The Essays Chapter 47

(1, p. 117v-120v).Michel de MontaigneC147 De l’incertitude de nostre iugementMontaigne - Essais, Éd de Bordeaux, 1.djvuMontaigne - Essais, Éd de Bordeaux, 1.djvu/1117v-120v
Chapitre 47 :
De l’Incertitude de Nostre Jugement

C’Est bien ce que dict ce vers :

'Επέων δὲ πολὺς νόμος ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα,

il y a prou loy de parler par tout, et pour et contre. Pour exemple :

Vinse Hannibal, et non seppe usar’poi
Ben la vittoriosa sua ventura,

qui voudra estre de ce party, et faire valoir avecques nos gens la
faute de n’avoir dernierement poursuivy nostre pointe à Montcontour, ou qui voudra accuser le Roy d’espagne de n’avoir sçeu se servir de l’advantage qu’il eut contre nous à Sainct Quentin, il pourra dire cette faute partir d’une ame enyvrée de sa bonne fortune, et d’un courage, lequel, plein et gorgé de ce commencement de bon heur, perd le goust de l’accroistre, des-jà par trop empesché à digerer ce qu’il en a ; il en a sa brassée toute comble, il n’en peut saisir davantage, indigne que la fortune luy aye mis un tel bien entre mains : car
quel profit en sent-il, si neantmoins il donne à son ennemy moyen
de se remettre sus ? quell’ esperance peut on avoir qu’il ose un’ autre
fois attaquer ceux-cy ralliez et remis, et de nouveau armez de despit
et de vengeance, qui ne les a osé ou sçeu poursuivre tous rompus et
effrayez ?

Dum fortuna calet, dum conficit omnia terror.

Mais en fin, que peut-il attendre de mieux que ce qu’il vient de
perdre ? Ce n’est pas comme à l’escrime, où le nombre des touches
donne gain : tant que l’ennemy est en pieds, c’est à recommencer de
plus belle ; ce n’est pas victoire, si elle ne met fin à la guerre. En
cette escarmouche où Caesar eut du pire pres la Ville d’Oricum, il
reprochoit aux soldats de Pompeius qu’il eust esté perdu, si leur
Capitaine eust sçeu vaincre, et luy chaussa bien autrement les
esperons quand ce fut à son tour. Mais pourquoy ne dira l’on aussi
au
contraire, que c’est l’effect d’un esprit precipiteux et insatiable de
ne sçavoir mettre fin à sa convoitise ; que c’est abuser des faveurs
de Dieu, de leur vouloir faire perdre la mesure qu’il leur a
prescripte : et que, de se rejetter au dangier apres la victoire, c’est
la remettre encore un coup à la mercy de la fortune ; que l’une des
plus grandes sagesses en l’art militaire c’est de ne pousser son ennemy
au desespoir. Sylla et Marius en la guerre sociale ayant défaict les
Marses, en voyant encore une trouppe de reste, qui par desespoir se
revenoient jetter à eux comme bestes furieuses, ne furent pas d’advis
de les attendre. Si l’ardeur de Monsieur de Foix ne l’eut emporté
à poursuivre trop asprement les restes de la victoire de Ravenne, il
ne l’eut pas souillée de sa mort. Toutesfois encore servit la recente
memoire de son exemple à conserver Monsieur d’Anguien de pareil
inconvenient à Serisoles. Il faict dangereux assaillir un homme à
qui vous avez osté tout autre moyen d’eschaper que par les armes : car
c’est
une violente maistresse
d’escole que la necessité :

Vincitur haud gratis jugulo qui provocat hostem.

Clodomire, Roy d’Aquitaine, apres sa victoire poursuyvant Gondemar,
Roy de Bourgogne, vaincu et fuiant, le força de tourner teste ; mais
son opiniatreté luy osta le fruict de sa victoire, car il y mourut.
Pareillement, qui auroit à choisir, ou de tenir ses soldats richement
et somptueusement armez, ou armez seulement pour la necessité, il se
presenteroit en faveur du premier party, duquel estoit Sertorius,
Philopoemen,
Brutus, Caesar et autres, que c’est tousjours un éguillon d’honneur
et de gloire au soldat de se voir paré, et un’ occasion de se rendre
plus obstiné au combat, ayant à sauver ses armes comme ses biens et
heritages :

Mais il s’offriroit aussi, de l’autre part, qu’on doit plustost oster
au soldat le soing de se conserver, que de le luy accroistre ; qu’il
craindra par ce moyen doublement à se hazarder : joint que c’est
augmenter à l’ennemy l’envie de la victoire par ces riches
despouilles ; et a l’on remarqué que, d’autres fois, cela encouragea
merveilleusement les Romains à l’encontre des Samnites.

Licurgus deffendoit aux siens, non seulement la sumptuosité en leur
equipage, mais encore de despouiller leurs ennemis vaincus, voulant,
disoit-il, que la pauvreté et frugalité reluisit avec le reste de la
bataille. Aux sieges et ailleurs, où l’occasion nous approche de
l’ennemy, nous donnons volontiers licence aux soldats de le braver,
desdaigner et injurier de toutes façons de reproches, et non sans
apparence de raison : car ce n’est pas faire peu, de leur oster toute
esperance de grace et de
composition, en leur representant qu’il n’y a
plus ordre de l’attendre de celuy qu’ils ont si fort outragé, et
qu’il
ne reste remede que de la victoire. Si est-ce qu’il en mesprit à
Vitellius : car, ayant affaire à Othon, plus foible en valeur de
soldats, des-accoustumez de longue main du faict de la guerre et
amollis par les delices de la ville, il les agassa tant en fin par ses
paroles picquantes, leur reprochant leur pusillanimité et le regret
des Dames et festes qu’ils venoient de laisser à Rome, qu’il leur
remit par ce moyen le cœur au ventre, ce que nuls enhortemens
n’avoient sceu faire, et les attira luymesme sur ses bras, où l’on ne
les pouvoit pousser : et, de vray, quand ce sont injures qui touchent
au
vif, elles peuvent faire ayséement que celuy qui alloit lachement à
la besongne pour la querelle de son Roy, y aille d’un autre affection
pour la sienne propre. A considerer de combien d’importance est la
conservation d’un chef en un’ armée, et que la visée de l’ennemy
regarde principalement cette teste à laquelle tiennent toutes les
autres et en dependent, il semble qu’on ne puisse mettre en doubte
ce
conseil, que nous voions avoir esté pris par plusieurs grands chefs,
de se travestir et desguiser sur le point de la meslée ; toutefois
l’inconvenient qu’on encourt par ce moyen n’est pas
moindre que celuy qu’on pense fuir : car le capitaine venant à estre
mesconu des siens, le courage qu’ils prennent de son exemple et de sa
presence, vient aussi quant et quant à leur faillir, et, perdant la
veue de ses marques et enseignes accoustumées, ils le jugent ou
mort,
ou s’estre desrobé, desesperant de l’affaire. Et, quant à
l’experience, nous luy voyons favoriser tantost l’un, tantost l’autre
party. L’accident de Pyrrhus, en la bataille qu’il eut contre le
consul Levinus en Italie, nous sert à l’un et l’autre visage : car,
pour s’estre voulu cacher sous les armes de Demogacles et luy avoir
donné les siennes, il sauva bien sans doute sa vie, mais aussi il en
cuida encourir l’autre inconvenient, de
perdre la journée.

A la bataille de Pharsale, entre autres reproches qu’on donne à
Pompeius, c’est d’avoir arresté son armée pied coy, attendant
l’ennemy : pour autant que cela (je des-roberay icy les mots mesmes de
Plutarque, qui valent mieux que les miens) affoiblit la violence que
le courir donne aux premiers coups, et, quant et quant, oste
l’eslancement des combatans les uns contre les autres, qui a
accoustumé
de les remplir d’impetuosité et de fureur plus que autre chose, quand
ils viennent à s’entrechoquer de roideur, leur augmentant le courage
par
le cry et la course, et rend la chaleur des soldats, en maniere de dire,
refroidie et figée. Voilà ce qu’il dict pour ce rolle : mais si
Caesar eut perdu, qui n’eust peu aussi bien dire qu’au contraire la
plus forte et roide assiette est celle en laquelle on se tient planté
sans bouger, et que, qui est en sa marche arresté, resserrant et
espargnant pour le besoing sa force en soymesmes, a grand avantage
contre celuy qui est esbranlé et qui a desja consommé à la course la
moitié de son haleine ? outre ce que, l’armée estant un corps de tant
de diverses pieces, il est impossible qu’elle s’esmeuve en cette furie
d’un mouvement si juste, qu’elle n’en altere ou rompe son ordonnance,
et que le plus dispost ne soit aux prises, avant que son compagnon
le
secoure.

