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Aristotle

Rhetoric Section 6

Section 59 of 882

Canonical reference 1.11.6

Ancient Greek

ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐστὶν τὸ ἥδεσθαι ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαί τινος πάθους, ἡ δὲ φαντασία ἐστὶν αἴσθησίς τις ἀσθενής, ἀεὶ ἐν τῷ μεμνημένῳ καὶ τῷ ἐλπίζοντι ἀκολουθοῖ ἂν φαντασία τις οὗ μέμνηται ἢ ἐλπίζει· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡδοναὶ ἅμα μεμνημένοις καὶ ἐλπίζουσιν, ἐπείπερ καὶ αἴσθησις·

English

J. H. Freese, 1926

And if pleasure consists in the sensation of a certain emotion, and imagination is a weakened sensation, then both the man who remembers and the man who hopes will be attended by an imagination of what he remembers or hopes. This being so, it is evident that there is pleasure both for those who remember and for those who hope, since there is sensation.

French AI-generated translation, non-official

Codex gpt-5.6-sol · Non-official working translation · 2026-09-13

Et si le plaisir consiste dans la sensation d'une certaine émotion, et si l'imagination est une sensation affaiblie, alors celui qui se souvient comme celui qui espère sera accompagné d'une représentation de ce dont il se souvient ou qu'il espère. S'il en est ainsi, il est évident qu'il y a du plaisir aussi bien pour ceux qui se souviennent que pour ceux qui espèrent, puisqu'il y a sensation.

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