The Stoic Response to Wrongdoing: Two Case Studies COSP
- Availability
- Text available
- Text quality
- Automatic checks passed
- Text format
- Digital text extracted from the document
- Document type
- Educational resource
- Usage rights
- Authorized for this project
- Excerpts
- 18
page 1
ISSUE 71
A publication of the College of Stoic Philosophers
December 2025
The Stoic Response to Wrongdoing:
Two Case Studies
Michael O’Donnell
Introduction
A driver cuts you off in traffic; someone cuts in on the line you and others have been
patiently standing in; the institution of slavery still exists; a package is stolen from your
doorstep; systemic injustice limits your fellow human’s ability to thrive simply because
they belong to a marginalized group. We recognize these events as wrongs, and they’re all
equal in the eyes of the Stoics, in the sense that they’re all external events predicated on
faulty reasoning about what is truly good, and thus unable to penetrate the soul or
negatively affect one’s character. As Marcus Aurelius writes in The Meditations:
In themselves, the things of the world have no effect on the mind; they can’t get
through to it, they can’t sway it, and they can’t stir it. The only thing that changes
and stirs the mind is the mind, and when external objects are presented to it, it has
them conform to the judgements that it deems itself justified in making about them.
(Aurelius, 2021, book 5, section 19)
To be sure, some of the examples listed above are worse (in the sense that they have more
negative or adverse outcomes regarding externals) than others and demand concerted
and collective effort to rectify, but more importantly, for the Stoics they’re also all
opportunities to exercise wisdom and virtue. What wrongdoing consists of,
how we respond to it, and what we can learn from the behavior and
choices of those confronted by great injustice will be the focus of this paper.
I will first examine how the Stoics defined
wrongdoing as irrational or thoughtless action as
well as the position they placed such acts in as
occurring outside
page 1
of the will. I will then look
towards the example of Stilbo as a model of
personal forbearance in the face of his conquering
besieger (as related to us in Seneca’s On the
Constancy of the Wise Man [Seneca, n.d.]), and the
powerfully positive effect of letting go of externals
and embracing what is truly ours (virtue and will)
has on our psyche. Next I will look at a modern
examination of Stoic responses to wrongdoing with
1
page 2
ISSUE 71
A publication of the College of Stoic Philosophers
December 2025
an analysis of Martha Nussbaum’s “Middle realm,” (Nussbaum, 2016) the social sphere
that lies between our close and intimate relations and the greater world at large.
Strangers, co-workers, and neighbors populate this sphere, and are the greatest sources of
interpersonal conflict on a day to day basis (at least in this my opinion). We will look
towards the greater responsibility we have towards our fellow citizens (and the greater
one we have towards our own moral integrity) by examining Helvidius Priscus’ exchange
with the Emperor Vespasian (Epictetus, 2022) before entering the Senate as an example of
how the virtues of justice and courage relate to a devotion to duty (even under the threat
of execution or exile) that can enable one to rise above wrongs to serve the greater
cosmopolis.
Wrongdoing Defined
What, then, is wrongdoing? An everyday (non-philosophical) definition might be
expressed as: wrongdoing is an act (intentional or otherwise) that damages or diminishes
one’s property, person, or reputation, resulting from faulty reasoning, negligence, or
ill-will. This definition appears feasible at first, but practicing Stoics would be quick to
point out a few problematic features.
First, the common consideration paid to the things harmed, with property, body, and
status being the focus of the popular definition. These things are considered goods to the
Stoics, as they are things that are rational to pursue and protect because they contribute to
a good (pleasant) life, but they are not necessary or sufficient for a eudaimonic or truly
good life. For the Stoics only virtue, and a character that strives for virtuous living, fulfills
that role. Everything else is indifferent, including the
page 2
things that fortune can bestow or
recall, like good health and reputation.
So long as the wronged person’s virtue or character remain unharmed by the wrongful
act then no true damage has been done to them; indeed it is the wrongdoer who is
damaged, as the wrongful act harms their character and alienates them from their fellow
humans, themself, and, by extension, nature. Of course, wrongdoing does damage and
impact the offended individual, often in grievous and life altering ways. Simply saying
that an event will build one’s character does not and should not stop the wronged party
from seeking redress, be it through social or legal means.
Any act of injustice is an impious act, because universal nature has made rational
beings to help one another benefit one another as they deserve, without ever doing
harm, and to transgress against the will of universal nature is plainly to sin against
the eldest of the gods and goddesses. (Aurelius, 2021, book 9, section 1)
Second, the Stoics would take issue with the notion that wrongdoing could be
unintentional. While they make allowances for errors of judgement and accidents, they
2
page 3
ISSUE 71
A publication of the College of Stoic Philosophers
December 2025
would say that wrongdoing is an intentional act predicated on bad reasoning.