D’autres
ont reglé ce doubte en leur armée de cette maniere : si les ennemis
vous courent sus, attendez les de pied coy, s’ils vous attendent de
pied
coy, courez leur sus. Au passage que l’Empereur Charles cinquiesme
fit en Provence, le Roy François fust au propre d’eslire ou de
luy
aller au devant en Italie, ou de l’attendre en ses terres : et,
bien qu’il considerast combien c’est d’avantage de conserver sa maison
pure et
nette de troubles de la guerre, afin qu’entiere en ses forces elle
puisse continuellement fournir deniers et secours au besoing ; que la
necessité des guerres porte à tous les coups de
faire le gast, ce qui
ne se peut faire bonnement en nos biens propres, et si le païsant ne
porte pas si doucement ce ravage de ceux de son party que de l’ennemy,
en maniere qu’il s’en peut aysément allumer des seditions et des
troubles parmy nous ; que la licence de desrober et de piller, qui ne
peut estre permise en son pays, est un grand support aux ennuis de la
guerre, et, qui n’a autre esperance de gaing que sa solde, il est
mal aisé
qu’il soit tenu en office, estant à deux pas de sa femme et de
sa retraicte ; que celuy qui met la nappe, tombe tousjours des despens ;
qu’il y a plus d’allegresse à assaillir qu’à deffendre ; et que la
secousse de la perte d’une bataille dans nos entrailles est si
violente
qu’il est malaisé qu’elle ne crolle tout le corps, attendu qu’il n’est
passion contagieuse comme celle de la peur, ny qui se preigne si
ayséement à credit, et qui s’espande plus brusquement ; et que les
villes qui auront ouy l’esclat de cette tempeste à leurs portes, qui
auront recueilly leurs Capitaines et soldats tremblans encore et hors
d’haleine, il est dangereux, sur la chaude, qu’ils ne se jettent à
quelque mauvais party : si est-ce qu’il choisit de r’appeller les
forces
qu’il avoit delà les monts, et de voir venir l’ennemy : car il peut
imaginer au contraire, qu’estant chez luy et entre ses amis, il ne
pouvoit faillir d’avoir planté de toutes commoditez : les rivieres,
les
passages, à sa devotion, luy conduiroient et vivres et deniers en
toute seureté et sans besoing d’escorte ; qu’il auroit ses subjects
d’autant plus affectionnez, qu’ils auroient le dangier plus pres ;
qu’ayant tant de villes et de barrieres pour sa seureté, ce seroit à
luy
de donner loy au combat selon son opportunité et advantage ; et, s’il
luy plaisoit de temporiser, qu’à l’abry et à son aise il pourroit
voir morfondre son ennemy, et se défaire soy mesmes par les
difficultez qui le combatroyent, engagé en une terre contraire, où
il
n’auroit devant, ny derriere luy, ny à costé, rien qui ne luy fit
guerre, nul moyen de
refréchir ou eslargir son armée,
si les maladies s’y mettoient, ny de loger à couvert ses blessez ;
nuls
deniers, nuls vivres qu’à pointe de lance ; nul loisir de se reposer et
prendre haleine ; nulle science de lieux ny de pays, qui le sçeut
deffendre d’embusches et surprises ; et, s’il venoit à la perte d’une
bataille, aucun moyen d’en sauver les reliques. Et n’avoit pas faute
d’exemples pour l’un et pour l’autre party. Scipion trouva bien
meilleur
d’aller assaillir les terres de son ennemy en Afrique, que de defendre
les siennes et le combatre en Italie où il estoit, d’où bien luy
print. Mais, au rebours, Hannibal, en cette mesme guerre, se ruina
d’avoir abandonné la conqueste d’un pays estranger pour aller
deffendre
le sien. Les Atheniens, ayant laissé l’ennemy en leurs terres pour
passer en la Sicile, eurent la fortune contraire ; mais Agathocles,
Roy de Siracuse, l’eust favorable, ayant passé en Afrique et
laissé la guerre chez soy. Ainsi nous avons bien accoustumé de dire
avec raison que les evenemens et issues dependent, notamment en la
guerre, pour la pluspart, de la fortune, laquelle ne se veut pas renger
et assujectir à nostre discours et prudence, comme disent ces vers :

