On Benefits Chapter 29

" Ergo," inquit, " nec consilium deliberanti dabis ingrato nec aquam haurire permittes nec viam monstrabis erranti ? An haec quidem facies, sed nihil donabis ? " Distinguam istud, certe temptabo distinguere. Beneficium est opera utilis, sed non omnis opera utilis beneficium est ; quaedam enim tam exigua sunt, ut beneficii nomen non occupent. Duae res coire debent, quae beneficium efficiant. Primum rei magnitudo ; quaedam enim sunt infra huius nominis mensuram. Quis beneficium dixit quadram panis aut stipem aeris abiecti aut ignis accendendi factam potestatem ? Et interdum ista plus prosunt, quam maxima ; sed tamen vilitas sua illis, etiam ubi temporis necessitate facta sunt necessaria, detrahit pretium. Deinde hoc, quod potentissimum est, oportet accedat, ut eius causa faciam, ad quem volam pervenire beneficium, dignumque eum iudicem et libens id tribuam percipiensque ex munere meo gaudium, quorum nihil est in istis, de quibus loquebamur ; non enim tamquam dignis illa tribuimus, sed neclegenter tamquam parva, et non homini damus, sed humanitati.

"Shall we, then," argues he, "not give our advice to an ungrateful man when he is at a loss, or refuse him a drink of water when he is thirsty, or not show him the path when he has lost his way? or would you do him these services and yet not give him anything?" Here I will draw a distinction, or at any rate endeavour to do so. A benefit is a useful service, yet all useful service is not a benefit; for some are so trifling as not to claim the title of benefits. To produce a benefit two conditions must concur. First, the importance of the thing given; for some things fall short of the dignity of a benefit. Who ever called a hunch of bread a benefit, or a farthing dole tossed to a beggar, or the means of lighting a fire? yet sometimes these are of more value than the most costly benefits; still their cheapness detracts from their value even when, by the exigency of time, they are rendered essential. The next condition, which is the most important of all, must necessarily be present, namely, that I should confer the benefit for the sake of him whom I wish to receive it, that I should judge him worthy of it, bestow it of my own free will, and receive pleasure from my own gift, none of which conditions are present in the cases of which we have just now spoken; for we do not bestow such things as those upon these who are worthy of them, but we give them carelessly, as trifles, and do not give them so much to a man as to humanity.

« Ainsi, poursuit-on, vous ne lui donnerez pas même un conseil dans ses perplexités, ni ne lui permettrez de puiser de l’eau, ni ne lui montrerez sa route s’il s’égare ; ou bien vous vous prêterez à cela, mais vous ne lui ferez aucun don. » Distinguons ici, ou du moins tâchons de distinguer. Un bienfait est une œuvre utile, mais toute œuvre utile n’est pas un bienfait. Il est des choses de si mince valeur que la qualification de bienfait ne saurait leur appartenir. Il faut deux conditions pour le constituer. D’abord la grandeur de l’objet, car il en est de trop petits pour atteindre à un pareil titre. A-t-on jamais appelé bienfait un morceau de pain, une vile pièce de cuivre, la permission d’allumer du feu, choses néanmoins plus utiles parfois que les plus grands dons ? Leur peu de valeur intrinsèque, même quand la circonstance en faisait des nécessités, leur ôte tout mérite. La seconde condition, et la plus essentielle, c’est que le bienfait s’opère à l’intention de celui-là même auquel je veux qu’il parvienne, que je l’en juge digne, que je donne de bon cœur, que j’éprouve de la joie à donner. Rien de tout cela dans les actes indifférents dont je viens de parler. Car nous n’y voyons pas des tributs offerts au mérite, mais des bagatelles qu’on laisse prendre : ce n’est pas à l’homme que nous donnons, c’est à l’humanité.