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Cicero

Academica Passage 20

Passage 20 of 69

Canonical reference 1.20

Latin

perseus-cicero-academica-lat

animi autem quae essent ad comprehendendam ingeniis virtutem idonea, eaque ab his in naturam et mores dividebantur. naturae celeritatem ad discendum et memoriam dabant, quorum utrumque mentis esset proprium et ingenii; morum autem putabant studia esse et quasi consuetudinem, quam partim assiduitate exercitationis partim ratione formabant, in quibus erat ipsa philosophia; in qua quod inchoatum est neque absolutum progressio quaedam ad virtutem appellatur, quod autem absolutum, id est virtus, quasi perfectio naturae omniumque rerum quas in animis ponunt una res optima.

English AI-generated translation, non-official

Codex gpt-5.6-sol · Non-official working translation · 2026-09-11

“The goods of the mind were those that made our natural capacities fit to apprehend virtue, and these they divided into nature and character. To nature they assigned quickness in learning and memory, both of which belonged properly to the mind and intelligence. To character they assigned interests and a kind of habitual disposition, which they formed partly through constant practice and partly through reason. In these lay philosophy itself. Within philosophy, what has been begun but not completed is called a kind of progress toward virtue, while what has been completed is virtue. Virtue is, as it were, the perfection of nature and, of all the things they locate in the mind, the single best thing.”

French AI-generated translation, non-official

Codex gpt-5.6-sol · Non-official working translation · 2026-09-11

« Pour l’esprit, ils comptaient les qualités naturelles propres à saisir la vertu. Ils les divisaient entre le naturel et les mœurs. Au naturel, ils attribuaient la rapidité à apprendre et la mémoire, qui appartiennent toutes deux en propre à l’intelligence et au génie. Ils pensaient que les mœurs consistaient dans les goûts et dans une sorte d’habitude, qu’ils formaient en partie par la continuité de l’exercice, en partie par la raison. C’est en cela que résidait la philosophie elle-même. Ce qui y est commencé sans être achevé est appelé une certaine progression vers la vertu. Ce qui est achevé, c’est la vertu, comme la perfection de la nature et, parmi toutes les choses qu’ils placent dans l’esprit, la seule qui soit absolument excellente. »

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