Stoicism
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page 23
DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY
Novurn Organum for the Organon
Clean thes, we are
told,
of Aristotle.
recognised six parts of
dialectic,
namely,
philosophy,
1
and
rhetoric,
but
ethic,
these
are
theology;
of
subdivision
of
the
the
result
primary
obviously
physic,
politic,
ones.
Of the three departments we may say that
logic deals with the form and expression of know
ledge, physic with the matter of knowledge, and
The division
ethic with the use of knowledge.
be justified in this way. Philosophy
must study either nature (including the divine
may also
man; and, if it studies man, it must
him
either from the side of the intellect or
regard
nature) or
of the feelings, that is, either as a thinking (logic)
or as an acting (ethic) being.
As to the order in which the different depart
ments should be studied, we have had preserved
to us the actual words of Chrysippus in his fourth
book on Lives. 2
First of all then it seems to me
has been rightly said by the ancients,
there are three heads under which the specula
that, as
tions of the philosopher
fall, logic,
ethic,
next, that of these the logical should
physic
;
come first,
the ethical second, and the physical third and
that of the physical the treatment of the gods
;
should come
1
D.L. vii.
41.
last,
whence also they have given
2
Plut. 1035 A, B, Sto. Repug. 9.
II
page 24
STOICISM
the name of
1
"completions"
to
the instruction
That this order how
delivered on this subject.
ever might yield to convenience is plain from
2
another book on the use of reason, where he says
the student who takes
that
up logic first need
not entirely abstain from the other branches of
also as occasion
philosophy, but should study them
3
offers.
3
Plutarch twits Chrysippus with inconsistency,
because, in the face of this declaration as to the
order of treatment, he nevertheless says
morals rest upon physics.
that
But to this charge it
may fairly be replied that the order of exposition
need not coincide with the order of existence.
Metaphysically speaking, morals may depend
upon physics, and the right conduct of man be
deducible from the structure of the universe, but
for all that it
may be advisable to study physics
of God and
Physics meant the nature
the Universe. Our nature may be deducible
later.
from that, but it is better known to ourselves to
start with, so that it may be well to begin from
the end of the stick that we have in our hands.
1
rcXerdj.
By this passage, aided by Sext. Emp. adv. Math. vii.
we are able to correct the statement of D.L. vii. 40.
2
3
Pint. 1035 E, Sto. Repug. 9.
12
22,
page 25
DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY
But that Chrysippus did teach the logical de
is plain from his
pendence of morals on physics
own words. In his third book on the Gods he
says:
For it
is
not possible to find any other
mode of its generation, save
origin of justice or
and the nature of the universe
for anything we have to say about good and evil
must needs derive its origin therefrom/ and again
For there is no other or
in his Physical Theses
that from Zeus
;
:
more appropriate way of approaching the subject
of good and evil on the virtues or happiness than
from the nature of all things and the administra
tion of the universe ... for it is to these we
must attach the treatment of good and evil,
inasmuch as there is no better origin to which we
can refer them, and inasmuch as physical specula
tion is taken in solely with a view to the distinction
l
between good and evil.
The last words are worth noting, as showing
that even with Chrysippus, who has been called
the intellectual founder of Stoicism, the whole
stress of the philosophy of the Porch fell upon its
moral teaching. It was a favourite metaphor
with the school to compare philosophy to a fertile
Ethic was the good fruit,
or orchard.
vineyard
and logic the strong wall.
physic the tall plants,
1
Plut. 1035 C, D, Sto. Repug.
13
9.
page 26
STOICISM
The Avail existed only to guard the trees, and the
1
Or again
only to produce the fruit.
trees
philosophy was likened to an egg, of which ethic
was the yolk containing the chick, physic the
white, which formed
its nourishment, while logic
was the hard outside shell. Posidonius, a later
member of the school, objected to the metaphor
from the vineyard on the ground that the fruit
and the
trees
and the wall were
all
separable,
whereas the parts of philosophy were inseparable.
He preferred
therefore
to
liken
it
to a living
organism, logic being the bones and sinews, physic
the flesh and blood, but ethic the soul. 2
1
Philo,
i.
adv. M. vii.
-
S.
E.
302, De Agr.
17 ; D.L. vii.
adv.
M.
vii.
3,
i.
589,
Mut. Norn. 10 ; S. E.
19;
D.L.
40.
18,
interchanges the places of physic and ethic.
vii.
40,
who
page 27
CHAPTER III
LOGIC
THE Stoics had a tremendous reputation for logic.
In this department they were the successors, or
For after
rather the supersessors, of Aristotle.
the
the death of Theophrastus
library of the
Lyceum is said to have been buried underground
at Scepsis until about a century before Christ.
So that the Organon may actually have been lost
to the world during that period.
At all events
under Strato, the successor of Theophrastus, who
specialised in natural science, the
its comprehensiveness.
