Discourses of Musonius Rufus Reported by Lucius Passage 8

Εἰσελθόντος δέ ποτε ὡς αὐτὸν τῶν βασιλέων τινὸς τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς Συρίας, ἦσαν γὰρ ἔτι τότε ἐν Συρίᾳ βασιλεῖς Ῥωμαίων ὑπήκοοι, ἄλλα τε πολλὰ εἶπε πρὸς τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ δὴ καὶ ταῦτα. Μὴ οἴου, ἔφη, ἄλλῳ τινὶ μᾶλλον προσήκειν φιλοσοφεῖν ἢ σοί, μηδ’ ἄλλου του χάριν μᾶλλον ἢ ὅτι βασιλεὺς τυγχάνεις ὤν. δεῖ μὲν γὰρ δήπου δύνασθαι τὸν βασιλέα σῴζειν ἀνθρώπους καὶ εὐεργετεῖν· τὸν δέ γε σώσοντα καὶ εὐεργετήσοντα χρὴ ἐπίστασθαι, τί μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώπῳ τί δὲ κακόν, καὶ τί μὲν ὠφέλιμον τί δὲ βλαβερόν, καὶ συμφέρον γε καὶ ἀσύμφορον· εἴ γε ἀπόλλυνται μὲν οἱ περιπίπτοντες τοῖς κακοῖς, σῴζονται δὲ οἱ τυγχάνοντες τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ εὐεργετοῦνται μὲν οἱ ἀξιούμενοι τῶν ὠφελίμων καὶ συμφερόντων, κακοποιοῦνται δὲ οἱ ἐμβαλλόμενοι τοῖς ἀσυμφόροις καὶ βλαβεροῖς. ἀγαθὸν μέντοι καὶ κακὸν ἢ συμφέρον καὶ ἀσύμφορον ἢ ὠφέλιμον καὶ βλαβερὸν οὐκ ἄλλου του διαγινώσκειν ἢ τοῦ φιλοσόφου ἐστίν, ὃς αὐτὸ τοῦτο διατελεῖ πραγματευόμενος, ὅπως μηδὲ ἓν τούτων ἀγνοήσει, καὶ τέχνην πεποίηται ταύτην εἰδέναι τί φέρει πρὸς ἀνθρώπου εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ κακοδαιμονίαν. διὸ φαίνεται δεῖν τὸν βασιλέα φιλοσοφεῖν. καὶ μὴν προσήκει μὲν τῷ βασιλεῖ, μᾶλλον δ’ ἀνάγκη ἐστὶν αὐτῷ, τὰ δίκαια βραβεύειν τοῖς ὑπηκόοις, ὡς μήτε πλέον ἔχειν μήτε ἐλαττοῦσθαι μηδένα παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τιμῆς καὶ τιμωρίας τυγχάνειν τοὺς ἀξίους. ταῦτα δὲ πῶς ποτε δυνηθείη ἄν τις δίκαιος οὐκ ὤν; δίκαιος δὲ πῶς ἂν εἴη τις μὴ ἐπιστάμενος δικαιοσύνην, ὁποῖόν τι ἐστίν; πάλιν οὖν καὶ ταύτῃ φιλοσοφητέον τῷ βασιλεῖ, ὅτι δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως φαίνοιτο γνούς, εἰ μὴ φιλοσοφήσειεν. οὐ γὰρ οὔθ’ ὡς οὐχ ὁ μαθὼν μᾶλλον εἰδήσει τὰ δίκαία τοῦ μὴ μαθόντος ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, οὔθ’ ὡς οὐκ ἀμαθεῖς εἰσι τῶν τοιούτων πάντες οἱ μὴ φιλοσοφήσαντες. στασιάζουσι γοῦν καὶ πολεμοῦσι