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Aristotle

Rhetoric Section 23

Section 49 of 882

Canonical reference 1.11.23

Ancient Greek

ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ μανθάνειν τε ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν, καὶ τὰ τοιάδε ἀνάγκη ἡδέα εἶναι, οἷον τό τε μιμούμενον, ὥσπερ γραφικὴ καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιία καὶ ποιητική, καὶ πᾶν ὃ ἂν εὖ μεμιμημένον ᾖ, κἂν ᾖ μὴ ἡδὺ αὐτὸ τὸ μεμιμημένον· οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ χαίρει, ἀλλὰ συλλογισμὸς ἔστιν ὅτι τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο, ὥστε μανθάνειν τι συμβαίνει.

English

J. H. Freese, 1926

And since learning and admiring are pleasant, all things connected with them must also be pleasant; for instance, a work of imitation, such as painting, sculpture, poetry, and all that is well imitated, even if the object of imitation is not pleasant; for it is not this that causes pleasure or the reverse, but the inference that the imitation and the object imitated are identical, so that the result is that we learn something.

French AI-generated translation, non-official

Codex gpt-5.6-sol · Non-official working translation · 2026-09-13

Et puisque apprendre et admirer sont agréables, toutes les choses qui s'y rattachent doivent l'être aussi. Par exemple, une œuvre d'imitation, telle que la peinture, la sculpture, la poésie, et tout ce qui est bien imité, même si l'objet de l'imitation n'est pas agréable. Car ce n'est pas cet objet qui cause le plaisir ou son contraire, mais la conclusion que l'imitation et l'objet imité sont identiques, de sorte qu'il en résulte que nous apprenons quelque chose.

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