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Aristotle

Rhetoric Section 27

Section 238 of 882

Canonical reference 1.6.27

Ancient Greek

ταῦτα δὲ διχῶς ἐστιν, τά τε γενόμενα ἂν καὶ τὰ ῥᾳδίως γιγνόμενα· ῥᾴδια δὲ ὅσα ἢ ἄνευ λύπης ἢ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ· τὸ γὰρ χαλεπὸν ὁρίζεται ἢ λύπῃ ἢ πλήθει χρόνου. καὶ ἐὰν ὡς βούλονται· βούλονται δὲ ἢ μηδὲν κακὸν ἢ ἔλαττον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ (τοῦτο δὲ ἔσται, ἐὰν ἢ λανθάνῃ ἢ ἡ τιμωρία μικρὰ ᾖ).

English

J. H. Freese, 1926

The last are of two kinds: things which might happen, and things which easily happen; by the latter are meant things that happen without labor or in a short time, for difficulty is defined by labor or length of time. And anything that happens as men wish is good; and what they wish is either what is not evil at all or is less an evil than a good, which will be the case for instance, whenever the penalty attached to it is unnoticed or light.

French AI-generated translation, non-official

Codex gpt-5.6-sol · Non-official working translation · 2026-09-13

Ces dernières sont de deux sortes : les choses qui pourraient arriver et celles qui arrivent facilement. Par ces dernières, on entend celles qui arrivent sans travail ou en peu de temps, car la difficulté se définit par le travail ou par la longueur du temps. Et tout ce qui arrive comme les hommes le souhaitent est un bien ; or ce qu’ils souhaitent est soit ce qui n’est aucunement mauvais, soit ce qui constitue un mal moindre qu’un bien, comme ce sera le cas, par exemple, chaque fois que la peine qui s’y attache passe inaperçue ou demeure légère.

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