περὶ τῶν δικαίων πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οἱ μὲν ταῦτα φάσκοντες οἱ δὲ ἐκεῖνα δικαιότερα εἶναι. καίτοι περί γε ὧν ἐπίστανται ἄνθρωποι, περὶ τούτων οὐ διαφέρονται· οὔτε περὶ λευκῶν ἢ μελάνων, ἢ θερμῶν ἢ ψυχρῶν, οὔτε περὶ μαλακῶν ἢ σκληρῶν· ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ περὶ τούτων ἅπαντες φρονοῦσί τε καὶ λέγουσιν· ὥστε καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων ὡμονόουν ἂν παραπλησίως, εἴπερ ᾔδεσαν ἅ τινα ἐστίν· ἐν ὦ δ’ οὐχ ὁμονοοῦσιν, ἀγνοοῦντες φαίνονται. καὶ οὐδὲ σὺ ταύτης ἐκτὸς εἶ τῆς ἀγνοίας, ὡς ἐγὼ δοκῶ· ὅθεν ἐπιμελητέον σοι τῆς γνώσεως μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν, καὶ τοσούτῳ γε μᾶλλον ⟨ὅσῳ περ⟩ αἴσχιον ἀνδρὶ βασιλεῖ ἢ ἰδιώτῃ εἶναι ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ δικαιοσύνης. Ἔτι τοίνυν δεῖ μὲν τὸν βασιλέα σωφρονεῖν αὐτόν, δεῖ δὲ τοὺς ὑπηκόους σωφρονίζειν, ἵν’ ὁ μὲν ἄρχῃ σωφρόνως, οἱ δ’ ἄρχωνται κοσμίως, μηδέτεροι δὲ τρυφῶσι· λυμαντικὸν γὰρ ἄρχοντός τε καὶ ἰδιώτου παντὸς ἡ τρυφή. πῶς δ’ ἂν ἢ αὐτὸς σωφρονήσειέ τις μὴ μελετήσας κρατεῖν τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, ἢ ἀκόλαστος ὢν ἄλλους ποιήσειε σώφρονας; τίς μέντοι ἐπιστήμη πρὸς σωφροσύνην ἄγει πλὴν φιλοσοφίας, οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν· αὕτη γὰρ διδάσκει μὲν ἐπάνω ἡδονῆς εἶναι, διδάσκει δ’ ἐπάνω πλεονεξίας, διδάσκει δὲ ἀγαπᾶν εὐτέλειαν, διδάσκει δὲ φεύγειν πολυτέλειαν, ἐθίζει δ’ αἰδῶ ἔχειν, ἐθίζει δὲ γλώττης κρατεῖν, τάξιν δὲ καὶ κόσμον καὶ εὐσχημοσύνην περιποιεῖ καὶ ὅλως τὸ ἐν κινήσει καὶ σχέσει πρέπον. ταῦτα δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ προσόντα παρέχεται σεμνὸν καὶ σώφρονα αὐτόν. καὶ δὴ καὶ βασιλεύς, ὅτῳ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα, μάλιστα ἂν εἴη θεοπρεπής τε καὶ αἰδοῦς ἄξιος. τό γε μὴν ἄφοβον καὶ ἀνέκπληκτον καὶ θαρσαλέον ἔστι μὲν ἀνδρείας ἔργον, πῶς δ’ ἂν ἄλλως μᾶλλον ἀνθρώπῳ ὑπάρξειεν ἢ εἴ τις περὶ θανάτου καὶ πόνου λάβοι πίστιν ἰσχυρὰν ὡς οὐ κακοῖν ὄντοιν αὐτοῖν; ταῦτα γὰρ δὴ τὰ ἐξιστάντα καὶ φοβοῦντα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐστίν, ὅ τε θάνατος καὶ ὁ πόνος, ὅταν ὡς περὶ κακῶν πεπεισμένοι ὦσιν αὐτῶν· μὴ κακὰ δ’ εἶναι ταῦτα φιλοσοφία διδάσκει μόνη. ὥστ’ εἴπερ ἀνδρείαν κτητέον τοῖς βασιλεῦσι, κτητέον δὲ παντὸς ⟨ὁτου〉οῦν ἑτέρου μᾶλλον, ἐπιμελητέον τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν αὐτοῖς, ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἑτέρως ἀνδρείοις γενομένοις. καὶ δὴ βασιλικὸν μέν, εἴ τι ἄλλο, καὶ τὸ ἀήττητον ἐν λόγῳ εἶναι καὶ δύνασθαι κρατεῖν ὥσπερ ὅπλοις τῶν μαχομένων, οὕτω λόγοις 〈τῶν〉 διαλεγομένων· ὡς ἄν γε ταύτῃ ἀσθενήσωσιν οἱ βασιλεῖς, ἀνάγκη πολλάκις περιάγεσθαι αὐτοὺς καὶ βιάζεσθαι τὰ ψευδῆ ὡς ἀληθῆ προσίεσθαι, ὅπερ ἀφροσύνης ἔργον καὶ ἀμαθίας τῆς ἐσχάτης. φιλοσοφία δ’ οὐκ οἶδ’ εἴ τι 〈ἄλλο〉 μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦτο παρέχειν τοῖς μετιοῦσιν αὐτὴν πέφυκεν, ὥστε περιεῖναι λόγῳ τῶν πλησίον καὶ τὰ ψευδῆ διακρίνειν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀληθῶν καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐλέγχειν τὰ δὲ βεβαιοῦν. οἱ γοῦν ῥήτορες ὁπόταν ἔλθωσιν εἰς ταὐτὸ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις καὶ διδῶσι καὶ λαμβάνωσι λόγον, ἔστιν ὁρᾶν αὐτοὺς συγκρουομένους ἀπορουμένους, ἐναντία λέγειν αὑτοῖς ἀναγκαζομένους· καίτοι ὁπόταν οἱ ῥήτορες, οἱ τοῦτο πεποιημένοι ἔργον λόγους μελετᾶν, ἀσθενέστεροι περὶ λόγους ἁλίσκωνται τῶν φιλοσόφων ὄντες, τί χρὴ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ὑπολαμβάνειν; ὅθεν εἴ τινι ὄντι βασιλεῖ ἔστιν ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἐν λόγῳ κράτους, φιλοσοφητέον αὐτῷ, ἵνα μὴ δεδίῃ μηδὲ ταύτῃ μηδένα ὡς περιγενησόμενον αὐτοῦ, δέον ἁπανταχοῦ ἀδεῆ εἶναι τὸν βασιλέα καὶ θαρραλέον καὶ ἀήττητον. Καθόλου δὲ τὸν μὲν βασιλέα τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀνάγκη πᾶσα καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ εἶναι ἀναμάρτητον καὶ τέλειον· εἴ περ δεῖ αὐτόν, ὥσπερ ἐδόκει τοῖς παλαιοῖς, νόμον ἔμψυχον εἶναι, εὐνομίαν μὲν καὶ ὁμόνοιαν μηχανώμενον, ἀνομίαν δὲ καὶ στάσιν ἀπείργοντα, ζηλωτὴν δὲ τοῦ Διὸς ὄντα καὶ πατέρα