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Aristotle

Rhetoric Section 8

Section 32 of 882

Canonical reference 1.10.8

Ancient Greek

ἔστιν δʼ ἡ μὲν βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ ὄρεξις (οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται ἀλλʼ ἢ ὅταν οἰηθῇ εἶναι ἀγαθόν), ἄλογοι δʼ ὀρέξεις ὀργὴ καὶ ἐπιθυμία· ὥστε πάντα ὅσα πράττουσιν ἀνάγκη πράττειν διʼ αἰτίας ἑπτά, διὰ τύχην, διὰ φύσιν, διὰ βίαν, διʼ ἔθος, διὰ λογισμόν, διὰ θυμόν, διʼ ἐπιθυμίαν.

English

J. H. Freese, 1926

Now wish is a [rational] longing for good, for no one wishes for anything unless he thinks it is good; irrational longings are anger and desire. Thus all the actions of men must necessarily be referred to seven causes: chance, nature, compulsion, habit, reason, anger, and desire.

French AI-generated translation, non-official

Codex gpt-5.6-sol · Non-official working translation · 2026-09-13

Or, le souhait est un désir [rationnel] du bien, car nul ne souhaite une chose sans penser qu'elle est bonne; les désirs irrationnels sont la colère et le désir. Ainsi, toutes les actions humaines doivent nécessairement être rapportées à sept causes: le hasard, la nature, la contrainte, l'habitude, la raison, la colère et le désir.

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