Potentially copyrighted passage By consulting this text, you confirm that you may use it for personal and educational purposes. Do not reproduce its content. If the book helps you, buy it to support the author or rights holders.

Aristotle

Rhetoric Section 6

Section 11 of 882

Canonical reference 1.1.6

Ancient Greek

ἔτι δὲ φανερὸν ὅτι τοῦ μὲν ἀμφισβητοῦντος οὐδέν ἐστιν ἔξω τοῦ δεῖξαι τὸ πρᾶγμα ὅτι ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἢ γέγονεν ἢ οὐ γέγονεν· εἰ δὲ μέγα ἢ μικρόν, ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, ὅσα μὴ ὁ νομοθέτης διώρικεν, αὐτὸν δή που τὸν δικαστὴν δεῖ γιγνώσκειν καὶ οὐ μανθάνειν παρὰ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων.

English

J. H. Freese, 1926

Further, it is evident that the only business of the litigant is to prove that the fact in question is or is not so, that it has happened or not; whether it is important or unimportant, just or unjust, in all cases in which the legislator has not laid down a ruling, is a matter for the dicast himself to decide; it is not the business of the litigants to instruct him.

French AI-generated translation, non-official

Codex gpt-5.6-sol · Non-official working translation · 2026-09-13

En outre, il est évident que la seule tâche du plaideur consiste à prouver que le fait en question est ou n'est pas tel, qu'il s'est produit ou non. Quant à savoir s'il est important ou sans importance, juste ou injuste, dans tous les cas où le législateur n'a pas établi de règle, c'est au juge lui-même d'en décider; il n'appartient pas aux plaideurs de l'en instruire.

Concepts in this passage

Before reading

What you will learn

Open the full record