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John Locke
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Section S26
Section 601 of 1,114
Canonical reference B2.C32.S26
English
Project Gutenberg transcription of Locke author text
Upon the whole matter, I think that our ideas, as they are considered by the mind, - either in reference to the proper signification of their names; or in reference to the reality of things, - may very fitly be called RIGHT or WRONG ideas, according as they agree or disagree to those patterns to which they are referred. But if any one had rather call them true or false, it is fit he use a liberty, which every one has, to call things by those names he thinks best; though, in propriety of speech, TRUTH or FALSEHOOD will, I think, scarce agree to them, but as they, some way or other, virtually contain in them some mental proposition. The ideas that are in a man’s mind, simply considered, cannot be wrong; unless complex ones, wherein inconsistent parts are jumbled together. All other ideas are in themselves right, and the knowledge about them right and true knowledge; but when we come to refer them to anything, as to their patterns and archetypes then they are capable of being wrong, as far as they disagree with such archetypes.
French
Pierre Coste · Pierre Mortier, Amsterdam, 1735, third edition
En un mot, je croi que nos Idées, conſiderées par l’Eſprit ou par rapport à la ſignification propre des noms qu’on leur donne ou par rapport à la réalité des choſes, peuvent être fort bien nommées idées () juſtes ou fautives, ſelon qu’elles conviennent ou diſconviennent aux Modèles auxquels on les rapporte. Mais qui voudra les appeler véritables ou fauſſes, peut le faire. Il eſt juſte qu’il jouïſſe de la liberté que chacun peut prendre de donner aux choſes tels noms qu’il juge leur convenir le mieux, quoi que ſelon la propriété du Langage, la vérité & la fauſſeté ne puiſſent guere convenir aux Idées, ce me ſemble, ſinon entant que d’une maniére ou d’autre elles renferment virtuellement quelque Propoſition mentale. Les Idées qui ſont dans l’Eſprit d’un homme, conſiderées ſimplement en elles-mêmes, ne ſauroient être fauſſes, excepté les Idées complexes dont les parties ſont incompatibles. Toutes les autres Idées ſont droites en elles-mêmes, & la connoiſſance qu’on en a, eſt une connoiſſance droite & véritable. Mais quand nous venons à les rapporter à certaines choſes, comme à leurs Modèles ou Archetypes, alors elles peuvent être fauſſes, autant qu’elles s’éloignent de ces Archetypes.
Concepts in this passage
Care of the soul
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Degrees of knowledge and probability
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Ether and field
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Family
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Freedom
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Ideas from sensation and reflection
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Impressions and assent
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Justice
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Knowledge
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Law
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Mode
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Nominal and real essence
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Personal identity and consciousness
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Primary and secondary qualities
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Psychological complex
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Reason
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Simple and complex ideas
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Sin
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Spirit
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Suffering
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Truth
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Virtue
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