Rhetoric Section 36

καὶ τὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν τῶν πρὸς δόξαν· ὅρος δὲ τοῦ πρὸς δόξαν, ὃ λανθάνειν μέλλων οὐκ ἂν ἕλοιτο· διὸ καὶ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν τοῦ εὖ ποιεῖν δόξειεν ἂν αἱρετώτερον εἶναι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ κἂν λανθάνῃ αἱρήσεται, ποιεῖν δʼ εὖ λανθάνων οὐ δοκεῖ ἂν ἑλέσθαι.

And real things are preferable to those that have reference to public opinion, the latter being defined as those which a man would not choose if they were likely to remain unnoticed by others. It would seem then that it is better to receive than to confer a benefit; for one would choose the former even if it should pass unnoticed, whereas one would not choose to confer a benefit, if it were likely to remain unknown.

Et les choses réelles sont préférables à celles qui se rapportent à l’opinion publique, ces dernières étant définies comme celles qu’un homme ne choisirait pas si elles devaient rester inaperçues des autres. Il semblerait donc qu’il soit préférable de recevoir un bienfait plutôt que d’en accorder un. Car on choisirait de recevoir même si cela devait passer inaperçu, tandis qu’on ne choisirait pas d’accorder un bienfait s’il devait demeurer inconnu.