Cicero
l
school had lost
even finds it con
sonant with dramatic propriety to make Cato
charge the later Peripatetics with ignorance of
logic
so
!
On the other hand, Chrysippus became
famous
for his logic as to create a general
impression that, if there were a logic among the
2
gods, it would be no other than the Chrysippean.
1
Fin. iii.
2
41.
15
Cic. Brut.
118.
page 28
STOICISM
the Stoics were strong in logic, they
were weak in rhetoric. 1 This strength and weak
if
But,
ness
were
characteristic
of the
school
at
all
Cato is the only Roman Stoic to whom
periods.
Cicero accords the praise of real eloquence. In
the dying accents of the school, as we hear them
in Marcus Aurelius, the imperial sage counts it a
thing to be thankful for that he had learnt to
abstain from
rhetoric,
poetic,
and elegance of
The reader however cannot help wish
diction.
ing that he had taken some means to diminish
2
the crabbedness of his
style.
If a lesson
were
wanted in the importance of sacrificing to the
Graces, it might be found in the fact that the
their logical subtlety,
early Stoic writers, despite
have all perished, and that their remains have to
be sought for so largely in the pages of Cicero.
In speaking of logic as one of the three depart
ments of philosophy, we must bear in mind that
the term was one of much wider meaning than
it
is
with us.
It included
rhetoric, poetic,
and
grammar as well as dialectic, or logic proper, to
on the senses and
say nothing of disquisitions
the intellect, which we should
now
refer
psychology.
118, Paradoxa, Introd.
1
Cic. Brut.
2
Marc. Ant. i.
7.
16
2.
to
page 29
LOGIC
The
school,
rhetoric.
it
been
has
said,
was weak
in
Nevertheless Cleanthes wrote an Art
of Rhetoric, and so did Chrysippus, but such as
Cicero could recommend to the perusal of any one
whose ambition was to hold his tongue. 1
They
followed the well-established division of rhetoric
into
deliberative,
judicial,
and
demonstrative,
recognising that the ends of public speaking are
to sway the counsels of men, or to plead the
cause of justice, or to put forward some person
or thing as an object of praise or blame. 2 Among
they enumerated
3
and
A
invention, style, arrangement,
delivery.
fifth requisite, namely, memory, is usually added: 4
the oratcr
the requisites of
for the other
orator,
if
equipments are of little use to the
there be not
memory
to
the
retain
Another
thought, language, and arrangement.
on
which
the
Stoics
followed
established
point
was in the analysis of a speech into
preface, narration, controversial matter, and con
tradition
clusion. 5
With regard to invention
1
Fin.
2
Arist. Rhet.
Inv. i.
4
iv.
7.
i.
2,
3,
ad Alex. 2,
7 ; Cornif. ad Herenn. i. 2,
Cic. Inv.
Cicero complains of
9 ; Cornif. ad H.
i.
1 ;
2.
i.
D.L. vii.
42 Cic.
3
D.L. vii. 42.
;
3 ; Philo,
i.
652, Do
Somn. i. 35.
5
D.L. vii.
B
42
;
Cic. Inv. i.
I/
19 ; Cornif. ad H. i.
4.
page 30
STOICISM
1
They
the Stoics for their neglect of it as an art.
of Aris
the
to
had
topics
corresponding
nothing
for dialectic, nor any
supply material
orator s vade-mecum, such as the later Art of
which almost saved people the
totle,
to
Hermagoras,
trouble of thinking.
divided into rhetoric
Logic as a whole being
the
rhetoric was denned to be
and
dialectic,
well in expository
knowledge of how to speak
of
discourses, and dialectic as the knowledge
in matters of question and
how to
argue rightly
answer. 2
Both
rhetoric
and
dialectic
were
as virtues; for they
spoken of by the Stoics
most
its
in
divided virtue,
generic sense, in the
same way as they divided philosophy, into physi
3
Rhetoric and dialectic
cal, ethical, and logical.
Zeno
of
two
were thus the
logical virtue.
species
difference
by comparing
expressed their
the fist. 4
to
dialectic
and
to the palm
rhetoric
Instead of throwing in poetic and grammar
with rhetoric, the Stoics subdivided dialectic into
the part which dealt with the meaning and the
dealt with the sound, or, as Chrysippus
part which
1
Fin. iv.
2
17 ; D.L. vii.
Sen. Ep. 89,
5, cp. Pr.
Cic. Acad. Post.
8
10.
Phil. i. ad init. ; D.L. vii.
92.
17, Orat.
113
4
Cic. Fin. ii.
18
;
41, 42.
132 ; Pint. 874 E, Plac.
