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John Locke
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Section S61
Section 406 of 1,114
Canonical reference B2.C21.S61
English
Project Gutenberg transcription of Locke author text
But since our voluntary actions carry not all the happiness and misery that depend on them along with them in their present performance, but are the precedent causes of good and evil, which they draw after them, and bring upon us, when they themselves are past and cease to be; our desires look beyond our present enjoyments, and carry the mind out to ABSENT GOOD, according to the necessity which we think there is of it, to the making or increase of our happiness. It is our opinion of such a necessity that gives it its attraction: without that, we are not moved by absent good. For, in this narrow scantling of capacity which we are accustomed to and sensible of here, wherein we enjoy but one pleasure at once, which, when all uneasiness is away, is, whilst it lasts, sufficient to make us think ourselves happy, it is not all remote and even apparent good that affects us. Because the indolency and enjoyment we have, sufficing for our present happiness, we desire not to venture the change; since we judge that we are happy already, being content, and that is enough. For who is content is happy. But as soon as any new uneasiness comes in, this happiness is disturbed, and we are set afresh on work in the pursuit of happiness.
French
Pierre Coste · Pierre Mortier, Amsterdam, 1735, third edition
Mais pour rendre plus particulierement raiſon de la Miſére où les Hommes ſe précipitent ſouvent d’eux-mêmes, quoi qu’ils recherchent tous le Bonheur avec une entiére ſincerité, il faut conſiderer comme les choſes viennent à être repréſentées à nos Deſirs ſous des apparences trompeuſes, ce qui vient du faux Jugement que nous portons de ces choſes. Et pour voir juſqu’où cela s’étend, & quelles ſont les cauſes de ces faux Jugemens, il faut ſe reſſouvenir que les choſes ſont jugées bonnes ou mauvaiſes en deux ſens.
Prémiérement, ce qui eſt proprement bon ou mauvais, n’eſt autre choſe que le Plaiſir ou la Douleur : & en ſecond lieu, comme ce qui eſt le propre objet de nos deſirs, & qui eſt capable de toucher une Créature doûée de prévoyance, n’eſt pas ſeulement la ſatisfaction & la douleur préſente, mais encore ce qui par ſon efficace ou par ſes ſuites eſt propre à produire ces ſentimens en nous, à une certaine diſtance de temps, on conſidére auſſi comme bonnes & mauvaiſes les choſes qui ſont ſuivies de Plaiſir & de Douleur.
Concepts in this passage
Affects
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Degrees of knowledge and probability
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Desire
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Family
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Ideas from sensation and reflection
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Judgment
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Knowledge
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Mindfulness
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Necessity
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Nominal and real essence
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Personal identity and consciousness
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Pleasure
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Primary and secondary qualities
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Reason
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Roles and relationships
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Simple and complex ideas
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Sin
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Time
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