Et male consultis pretium est : prudentia fallax,
Nec fortuna probat causas sequiturque merentes ;
Sed vaga per cunctos nullo discrimine fertur ;
Scilicet est aliud quod nos cogatque regatque
Majus, et in proprias ducat mortalia leges.

Mais, à le bien prendre, il semble
que
nos conseils et deliberations en dependent bien autant, et que la
fortune engage en son trouble et incertitude aussi nos discours.

Chapter XLVII. Of the uncertainty of our judgment.

Well says this verse:

For example:

Such as would improve this argument, and condemn the oversight of our

leaders in not pushing home the victory at Moncontour, or accuse the King

of Spain of not knowing how to make the best use of the advantage he had

against us at St. Quentin, may conclude these oversights to proceed from

a soul already drunk with success, or from a spirit which, being full and

overgorged with this beginning of good fortune, had lost the appetite of

adding to it, already having enough to do to digest what it had taken in:

he has his arms full, and can embrace no more: unworthy of the benefit

fortune has conferred upon him and the advantage she had put into his

hands: for what utility does he reap from it, if, notwithstanding, he

give his enemy respite to rally and make head against him? What hope is

there that he will dare at another time to attack an enemy reunited and

recomposed, and armed anew with anger and revenge, who did not dare to

pursue them when routed and unmanned by fear?

"Dum fortuna calet, dum conficit omnia terror."

But withal, what better opportunity can he expect than that he has lost?

'Tis not here, as in fencing, where the most hits gain the prize; for so

long as the enemy is on foot, the game is new to begin, and that is not

to be called a victory that puts not an end to the war. In the encounter

where Caesar had the worst, near the city of Oricum, he reproached

Pompey's soldiers that he had been lost had their general known how to

overcome; and afterwards clawed him in a very different fashion when it

came to his turn.

But why may not a man also argue, on the contrary, that it is the effect

of a precipitous and insatiate spirit not to know how to bound and

restrain its coveting; that it is to abuse the favours of God to exceed

the measure He has prescribed them: and that again to throw a man's self

into danger after a victory obtained is again to expose himself to the

mercy of fortune: that it is one of the greatest discretions in the rule

of war not to drive an enemy to despair? Sylla and Marius in the social

war, having defeated the Marsians, seeing yet a body of reserve that,

prompted by despair, was coming on like enraged brutes to dash in upon

them, thought it not convenient to stand their charge. Had not Monsieur

de Foix's ardour transported him so furiously to pursue the remains of

the victory of Ravenna, he had not obscured it by his own death. And yet

the recent memory of his example served to preserve Monsieur d'Anguien

from the same misfortune at the battle of Serisoles. 'Tis dangerous to

attack a man you have deprived of all means to escape but by his arms,

for necessity teaches violent resolutions:

"Gravissimi sunt morsus irritatae necessitatis."

"Vincitur haud gratis, jugulo qui provocat hostem."

This was it that made Pharax withhold the King of Lacedaemon, who had won

a battle against the Mantineans, from going to charge a thousand Argians,

who had escaped in an entire body from the defeat, but rather let them

steal off at liberty that he might not encounter valour whetted and

enraged by mischance. Clodomir, king of Aquitaine, after his victory

pursuing Gondemar, king of Burgundy, beaten and making off as fast as he

could for safety, compelled him to face about and make head, wherein his

obstinacy deprived him of the fruit of his conquest, for he there lost

his life.