Quint. Inst. ii. 20,
7.
page 31
LOGIC
phrased it, concerning significants and significates. 1
Under the former came the treatment of the
alphabet, of the parts of speech, of solecism, of
barbarism, of poems, of amphibolies, of metre and
music 2
a list which seems at first sight a little
mixed, but in which we can recognise the general
features
of
grammar, with its departments of
The treat
phonology, accidence, and prosody.
ment of solecism and barbarism in grammar
corresponded to that of fallacies in logic. With
regard to the alphabet it is worth noting that the
Stoics recognised seven vowels and six mutes. 3
This is more correct than our
way of talking of
nine mutes, since the aspirate consonants are
plainly not mute.
Stoics, five parts
verb,
There were, according to the
of speech
conjunction,
name, appellative,
Name
article.
meant
a
4
a common term.
proper name, and appellative
There were reckoned to be five virtues of
speech
Hellenism, clearness, conciseness, propriety, dis
tinction.
By
Hellenism
was meant speaking
was defined to be a
Distinction
good Greek.
diction which avoided homeliness. 5
Over against
these there were two
comprehensive vices, bar1
2
6
Sen. Ep. 89,
17 ; D.L. vii.
3
D.L. vii.
44.
Ibid.
57.
Ibid.
59,
KaraffKcvij
dt
43, 62.
4
19
D.L. vii.
58.
e/CTre^evyum
rbv
irpoffrjyopia,
6<m
X<?ts
page 32
STOICISM
barism and solecism, the one being an offence
the other against syntax.
against accidence,
the idea of poetry much
associate
not
does
One
with the austere sect of the Stoics.
Still it should
be remembered that the finest devotional utter
ance of Paganism is Cleanthes Hymn to Zeus,
and that Aratus among the Greeks, and among
the Romans Manilius, Seneca, Persius, and Juvenal
may be set down to the credit of the school.
which
Amphiboly was defined as diction
or more things in the strict prose
signifies two
It
sense of the terms and in the same language.
name for ambiguity. 1
We come now to that part of dialectic which
is thus a general
deals with the meaning, not with the expression,
and which answers to our logic. The Stoics were
far from taking that confined view of logic which
would limit it to mere consistency and deny its
They defined Dialectic as the
true and false, and what is
science of what
2
Under the last
neither the one nor the other.
relation to truth.
is
head would come a question.
Ancient logic was
this as being conessentially concerned with
1
62 is avXyrpls
The example given by D.L. vii.
which may be read so as to mean (1) The house has fallen three
times (2) The flute-girl has had a fall. This is what Aristotle
;
would call the fallacy of division.
2
D.L. vii.
42, 62.
20
page 33
LOGIC
ducted by way of question and answer. From
the wide point of view of the Stoic definition of
evident that the problem of the
canon and criterion of truth presents itself as
it is
Dialectic,
fundamental; and that definition also becomes
a matter of great importance as being concerned
with ascertaining the real nature of things. It
was by the criterion that the different reports of
the senses had to be corrected
;
and if definitions
were not founded on true ideas, our grasp on
1
With
reality would be enfeebled from the first.
the Stoics then, as with ourselves, the difficulties
of logic
came
at
the beginning.
They boldly
plunged into the subject with a disquisition on
sense-impressions, feeling that, if truth were to be
made good, it must be by reliance on the validity
of the senses. 2
After that the topics come much
in our order.
The treatment of sensation leads
up to that of notions, which are our concepts or
terms; then we have a disquisition on proposi
tions, their parts
and varieties, very much
guised by strange phraseology
and syllogisms
1
D. L. vii.
2
Ibid., $ 49.
of truth
;
;
and last of all fallacies. 3
42.
Cicero, Acad. Pr.
29, says that the criterion
and the nature of the highest good are the two ques
tions of supreme importance in philosophy.
3
dis
then come moods
D. L. vii.
43.
21
page 34
STOICISM
The famous comparison of the infant mind to
a blank sheet of paper, which we connect so
comes
closely with the name of Locke, really
The earliest characters in
from the Stoics. 1
were the impressions of sense,
A phan
which the Greeks called phantasies.
scribed
upon
it
denned by Zeno as an impression in
the soul."2 Cleanthes was content to take this
definition in its literal sense, and believe that
tasy was
the soul was impressed by external objects as
wax by a signet - ring. 3 Chrysippus, however,
found a difficulty here, and preferred to interpret
the Master s saying to mean an alteration or
He figured to himself the
soul as receiving a modification from every ex
ternal object which acts upon it, just as the air
change in the soul.
4
receives countless strokes when many people are
5
Further, he declared that
speaking at once.
receiving an impression the soul was purely
in
not only
passive, and that the phantasy revealed,
its own existence, but that also of its cause, just
and the things that
as light displays itself
1
2
Plut. 900 B, Plac. 11.
ruTraxm tv ^vxv, D.L. vii.
45, 50 ; S.E. adv.
are
M. vii. 228,
230.
3
4
5
D. L. vii.,
D. L. vii.,
45 ; S.E. adv. M. vii. 228, 372, viii. 400.
50, dXXoioxm ; S.E. adv. M. vii. 230 crepotwffis.
S.E. adv. M. vii. 230, 231.
22