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Aristotle

Rhetoric Section 4

Section 799 of 882

Canonical reference 3.17.4

Ancient Greek

ἐν δὲ τοῖς δημηγορικοῖς ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἔσται ἀμφισβητήσειεν ἄν τις, ἢ ὡς ἔσται μὲν ποιοῦσιν ἃ κελεύει, ἀλλʼ οὐ δίκαια ἢ οὐκ ὠφέλιμα ἢ οὐ τηλικαῦτα. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁρᾶν εἴ τι ψεύδεται ἐκτὸς τοῦ πράγματος· τεκμήρια γὰρ ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅτι ψεύδεται.

English

J. H. Freese, 1926

In deliberative oratory, it may be maintained either that certain consequences will not happen, or that what the adversary recommends will happen, but that it will be unjust, inexpedient, or not so important as supposed. But one must also look to see whether he makes any false statements as to things outside the issue; for these look like evidence that he makes misstatements about the issue itself as well.

French AI-generated translation, non-official

Codex gpt-5.6-sol · Non-official working translation · 2026-09-13

Dans l'éloquence délibérative, on peut soutenir soit que certaines conséquences ne se produiront pas, soit que ce que recommande l'adversaire se produira, mais que ce sera injuste, désavantageux ou moins important qu'on ne le suppose. Il faut également examiner s'il formule des affirmations fausses sur des choses étrangères à la question, car elles semblent indiquer qu'il énonce aussi des contrevérités à propos de la question elle-même.

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