In like manner, if a man were to choose whether he would have his

soldiers richly and sumptuously accoutred or armed only for the necessity

of the matter in hand, this argument would step in to favour the first,

of which opinion was Sertorius, Philopcemen, Brutus, Caesar, and others,

that it is to a soldier an enflaming of courage and a spur himself in

brave attire; and withal a motive to be more obstinate in fight, having

his arms, which are in a manner his estate and whole inheritance to

defend; which is the reason, says Xenophon, why those of Asia carried

their wives and concubines, with their choicest jewels and greatest

wealth, along with them to the wars. But then these arguments would be

as ready to stand up for the other side; that a general ought rather to

lessen in his men their solicitude of preserving themselves than to

increase it; that by such means they will be in a double fear of

hazarding their persons, as it will be a double temptation to the enemy

to fight with greater resolution where so great booty and so rich spoils

are to be obtained; and this very thing has been observed in former

times, notably to encourage the Romans against the Samnites. Antiochus,

shewing Hannibal the army he had raised, wonderfully splendid and rich in

all sorts of equipage, asked him if the Romans would be satisfied with

that army? "Satisfied," replied the other, "yes, doubtless, were their

avarice never so great." Lycurgus not only forbad his soldiers all

manner of bravery in their equipage, but, moreover, to strip their

conquered enemies, because he would, as he said, that poverty and

frugality should shine with the rest of the battle.

At sieges and elsewhere, where occasion draws us near to the enemy, we

willingly suffer our men to brave, rate, and affront him with all sorts

of injurious language; and not without some colour of reason: for it is

of no little consequence to take from them all hopes of mercy and

composition, by representing to them that there is no fair quarter to be

expected from an enemy they have incensed to that degree, nor other

remedy remaining but in victory. And yet Vitellius found himself

deceived in this way of proceeding; for having to do with Otho, weaker in

the valour of his soldiers, long unaccustomed to war and effeminated with

the delights of the city, he so nettled them at last with injurious

language, reproaching them with cowardice and regret for the mistresses

and entertainments they had left behind at Rome, that by this means he

inspired them with such resolution as no exhortation had had the power to

have done, and himself made them fall upon him, with whom their own

captains before could by no means prevail. And, indeed, when they are

injuries that touch to the quick, it may very well fall out that he who

went but unwillingly to work in the behalf of his prince will fall to't

with another sort of mettle when the quarrel is his own.

Considering of how great importance is the preservation of the general of

an army, and that the universal aim of an enemy is levelled directly at

the head, upon which all the others depend, the course seems to admit of

no dispute, which we know has been taken by so many great captains, of

changing their habit and disguising their persons upon the point of going

to engage. Nevertheless, the inconvenience a man by so doing runs into

is not less than that he thinks to avoid; for the captain, by this means

being concealed from the knowledge of his own men, the courage they

should derive from his presence and example happens by degrees to cool

and to decay; and not seeing the wonted marks and ensigns of their

leader, they presently conclude him either dead, or that, despairing of

the business, he is gone to shift for himself. And experience shows us

that both these ways have been successful and otherwise. What befell

Pyrrhus in the battle he fought against the Consul Levinus in Italy will

serve us to both purposes; for though by shrouding his person under the

armour of Megacles and making him wear his own, he undoubtedly preserved

his own life, yet, by that very means, he was withal very near running

into the other mischief of losing the battle. Alexander, Caesar, and

Lucullus loved to make themselves known in a battle by rich accoutrements

and armour of a particular lustre and colour: Agis, Agesilaus, and that

great Gilippus, on the contrary, used to fight obscurely armed, and

without any imperial attendance or distinction.

Amongst other oversights Pompey is charged withal at the battle of

Pharsalia, he is condemned for making his army stand still to receive the

enemy's charge; by "reason that" (I shall here steal Plutarch's own

words, which are better than mine) "he by so doing deprived himself of

the violent impression the motion of running adds to the first shock of

arms, and hindered that clashing of the combatants against one another

which is wont to give them greater impetuosity and fury; especially when

they come to rush in with their utmost vigour, their courages increasing

by the shouts and the career; 'tis to render the soldiers' ardour, as a

man may say, more reserved and cold." This is what he says. But if

Caesar had come by the worse, why might it not as well have been urged by

another, that, on the contrary, the strongest and most steady posture of

fighting is that wherein a man stands planted firm without motion; and

that they who are steady upon the march, closing up, and reserving their

force within themselves for the push of the business, have a great

advantage against those who are disordered, and who have already spent

half their breath in running on precipitately to the charge? Besides

that an army is a body made up of so many individual members, it is

impossible for it to move in this fury with so exact a motion as not to

break the order of battle, and that the best of them are not engaged

before their fellows can come on to help them. In that unnatural battle

betwixt the two Persian brothers, the Lacedaemonian Clearchus, who

commanded the Greeks of Cyrus' party, led them on softly and without

precipitation to the charge; but, coming within fifty paces, hurried them

on full speed, hoping in so short a career both to keep their order and

to husband their breath, and at the same time to give the advantage of

impetuosity and impression both to their persons and their missile arms.