… So why are you angry with her [Medea]? The poor thing has gone astray in
matters of supreme importance, and has changed into a viper instead of a human
being. Doesn’t she more deserve pity, then, if that’s the case? Just as we pity the
blinded and lame, shouldn’t we pity those who’ve been blinded and crippled where
matters of supreme importance are concerned? (Epictetus, 2022, book 1, section 28)
With these objections in mind, I’d like to amend the common definition of wrongdoing to
more align with the Stoic view: wrongdoing, then, is a voluntary act stemming from an
incorrect belief about what is right and good, in which the agent violates right reason and
harms their own moral integrity. The agent can be a person, an organization (corporate,
government, or a mob), or, to some extent, a culture. The wrong can be as petty as an
insult or as grand as genocide. The virtue violated is usually justice, but one could
consider that the more virtues (the others being courage, temperance, and wisdom) that
the act transgresses upon, the greater the wrong (and the more damaging the act is to the
wrongdoer’s character and moral integrity).
Assent plays a critical role in the choosing of a wrongful act. From the previously
referenced Discourse:
So whenever someone assents to a falsehood, you can be sure that it’s not the
falsehood to which he wished to assent, for no soul, Plato says, is willingly deprived
of the truth - but that he judged something false to be true. Now, in the sphere of
action, what is it that corresponds to truth and falsehood in the realm of belief?
Appropriateness and inappropriateness, advantage and
page 3
disadvantage, right for me
and wrong for me, and so on and so forth. (Epictetus, 2022, book 1, section 28)
Stoic ethics (all virtue ethics, for that matter) are thus situational, and how to answer the
question of what is the proper thing to do in any given situation falls to the agent. While
the Stoics spent a great deal of time writing about how to respond to wrongs, they were
more concerned with the progressing Stoic being focused on not wronging others, placing
greater moral value on striving to improve one’s character rather than giving mere
prescriptions against the trials of life. Marcus’ injunction in book 5 of his Meditations is
emblematic of this attitude:
Is someone treating me badly? That’s his concern. He’s his own man and his actions
are his own. I currently have what universal nature wants me to have, and I’m acting
as my nature currently wants me to act. (Aurelius, 2021, book 5, section 25)
What we believe to be truly good informs what we do and how we respond to
wrongdoing when it occurs. For the Stoics, the one truly good thing is virtue, and virtue
cannot be taken from us. For an example of how a Stoic would handle a wrongful act so
damaging that it takes nearly everything from the victim, let us turn our attention to the
Megarian philosopher Stilbo’s response to Demetrius.
3
page 4
ISSUE 71
A publication of the College of Stoic Philosophers
December 2025
The Forbearance of Stilbo
Demetrius, who was surnamed Poliorcetes, took Megara, and the philosopher Stilbo,
when asked by him whether he had lost anything, answered, “No, I carry all my
property about me.” Yet his inheritance had been given up to pillage, his daughters
had been outraged by the enemy, his country had fallen under a foreign dominion,
and it was the king, enthroned on high, surrounded by the spears of his victorious
troops, who put this question to him; yet he struck the victory out of the king's
hands, and proved that, though the city was taken, he himself was not only
unconquered but unharmed, for he bore with him those true goods which no one can
lay hands upon. What was being plundered and carried away hither and thither he
did not consider to be his own, but to be merely things which come and go at the
caprice of fortune; therefore he had not loved them as his own, for the possession of
all things which come from without is slippery and insecure. (Seneca n.d.)
Demetrius, known as the “Besieger of Cities” sacked the city of Megara in 307 B.C.,
around the time when the Stoic school was founded. His soldiers plundered the city of
goods and slaves, and, if Seneca is to be believed, brought great destruction and misery to
its residents. Plutarch offers a somewhat similar account of the events in his Life of
Demetrius:
Megara, however, was captured, and the soldiers would have plundered it had not
the Athenians made strong intercession for its citizens; Demetrius also expelled its
garrison and gave the city its freedom. While he was still engaged in this, he
bethought himself of Stilpo the philosopher, who was famous for his election of a life
of tranquillity. Accordingly,
page 4
Demetrius summoned him and asked him whether any
one had robbed him of anything. "No one," said Stilpo, "for I saw nobody carrying
away knowledge." (Plutarch, 1920)
One could be forgiven for lapsing into a rage when confronted by the one responsible for
the ills Seneca reports, but Stilbo’s reply is emblematic of the Stoic approach. Stilbo
showed a magnanimous disposition in his reply, and with it modeled the philosopher’s
way for Demetrius. Stilbo was of the Megarian philosophical school, from whose school
Zeno adapted Stoic logic (Sellars, 2006), and thus was not a Stoic, but his reply indicated a
contempt for external goods and an exaltation of virtue, something the Stoics (Seneca
specifically in this case) heartily endorsed. His reply showed his dedication to philosophy
and teaching. Rather than react angrily at Demetrius’ query, he used it as an opportunity
to display strength of character, unshakable confidence in the promise of philosophy, and
as a way to show Demetrius the folly of his dedication to externals. Stilbo couldn’t defeat
him on Demetrius’ terms, so he taught him the better way through virtue.