τῶν ἀρχομένων ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνον. τοιοῦτος δὲ πῶς ἂν εἴη τις μὴ φύσει τε διαφερούσῃ κεχρημένος παιδείαν τε τὴν ἀρίστην πεπαιδευμένος ἀρετάς τε ἁπάσας ἔχων, ὅσαι περ ἀνθρώπῳ προσήκουσιν; εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἑτέρα ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἡ ποδηγοῦσα πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀνθρώπου φύσιν καὶ ἀσκεῖν καὶ μετιέναι τὰ καλὰ διδάσκουσα, παραβλητέον ἂν εἴη καὶ συγκριτέον, εἴτε ἐκείνη εἴτε φιλοσοφία κρείττων καὶ ἀποχρῶσα μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ἀποδεῖξαι βασιλέα· καὶ τῇ κρείττονι χρῷτ’ ἂν εἰκότως ὁ βασιλεὺς βουλόμενός γε δὴ εἶναι ἀγαθός. εἰ δ’ ἄλλη μὲν οὖν οὐδ’ ὑπισχνεῖται τέχνη οὐδεμία παράδοσιν καὶ διδασκαλίαν ἀρετῆς, 〈ἀλλ’ εἰσὶν〉 αἱ μὲν περὶ τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἀνθρώπινον καὶ τὰ τούτῳ χρήσιμα πραγματευόμεναι μόνον, ὅσαι δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐφάπτονται, πάντα σκοπούμεναι μᾶλλον, ἢ ὅθεν αὐτὴ σωφρονήσει· μόνη δὲ φιλοσοφία τοῦτο σκοπεῖται καὶ τοῦτο μηχανᾶται, πῶς ἂν ὁ ἄνθρωπος κακίαν μὲν ἐκφύγοι, κτήσαιτο δὲ ἀρετήν· εἰ ταῦτα ταύτῃ ἔχει, τί ἂν ἄλλο εἴη βασιλεῖ τῷ γε ἀγαθῷ εἶναι βουλομένῳ προυργιαίτερον τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν; μᾶλλον δὲ πῶς καὶ τίνα τρόπον δύναιτο ἄν τις βασιλεῦσαι ἢ βιῶναι καλῶς, εἰ μὴ φιλοσοφήσειεν; ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι τὸν βασιλέα τὸν ἀγαθὸν εὐθὺς καὶ φιλόσοφον ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι καὶ τόν γε φιλόσοφον εὐθὺς καὶ βασιλικὸν εἶναι. Πρῶτον δὲ τὸ πρότερον θεασώμεθα. ἆρ’ ἔσθ’ ὅπως βασιλεὺς ἀγαθὸς εἴη τις ἂν μὴ ἄνθρωπος ἀγαθὸς ὤν; οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν. ἀγαθὸς δέ τις ἀνὴρ ὢν οὐ καὶ φιλόσοφος εἴη ἄν; νὴ Δία, εἴ γε τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν καλοκἀγαθίας ἐπιτήδευσίς ἐστιν. ὥσθ’ ὁ βασιλεὺς ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης εὐθὺς καὶ φιλόσοφος εὑρίσκεται ὤν. καὶ μὴν ὅ γε φιλόσοφος ὅτι πάντως καὶ βασιλικός, οὕτως