On Benefits Chapter 15

Ego vero beneficiis non obicio moras ; quo plura maioraque fuerint, plus adferent laudis. At sit iudicium ; neque enim cordi esse cuiquam possunt forte ac temere data. Quare si quis existimat nos, cum ista praecipimus, benignitatis fines introrsus referre et illi minus laxum limitem aperire, ne perperam monitiones nostras exaudivit. Quam enim virtutem magis veneramur ? Cui magis stimulos addimus ? Quibusve tam convenit haec adhortatio quam nobis societatem generis humani sancientibus ? Quid ergo est ? Cum sit nulla honesta vis animi, etiam si a recta voluntate incepit, nisi quam virtutem modus fecit, veto liberalitatem nepotari. Tunc iuvat accepisse beneficium et supinis quidem manibus, ubi illud ratio ad dignos perducit, non quolibet casus et consilii indigens impetus defert ; quod ostentare libet et inscribere sibi. Beneficia tu vocas, quorum auctorem fateri pudet ? At illa quanto gratiora sunt quantoque in partem interiorem animi numquam exitura descendunt, cum delectant cogitantem magis a quo, quam quid acceperis ? Crispus Passienus solebat dicere quorundam se iudicium malle quam beneficium, quorundam beneficium malle quam iudicium, et subiciebat exempla. " Malo," aiebat, " divi Augusti iudicium, malo Claudii beneficium." Ego vero nullius puto expetendum esse beneficium, cuius vile iudicium est. Quid ergo ? Non erat accipiendum a Claudio, quod dabatur ? Erat, sed sicut a fortuna, quam scires posse statim malam fieri. Quid ista inter se mixta dividimus ? Non est beneficium, cui deest pars optima, datum esse iudicio : alioqui pecunia ingens, si non ratione nec recta voluntate donata est, non magis beneficium est quam thesaurus. Multa sunt autem, quae oportet accipere nec debere.

I am no advocate of slackness in giving benefits: the more and the greater they are, the more praise they will bring to the giver. Yet let them be given with discretion; for what is given carelessly and recklessly can please no one. Whoever, therefore, supposes that in giving this advice I wish to restrict benevolence and to confine it to narrower limits, entirely mistakes the object of my warning. What virtue do we admire more than benevolence? Which do we encourage more? Who ought to applaud it more than we Stoics, who preach the brotherhood of the human race? What then is it? Since no impulse of the human mind can be approved of, even though it springs from a right feeling, unless it be made into a virtue by discretion, I forbid generosity to degenerate into extravagance. It is, indeed, pleasant to receive a benefit with open arms, when reason bestows it upon the worthy, not when it is flung hither or thither thoughtlessly and at random; this alone we care to display and claim as our own. Can you call anything a benefit, if you feel ashamed to mention the person who gave it you? How far more grateful is a benefit, how far more deeply does it impress itself upon the mind, never to be forgotten, when we rejoice to think not so much of what it is, as from whom we have received it! Crispus Passienus was wont to say that some men's advice was to be preferred to their presents, some men's presents to their advice; and he added as an example, "I would rather have received advice from Augustus than a present; I would rather receive a present from Claudius than advice." I, however, think that one ought not to wish for a benefit from any man whose judgement is worthless. What then? Ought we not to receive what Claudius gives? We ought; but we ought to regard it as obtained from fortune, which may at any moment turn against us. Why do we separate this which naturally is connected? That is not a benefit, to which the best part of a benefit, that it be bestowed with judgment, is wanting: a really great sum of money, if it be given neither with discernment nor with good will, is no more a benefit than if it remained hoarded. There are, however, many things which we ought not to reject, yet for which we cannot feel indebted.

Quelle est donc ma pensée ? Comme l’élan du cœur le plus noble cesse de l’être, bien qu’il parte d’une volonté droite, s’il dépasse cette mesure qui fait la vertu, je ne veux pas que la libéralité devienne profusion. Un bienfait n’est doux à et ne s’accueille avec une religieuse gratitude, qu’autant que la raison le dispense au mérite, et non lorsqu’il tombe à l’aveugle, étourdiment semé par l’irréflexion ; il faut qu’on puisse s’en faire gloire, et dire : « Il était pour moi. » Appelles-tu bienfaits des actes dont je rougirais d’avouer l’auteur ? Mais combien elles sont plus flatteuses, combien elles descendent plus avant dans l’âme pour n’en sortir jamais, ces grâces qui nous font songer avec délices moins à elles-mêmes qu’à celui de qui nous les tenons ! Crispus Passiénus répétait souvent qu’il préférait l’estime de certains hommes à leurs services, et les services de certains autres à leur estime. « Par exemple, ajoutait-il, à Auguste je lui demanderai plutôt son estime, à Claude ses services. » Je pense, moi, qu’il ne faut rien désirer de gens dont on dédaignerait l’estime. « Comment ? Fallait-il refuser les dons de Claude ? » Non, mais les recevoir comme ceux de la Fortune, sachant qu’elle peut l’instant d’après devenir hostile. Pourquoi donc séparerions-nous deux choses qui se fondent l’une dans l’autre ? Il n’y a pas de bienfait là où manque ce qui en est l’âme, le discernement. Autrement la somme donnée, fût-elle immense, dès que ce n’est pas la raison ni une intention pure qui l’offre, n’est pas plus un bienfait que ne le serait un trésor trouvé. Il est mille choses qui peuvent s’accepter, mais pour lesquelles on ne doit rien.