For virtue, once gained, cannot be plundered. The will (prohairesis) also is subject to
nothing external, as Epictetus tells us again and again in both the Enchiridion and
Discourses. Tyrants and besiegers can topple walls and sunder bodies, but they can’t touch
the will. The Stoic, properly trained, is invincible:
4
page 5
ISSUE 71
A publication of the College of Stoic Philosophers
December 2025
“‘I’ve lost my toga.’ Yes, because you had a toga. ‘I’ve got a headache.’ But you don’t
have a horn ache, do you? So why are you annoyed? Only things we can possess can
be lost or ache.”
“‘But the tyrant will chain…’ What? Your leg. ‘He’ll remove…’ What? Your head? So
what can’t be chained or removed? Your will.”(Epictetus, 2022, book 1, section 18)
Wrongdoing that results in the loss of external goods, then, are morally neutral to the
Stoics, and how a Stoic responds to wrongs is the only thing of relevance for them.
Externals like health and wealth nominally contribute to the good life, but are not
necessary or sufficient for it.
Nussbaum’s “Middle Realm” and “Transition Anger”
In chapter 5 of her 2016 work Anger and Forgiveness, Martha Nussbaum “qualifies”
Stoicism as provisionally useful when dealing with the “middle realm,” the social space
between family and close friends on one end and the greater world at large on the other
(Nussbaum, 2016). She finds helpful Seneca’s advice to approach the folly of our
co-workers and strangers with playful humor, as well as his advice to Novatus in On
Anger to avoid rude or quarrelsome individuals as well as one can. But she also critiques
the detachment to externals Stoics advocate as unrealistic, given the seeming importance
of reputation, bodily health, safety, and so on (Nussbaum 2016, p. 140). As such, her
definition of wrongdoing falls more in line with the first definition I presented and
critiqued earlier, a view of harm that the Stoics would call fundamentally flawed.
When confronted with the wrongs of strangers and colleagues, Nussbaum advocates for a
special genus of anger, which she calls “transition anger,” whose cognitive content can
page 5
be
summed up as “How outrageous. Something should be done about this” (Nussbaum,
2016). It is a forward looking (that is, it does not look to the offense but what to do about
it in the future) and productive emotion that recognizes that one has been wronged and
that action ought to be taken to prevent it from occurring again in the future. Critically,
Nussbaum’s transition anger lacks the retributive feature characteristic of common anger,
which she (and the Stoics) find to be the infantile product of magical thinking (that the
punishment of wrongdoers will somehow retroactively repair the damage the wrong has
done).
From the Stoic perspective, transition anger strikes me as a unique blending of propatheia
and reasoned assent (perhaps it would be better to say a transition between the
proto-passion and the response or impulse) and is a novel way for the prokopton (one who
has made progress on the path of Stoic philosophy) to approach wrongdoing. The
practicing Stoic will feel the first movement of anger when provoked to it, but,
remembering Epictetus’ advice to “stay with the initial impression,” (Epictetus, 2022,
5
page 6
ISSUE 71
A publication of the College of Stoic Philosophers
December 2025
book 2, section 18) does not assent to the notion that real damage has been done, and will
instead look to reason to determine what to do and how to respond, rather than to the
dictates of anger.
The Stoic Response in the Middle Realm
How should a Stoic confront wrongdoing, then? If it is the Prokopton who has erred they
should try to make amends as soon as they become aware that they have done wrong.
Further, it’s far better if the agent comes to realize that moral error themselves, rather
than having to be told they have done wrong, both because it means the wrongdoer is
practicing the kind self-reflection needed to catch these errors, and because seeking an
atonement for the infraction that is unprompted shows understanding for the damage
done to the victim and eagerness to improve socially.
When the Stoic is the wronged party they should be quick to forgive when it’s asked for,
and quick to excuse if a reasonable explanation for the offense exists. Because Stoics place
greater emphasis on the purity of the intention behind an act than they do on the outcome
of that act, we should give the benefit of the doubt to whoever has offended us, be willing
to hear out the offending party, and seek the assistance of the law if or when the situation
calls for it. Getting angry, wishing for revenge, or actually seeking that retribution is
never called for.
The Stoic should strive to remain consistent in their actions and to practice so that when
they do encounter an incitement he or she can pause to evaluate the true depth of the
harm, or as Epictetus advises us to do, “Stay with the initial impression” of the event
(Epictetus, 2022, book 2, section 18). If they can do that they’ll see that the base
page 6
facts
presented to them in that initial impression is all they need to form a proper judgement
and plan of response. There’s no need to add emotive value judgments to the first
impression that pops into our heads after an event, and doing so only complicates
matters by disrupting the tranquility needed to address wrongs in a just manner.
Finally, apply punishment only as a means to moral correction, not as a vehicle for
personal satisfaction. We should be strict with ourselves and lenient with others, as
Marcus tells himself to do throughout the Meditations.
When the wrong is grievous Nussbaum believes the matter should be turned over to the
law, but in everyday instances trivial matters can be dealt with in a manner of ways,
many of which Seneca himself suggests in On Anger: non-response (similar to Cato’s
non-reaction when struck in a public bath), a performative show of anger to express
displeasure at the inciting stimulus (dangerous because it can so easily slip into a full
blown passion), avoidance, and so on (Nussbaum, 2016, pgs. 167-168).
6