The Essays Chapter 53

(1, p. 128v-129).Michel de MontaigneC153 D’un mot de CæsarMontaigne - Essais, Éd de Bordeaux, 1.djvuMontaigne - Essais, Éd de Bordeaux, 1.djvu/1128v-129
Chapitre 53 :
D’un Mot de Caesar

SI nous nous amusions par fois à nous considerer, et le temps que nous mettons à contreroller autruy et à connoistre les choses qui sont hors de nous, que nous l’emploissions à nous sonder nous mesmes, nous sentirions aisément combien toute cette nostre contexture est bastie de pieces foibles et defaillantes.
N’est-ce pas un singulier tesmoignage d’imperfection, ne pouvoir
r’assoir nostre contentement en aucune chose, et que, par desir mesme et imagination, il soit hors de nostre puissance de choisir ce
qu’il nous
faut ? Dequoy porte bon tesmoignage cette grande dispute qui a
tousjours esté entre les Philosophes pour trouver le souverain bien
de l’homme, et qui dure encores et durera eternellement, sans
resolution et sans accord :

dum abest quod avemus, id exuperare videtur
Caetera ; post aliud cùm contigit illud avemus,
Et sitis aequa tenet.

Quoy que ce soit qui tombe en nostre connoissance et jouïssance,
nous
sentons qu’il ne nous satisfaict pas, et allons beant apres les
choses
advenir et inconnues, d’autant que les presentes ne nous soulent
point :
non pas, à mon advis, qu’elles n’ayent assez dequoy nous souler, mais
c’est que nous les saisissons d’une prise malade et desreglée,

Nam, cùm vidit hic, ad usum quae flagitat usus,
Omnia jam ferme mortalibus esse parata,
Divitiis homines et honore et laude potentes
Affluere, atque bona natorum excellere fama,
Nec minus esse domi cuiquam tamen anxia corda,
Atque animum infestis cogi servire querelis :
Intellexit ibi vitium vas efficere ipsum,
Omniaque illius vitio corrumpier intus,
Quae collata foris et commoda quaeque venirent.

Nostre appetit est irresolu et incertain : il ne sçait rien tenir, ny
rien jouyr de bonne façon. L’homme, estimant que ce soit le vice de
ces choses, se remplit et se paist d’autres choses qu’il ne sçait
point et qu’il ne cognoit point, où il applique ses desirs et ses
esperances, les prend en honneur et reverence : comme dict Caesar,
communi fit vitio naturae ut invisis, latitantibus atque incognitis rebus magis confidamus, vehementiusque exterreamur.

Chapter LIII. Of a saying of Caesar.

If we would sometimes bestow a little consideration upon ourselves, and

employ the time we spend in prying into other men's actions, and

discovering things without us, in examining our own abilities we should

soon perceive of how infirm and decaying material this fabric of ours is

composed. Is it not a singular testimony of imperfection that we cannot

establish our satisfaction in any one thing, and that even our own fancy

and desire should deprive us of the power to choose what is most proper

and useful for us? A very good proof of this is the great dispute that

has ever been amongst the philosophers, of finding out man's sovereign

good, that continues yet, and will eternally continue, without solution

or accord:

"Dum abest quod avemus, id exsuperare videtur

Caetera; post aliud, quum contigit illud, avemus,

Et sitis aequa tenet."

Whatever it is that falls into our knowledge and possession, we find that

it satisfies not, and we still pant after things to come and unknown,

inasmuch as those present do not suffice for us; not that, in my

judgment, they have not in them wherewith to do it, but because we seize

them with an unruly and immoderate haste:

"Nam quum vidit hic, ad victum qux flagitat usus,

Et per quae possent vitam consistere tutam,

Omnia jam ferme mortalibus esse parata;

Divitiis homines, et honore, et laude potentes

Aflluere, atque bona natorum excellere fama;

Nec minus esse domi cuiquam tamen anxia corda,

Atque animi ingratis vitam vexare querelis

Causam, quae infestis cogit saevire querelis,

Intellegit ibi; vitium vas efficere ipsum,

Omniaque, illius vitio, corrumpier intus,

Qux collata foris et commoda quomque venirent."

Our appetite is irresolute and fickle; it can neither keep nor enjoy

anything with a good grace: and man concluding it to be the fault of the

things he is possessed of, fills himself with and feeds upon the idea of

things he neither knows nor understands, to which he devotes his hopes

and his desires, paying them all reverence and honour, according to the

saying of Caesar:

"Communi fit vitio naturae, ut invisis, latitantibus

atque incognitis rebus magis confidamas,

vehementiusque exterreamur."