ἂν μάθοις. τοῦ γὰρ βασιλικοῦ δήπου ἐστὶ τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς ἐπιτροπεύειν ἔθνη καὶ πόλεις καὶ εἶναι ἄξιον ἀνθρώπων ἄρχειν. τίς δ’ ἂν ἢ ἱκανώτερος εἴη πόλεως προστάτης ἢ ἀξιώτερος ἀνθρώπων ἄρχειν τοῦ φιλοσόφου; ᾧ γε προσήκει (ἄν περ ᾖ ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφος) εἶναι φρονίμῳ, σώφρονι, μεγαλόφρονι, τῶν δικαίων κριτικῷ καὶ τῶν πρεπόντων, καταπρακτικῷ τῶν νοηθέντων, καρτερικῷ τῶν ἐπιπόνων· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις θαρραλέος ἀδεὴς ὑποστατικὸς τῶν δοκούντων δεινῶν εἴη ἄν, ἔτι δὲ εὐεργετικὸς χρηστὸς φιλάνθρωπος. τοῦ δὲ τοιούτου τίς ἂν εὑρεθείη ἄρχειν ἐπιτηδειότερος ἢ δυνατώτερος; οὐδείς. ἂν δὲ μὴ ἔχῃ πολλοὺς τοὺς ὑπακούοντας καὶ πειθομένους αὐτῷ, οὔπω διὰ τοῦτο τοῦ βασιλικὸς εἶναι ἐστέρηται· ἐξαρκεῖ γὰρ καὶ τὸ τῶν φίλων ἄρχειν τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἢ γυναικός τε καὶ παίδων, ἢ καὶ νὴ Δία αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ μόνον. καὶ γὰρ ἰατρὸς οὐδὲν ἧττον τοῦ θεραπεύοντος πολλοὺς ὁ θεραπεύων ὀλίγους, εἴ γε ἔχει τὴν ἐμπειρίαν τὴν ἰατρικήν· καὶ μουσικὸς οὐδὲν ἧττον τοῦ διδάσκοντος πολλοὺς ὁ διδάσκων ὀλίγους, εἴ γε ἔχει τὴν μουσικήν· καὶ ἱππικὸς ὁμοίως τῷ χρωμένῳ πολλοῖς ἵπποις ὁ χρώμενος ἑνὶ ἢ δυοῖν, ἄν γε ἐπιστήμων τῆς ἱππικῆς ᾖ· καὶ δὴ καὶ βασιλικὸς παραπλησίως τῷ κεκτημένῳ πολλοὺς ὑπηκόους ὁ ἔχων ἕνα ἢ δύο τοὺς πειθομένους αὐτῷ· μόνον ἐχέτω τὴν τοῦ βασιλεύειν ἐμπειρίαν, ὥστε καὶ βασιλικὸς εἴη ἄν. διὰ τοῦτό μοι δοκεῖ καὶ Σωκράτης τὴν φιλοσοφίαν πολιτικήν τε καὶ βασιλικὴν ἐπιστήμην ὀνομάζειν, ὅτι ὁ ταύτην ἀναλαβὼν εὐθὺς πολιτικός ἐστι. Τοιαῦτα τοῦ Μουσωνίου εἰπόντος, ἡσθεὶς ὁ βασιλεὺς τοῖς λόγοις χάριν τε ἔχειν ὡμολόγει τῶν εἰρημένων αὐτῷ, καὶ ἀντὶ τούτων, ἔφη, αἴτησον ὅ τι βούλει με, οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀντείποιμί σοι περὶ οὐδενός. Ὁ οὖν Μουσώνιος, αἰτῶ σε, ἔφη, τούτοις στοιχεῖν καὶ ἕπεσθαι τοῖς λόγοις. οὓς ἐπαινεῖς· καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ οὕτω χαριεῖ μάλιστα καὶ ὠφεληθήσῃ αὐτὸς οὐχ ἑτέρως μᾶλλον.