Others have regulated this question as to their armies thus if your enemy

come full drive upon you, stand firm to receive him; if he stand to

receive you, run full drive upon him.

In the expedition of the Emperor Charles V. into Provence, King Francis

was put to choose either to go meet him in Italy or to await him in his

own dominions; wherein, though he very well considered of how great

advantage it was to preserve his own territory entire and clear from the

troubles of war, to the end that, being unexhausted of its stores, it

might continually supply men and money at need; that the necessity of war

requires at every turn to spoil and lay waste the country before us,

which cannot very well be done upon one's own; to which may be added,

that the country people do not so easily digest such a havoc by those of

their own party as from an enemy, so that seditions and commotions might

by such means be kindled amongst us; that the licence of pillage and

plunder (which are not to be tolerated at home) is a great ease and

refreshment against the fatigues and sufferings of war; and that he who

has no other prospect of gain than his bare pay will hardly be kept from

running home, being but two steps from his wife and his own house; that

he who lays the cloth is ever at the charge of the feast; that there is

more alacrity in assaulting than defending; and that the shock of a

battle's loss in our own bowels is so violent as to endanger the

disjointing of the whole body, there being no passion so contagious as

that of fear, that is so easily believed, or that so suddenly diffuses

itself; and that the cities that should hear the rattle of this tempest

at their gates, that should take in their captains and soldiers yet

trembling and out of breath, would be in danger in this heat and hurry to

precipitate themselves upon some untoward resolution: notwithstanding all

this, so it was that he chose to recall the forces he had beyond the

mountains and to suffer the enemy to come to him. For he might, on the

other hand, imagine that, being at home and amongst his friends, he could

not fail of plenty of all manner of conveniences; the rivers and passes

he had at his devotion would bring him in both provisions and money in

all security, and without the trouble of convoy; that he should find his

subjects by so much the more affectionate to him, by how much their

danger was more near and pressing; that having so many cities and

barriers to secure him, it would be in his power to give the law of

battle at his own opportunity and advantage; and that, if it pleased him

to delay the time, under cover and at his ease he might see his enemy

founder and defeat himself with the difficulties he was certain to

encounter, being engaged in a hostile country, where before, behind, and

on every side war would be made upon him; no means to refresh himself or

to enlarge his quarters, should diseases infest them, or to lodge his

wounded men in safety; no money, no victuals, but at the point of the

lance; no leisure to repose and take breath; no knowledge of the ways or

country to secure him from ambushes and surprises; and in case of losing

a battle, no possible means of saving the remains. Neither is there want

of example in both these cases.

Scipio thought it much better to go and attack his enemy's territories in

Africa than to stay at home to defend his own and to fight him in Italy,

and it succeeded well with him. But, on the contrary, Hannibal in the

same war ruined himself by abandoning the conquest of a foreign country

to go and defend his own. The Athenians having left the enemy in their

own dominions to go over into Sicily, were not favoured by fortune in

their design; but Agathocles, king of Syracuse, found her favourable to

him when he went over into Africa and left the war at home.

By which examples we are wont to conclude, and with some reason, that

events, especially in war, for the most part depend upon fortune, who

will not be governed by nor submit unto human reasons and prudence,

according to the poet:

"Et male consultis pretium est: prudentia fallit

Nec fortune probat causas, sequiturque merentes,

Sed vaga per cunctos nullo discrimine fertur.

Scilicet est aliud, quod nos cogatque regatque

Majus, et in proprias ducat mortalia leges."

But, to take the thing right, it should seem that our counsels and

deliberations depend as much upon fortune as anything else we do, and

that she engages also our arguments in her uncertainty and confusion.

"We argue rashly and adventurously," says Timaeus in Plato, "by reason

that, as well as ourselves, our discourses have great participation in

the temerity of chance."