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John Locke
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Section S11
Section 200 of 1,114
Canonical reference B2.C11.S11
English
Project Gutenberg transcription of Locke author text
Nor can it be imputed to their want of fit organs to frame articulate sounds, that they have no use or knowledge of general words; since many of them, we find, can fashion such sounds, and pronounce words distinctly enough, but never with any such application. And, on the other side, men who, through some defect in the organs, want words, yet fail not to express their universal ideas by signs, which serve them instead of general words, a faculty which we see beasts come short in. And, therefore, I think, we may suppose, that it is in this that the species of brutes are discriminated from man: and it is that proper difference wherein they are wholly separated, and which at last widens to so vast a distance. For if they have any ideas at all, and are not bare machines, (as some would have them,) we cannot deny them to have some reason. It seems as evident to me, that they do reason, as that they have sense; but it is only in particular ideas, just as they received them from their senses. They are the best of them tied up within those narrow bounds, and have not (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of abstraction.
French AI-generated translation, non-official
Codex gpt-5.6-sol · Non-official working translation · 2026-09-30
On ne peut pas davantage imputer à leur manque d’organes propres à former des sons articulés le fait qu’ils ne fassent aucun usage des mots généraux et n’en aient aucune connaissance, puisque nous constatons que beaucoup d’entre eux peuvent former de tels sons et prononcer des mots assez distinctement, mais jamais en les appliquant de cette manière. Et, d’un autre côté, les hommes qui, par quelque défaut des organes, sont privés de mots ne manquent pourtant pas d’exprimer leurs idées universelles par des signes qui leur tiennent lieu de mots généraux, faculté dont nous voyons que les bêtes sont dépourvues. Je pense donc que nous pouvons supposer que c’est par là que les espèces de brutes se distinguent de l’homme : telle est la différence propre qui les en sépare entièrement et qui finit par creuser entre eux une distance si immense. Car, si elles ont quelque idée que ce soit et ne sont pas de simples machines, comme certains voudraient qu’elles le fussent, nous ne pouvons leur refuser quelque raison. Il me paraît aussi évident qu’elles raisonnent que le fait qu’elles sentent. Mais elles ne raisonnent que sur des idées particulières, telles précisément qu’elles les ont reçues de leurs sens. Même les meilleures d’entre elles sont enfermées dans ces étroites limites et n’ont pas, à ce que je pense, la faculté d’élargir ces idées par aucune sorte d’abstraction.
Concepts in this passage
Care of the soul
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Degrees of knowledge and probability
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Family
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Ideas from sensation and reflection
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Justice
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Knowledge
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Nominal and real essence
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Personal identity and consciousness
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Primary and secondary qualities
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Reason
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Service
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Simple and complex ideas
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Sin
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