When one of the kings from Syria once came to him (for at that time there were still kings in Syria, vassals of the Romans), amongst many other things he had to say to the man were the following words in particular. Do not imagine, he said, that it is more appropriate for anyone to study philosophy than for you, nor for any other reason than because you are a king. For the first duty of a king is to be able to protect and benefit his people, and a protector and benefactor must know what is good for a man and what is bad, what is helpful and what harmful, what advantageous and what disadvantageous, inasmuch as it is plain that those who ally themselves with evil come to harm, while those who cleave to good enjoy protection, and those who are deemed worthy of help and advantage enjoy benefits, while those who involve themselves in things disadvantageous and harmful suffer punishment.

But to distinguish between good and bad, advantageous and disadvantageous, helpful and harmful is the part of none other than the philosopher, who constantly occupies himself with this very question, how not to be ignorant of any of these things, and has made it his art to understand what conduces to a man's happiness or unhappiness. Therefore it appears that the king should study philosophy. 6Furthermore it is fitting for a king, or rather it is an absolute necessity for him, to arbitrate justice as between subjects so that no one may have more or less than his just deserts, but may receive honor or punishment as he deserves.

But how would anyone who was not just ever be able to manage this? And how would anyone ever be just if he did not understand the nature of justice? Here again is a reason the king should study philosophy, for without such study it would not be plain that he knew justice and the just. For one cannot deny either that the one who has learned it will understand justice better than the one who has not learned it, or that all who have not studied philosophy are ignorant of its nature. The truth of this statement appears from the fact that men disagree and contend with one another about justice, some saying that it is here, others that it is there.

Yet about things of which men have knowledge there is no difference of opinion, as for example about white and black, or hot and cold, or soft and hard, but all think the same about them and use the same words. In just the same way they would agree about justice if they knew what it was, but in their very lack of agreement they reveal their ignorance. Indeed I am inclined to think that you are not far from such ignorance yourself, and you ought therefore more than anyone else to concern yourself with this knowledge, the more disgraceful it is for a king than for a private citizen to be ignorant about justice.

In the next place it is essential for the king to exercise selfcontrol over himself and demand self-control of his subjects, to the end that with sober rule and seemly submission there shall be no wantonness on the part of either. For the ruin of the ruler and the citizen alike is wantonness. But how would anyone achieve self-control if he did not make an effort to curb his desires, or how could one who was undisciplined make others temperate? One can mention no study except philosophy that develops self-control. Certainly it teaches one to be above pleasure and greed, to admire thrift and to avoid extravagance; it trains one to have a sense of shame, and to control one's tongue, and it produces discipline, order, and courtesy, and in general what is fitting in action and in bearing. In an ordinary man when these qualities are present they give him dignity and self-command, but if they be present in a king they make him preeminently godlike and worthy of reverence.

Nov, since fearlessness and intrepidity and boldness are the product of courage, how else would a man acquire them than by having a firm conviction that death and hardships are not evils? For these are the things, death and hardships, I repeat, which unbalance and frighten men when they believe that they are evils; that they are not evils philosophy is the only teacher. Consequently if kings ought to possess courage, and they more than anyone else should possess it, they must set themselves to the study of philosophy, since they cannot become courageous by any other means.

It is also the prerogative of kings (if they enjoy any whatever) to be invincible in reason and to be able to prevail over disputants by their arguments, just as over their enemies by their arms. Thus when kings are weak in this, it stands to reason that often they are misled and forced to accept the false as the true, which is the price of folly and dense ignorance. Now philosophy by its nature confers upon its devotees perhaps more than anything else the ability to remain superior to others in debate, to distinguish the false from the true, and to refute the one and to confirm the other. Professional speakers, at any rate, whenever they enter into the give and take of argument with philosophers one can see confused and confounded and obliged to contradict themselves. And yet if such speakers, whose business it is to practice debate, are caught because they are inferior to the philosophers in argument, what is bound to happen to other men? Therefore if it is the ambition of anyone who is a king to be powerful in debate, he should study philosophy in order that he may not have to fear that anyone will prevail over him in this, for a king should be completely fearless and courageous and invincible.

In general it is of the greatest importance for the good king to be faultless and perfect in word and action, if, indeed, he is to be a "living law" as he seemed to the ancients, effecting good government and harmony, suppressing lawlessness and dissension, a true imitator of Zeus and, like him, father of his people. But how could anyone be such a king if he were not endowed with a superior nature, given the best possible education, and possessed of all the virtues which befit a man? If, then, there is any other knowledge which guides man's nature to virtue and teaches him to practice and associate with the good, it should be placed beside philosophy and compared with it to see whether it or philosophy is better and more capable of producing a good king. Then the man who wished to become a good king would be wise to use the better one.

If, however, no other art professes the teaching and transmission of virtue, though there are some which are concerned solely with man's body and what is useful for it, while others which touch the mind aim at everything else but making it self-controlled, yet philosophy alone makes this its aim and occupies itself with this, how a man may avoid evil and acquire virtue, if this I say is so, what else would be more serviceable to a king who wished to be good than the study of philosophy? How better or how otherwise could a man be a good ruler or live a good life than by studying philosophy? For my part, I believe that the good king is straightway and of necessity a philosopher, and the philosopher a kingly person.

