, were able to make clear and evident to him. But this only, by the by, to show how much OUR KNOWLEDGE DEPENDS UPON THE RIGHT USE OF THOSE POWERS NATURE HATH BESTOWED UPON US, and how little upon SUCH INNATE PRINCIPLES AS ARE IN VAIN SUPPOSED TO BE IN ALL MANKIND FOR THEIR DIRECTION; which all men could not but know if they were there, or else they would be there to no purpose. And which since all men do not know, nor can distinguish from other adventitious truths, we may well conclude there are no such.

Je ne ſaurois dire à quelles cenſures je puis m’être expoſé, en revoquant en doute qu’il y ait des Principes innez ; & ſi on ne dira point que je renverſe par-là les anciens fondemens de la connoiſſance & de la certitude : mais je croi du moins que la méthode que j’ai ſuivie, étant conforme à la Vérité, rend ces fondemens plus inébranlables. Une autre choſe dont je ſuis fortement perſuadé, c’eſt que dans le Diſcours ſuivant je ne me ſuis point fait une affaire, d’abandonner ou de ſuivre l’autorité de qui que ce ſoit. La Vérité a été mon unique but. Par tout où elle a paru me conduire, je l’ai ſuivie ſans aucune prévention, & ſans me mettre en peine ſi quelque autre avoit ſuivi ou non le même chemin. Ce n’eſt pas que je n’aye beaucoup de reſpect pour les ſentimens des autres hommes : mais la Vérité doit être reſpectée par deſſus tout ; & j’eſpére qu’on ne me taxera pas de vanité, ſi je dis que nous ferions peut-être de plus grands progrès dans la connoiſſance des choſes, ſi nous allions à la ſource, je veux dire à l’examen des choſes mêmes ; & que nous nous fiſſions une affaire de chercher la Vérité en ſuivant nos propres penſées, plûtôt que celles des autres hommes. Car je croi que nous pouvons eſpérer avec autant de fondement de voir par les yeux d’autrui, que de connoître les choſes par l’Entendement des autres hommes. Plus nous connoiſſons la Vérité & la Raiſon par nous-mêmes, plus nos connoiſſances ſont réelles & véritables. Pour les opinions des autres hommes, ſi elles viennent à rouler & flotter, pour ainſi dire dans notre Eſprit, elles ne contribuent en rien à nous rendre plus intelligens, quoi que d’ailleurs elles ſoient conformes à la Vérité. Tandis que nous n’embraſſons ces opinions que par reſpect pour le nom de leurs Auteurs, & que nous n’employons point notre Raiſon, comme eux, à comprendre ces Véritez, dont la connoiſſance les a rendus ſi illuſtres dans le Monde, ce qui en eux étoit véritable ſcience, n’eſt en nous que pur entétement. Ariſtote étoit ſans doute un très-habile homme, mais perſonne ne s’eſt encore aviſé de le juger tel, parce qu’il embraſſoit aveuglément & ſoûtenoit avec confiance les ſentimens d’autrui. Et s’il n’eſt pas devenu Philoſophe en recevant ſans examen les Principes des Savans qui l’ont précédé, je ne vois pas que perſonne puiſſe le devenir par ce moyen-là. Dans les sciences, chacun ne poſſede qu’autant qu’il a de connoiſſances réelles, dont il comprend lui-meme les fondemens. C’eſt là ſon véritable tréſor, le fonds qui lui appartient en propre, & dont il ſe peut dire le maître. Pour ce qui eſt des choſes qu’il croit, & reçoit ſimplement ſur la foi d’autrui, elles ne ſauroient entrer en ligne de compte : ce ne ſont que des lambeaux, entiérement inutiles à ceux qui les ramaſſent, quoi qu’ils vaillent leur prix étant joints à la piéce d’où ils ont été détachez : Monnoye d’emprunt, toute pareille à ces piéces enchantées qui paroiſſent de l’or entre les mains de celui dont on les reçoit, mais qui deviennent des feuilles, ou de la cendre dès qu’on vient à s’en ſervir.