Of these two propositions let us examine the former: Is it possible for anyone to be a good king unless he is a good man? No, it is not possible. But given a good man, would he not be entitled to be called a philosopher? Most certainly, since philosophy is the pursuit of ideal good. Therefore a good king is found to be forthwith and of necessity a philosopher also. Now again that the philosopher is entirely kingly you may understand from this. The attribute of a kingly person is obviously the ability to rule peoples and cities well and to be worthy to govern men. Well, then, who would be a more capable head of a city or more worthy to govern men than the philosopher? For it behooves him (if he is truly a philosopher) to be intelligent, disciplined, noble-minded, a good judge of what is just and of what is seemly, efficient in putting his plans into effect, patient under hardship. In addition to this, he should be courageous, fearless, resolute in the face of things apparently disastrous, and besides beneficent, helpful, and humane. Could anyone be found more fit or better able to govern than such a man? No one. Even if he does not have many subjects obedient to him, he is not for that reason less kingly, for it is enough to rule one's friends or one's wife and children or, for that matter, only oneself.

For, indeed, a physician who attends few patients is no less a physician than the one who attends many if, to be sure, he has skill and experience in healing. In the same way the musician who teaches only a few pupils is no less a musician than the one who teaches many, provided he knows the art of music. Likewise the horseman who trains only one or two horses is just as much a horseman as the one who trains many if he is skilled in horsemanship. And so the title of kingly person belongs to the one who has only one or two subjects just as well as to the one who has many, only let him have the skill and ability to rule, so that he may deserve the name of king. For this reason it seems to me that Socrates too called philosophy the statesmanlike and royal discipline, because one who masters it immediately becomes a statesman.

When Musonius said these things, the king was glad at his words and told him that he was grateful for what he said and added, "In return for this, ask of me whatever you wish for I shall refuse you nothing." Then Musonius said, "The only favor I ask of you is to remain faithful to this teaching, since you find it commendable, for in this way and no other will you best please me and benefit yourself."

Un jour, un des rois de Syrie vint le voir (car à cette époque, il existait encore des rois en Syrie, vassaux des Romains). Parmi les nombreuses choses qu’il lui dit, voici en particulier quelques paroles. « Ne crois pas, » dit-il, « qu’il soit plus approprié pour quelqu’un d’autre que toi d’étudier la philosophie, et ce, pour aucune autre raison que parce que tu es roi. Car le premier devoir d’un roi est de protéger et de bénéficier à son peuple. Or, un protecteur et un bienfaiteur doivent savoir ce qui est bon et ce qui est mauvais pour l’homme, ce qui est utile et ce qui est nuisible, ce qui est avantageux et ce qui est désavantageux. Il est évident que ceux qui s’associent au mal subissent des torts, tandis que ceux qui s’attachent au bien jouissent d’une protection. De même, ceux qui sont jugés dignes d’aide et d’avantages en reçoivent les bienfaits, tandis que ceux qui s’impliquent dans des choses nuisibles ou désavantageuses subissent des châtiments. »

« Mais distinguer entre le bien et le mal, l’avantageux et le désavantageux, l’utile et le nuisible, est le propre du philosophe, qui se consacre constamment à cette question : comment ne pas ignorer ces choses ? Il a fait de cet art la clé pour comprendre ce qui conduit un homme au bonheur ou au malheur. Par conséquent, il semble que le roi doive étudier la philosophie. En outre, il est approprié, ou plutôt absolument nécessaire, pour un roi de rendre justice entre ses sujets, afin que chacun reçoive ce qui lui est dû ; ni plus, ni moins ; et obtienne honneur ou punition selon ce qu’il mérite. »

« Mais comment quelqu’un qui n’est pas juste pourrait-il jamais accomplir cela ? Et comment quelqu’un pourrait-il être juste s’il ne comprend pas la nature de la justice ? Voilà encore une raison pour laquelle le roi doit étudier la philosophie, car sans elle, il ne serait pas évident qu’il connaisse la justice et ce qui est juste. Il est indéniable que celui qui a appris la justice la comprend mieux que celui qui ne l’a pas apprise, et que tous ceux qui n’ont pas étudié la philosophie ignorent sa nature. La preuve de cette affirmation réside dans le fait que les hommes se disputent sur la justice, certains disant qu’elle se trouve ici, d’autres là. »

« Or, sur des choses que les hommes connaissent, il n’y a pas de désaccord, par exemple sur le blanc et le noir, le chaud et le froid, ou le doux et le dur. Tous s’accordent sur ces choses et utilisent les mêmes mots. De la même manière, ils s’accorderaient sur la justice s’ils savaient ce qu’elle est. Mais leur désaccord même révèle leur ignorance. À vrai dire, je suis enclin à penser que toi aussi, tu es proche d’une telle ignorance, et c’est pourquoi tu devrais plus que quiconque te préoccuper de cette connaissance, car il est bien plus honteux pour un roi que pour un simple citoyen d’ignorer ce qu’est la justice. »

« De plus, il est essentiel que le roi exerce sa maîtrise de lui-même et exige de ses sujets qu’ils fassent de même, afin que, dans une gouvernance sobre et une soumission convenable, il n’y ait ni excès de la part de l’un ni de l’autre. Car la ruine du gouvernant et du citoyen réside dans la démesure. Mais comment quelqu’un pourrait-il atteindre la maîtrise de soi s’il ne s’efforçait pas de dompter ses désirs ? Et comment une personne indisciplinée pourrait-elle rendre d’autres tempérants ? Il n’existe pas d’étude, sauf la philosophie, qui développe la maîtrise de soi. Elle enseigne à s’élever au-dessus du plaisir et de la cupidité, à admirer la frugalité et à éviter l’extravagance ; elle forme à avoir un sens de la honte, à contrôler sa langue, et elle produit discipline, ordre, et courtoisie ; et, en général, ce qui convient dans les actions et le comportement. Chez un homme ordinaire, ces qualités apportent dignité et maîtrise de soi, mais chez un roi, elles le rendent divin et digne de révérence. »

« Maintenant, puisque l’absence de peur, l’intrépidité et l’audace sont le produit du courage, comment un homme pourrait-il les acquérir autrement qu’en ayant la conviction ferme que la mort et les épreuves ne sont pas des maux ? Car ce sont ces choses ; la mort et les épreuves, je le répète ; qui déséquilibrent et effraient les hommes lorsqu’ils croient qu’elles sont des maux. Or, seule la philosophie enseigne qu’elles ne sont pas des maux. Par conséquent, si les rois doivent posséder du courage ; et ils doivent en avoir plus que quiconque ;, ils doivent s’appliquer à l’étude de la philosophie, car ils ne peuvent devenir courageux par aucun autre moyen. »

« De plus, c’est le privilège des rois ; s’ils en ont un ; d’être invincibles dans le raisonnement et capables de l’emporter sur leurs opposants par leurs arguments, tout comme ils l’emportent sur leurs ennemis par leurs armes. Ainsi, lorsque les rois sont faibles dans ce domaine, il est naturel qu’ils soient souvent trompés et contraints de prendre le faux pour le vrai, ce qui est le prix de la folie et de l’ignorance crasse. Or, la philosophie, par sa nature, confère à ses adeptes, plus que toute autre chose, la capacité de dominer dans le débat, de distinguer le faux du vrai, et de réfuter l’un et confirmer l’autre. »

« En général, il est d’une importance capitale qu’un bon roi soit irréprochable et parfait en paroles et en actes, s’il doit être une "loi vivante", comme le concevaient les anciens, promouvant le bon gouvernement et l’harmonie, réprimant l’anarchie et la dissension, un véritable imitateur de Zeus et, comme lui, père de son peuple. »