On Benefits Chapter 9

" Beneficium," inquit, " sibi dare oportet ; ergo et referre gratiam oportet." Primum illud falsum est, ex quo pendent sequentia ; nemo enim sibi beneficium dat, sed naturae suae paret, a qua ad caritatem sui compositus est, unde summa illi cura est nocitura vitandi, profutura appetendi. Itaque nec liberalis est, qui sibi donat, nec clemens, qui sibi ignoscit, nec misericors, qui malis suis tangitur. Quod aliis praestare liberalitas est, clementia, misericordia, sibi praestare natura est. Beneficium res voluntaria est, at prodesse sibi necessarium est. Quo quis plura beneficia dedit, beneficentior est; quis umquam laudatus est, quod sibi ipse fuisset auxilio ? Quod se eripuisset latronibus ? Nemo sibi beneficium dat, non magis quam hospitium ; nemo sibi donat, non magis quam credit. Si dat sibi quisque beneficium, semper dat, sine intermissione dat, inire beneficiorum suorum non potest numerum. Quando ergo gratiam referet, cum per hoc ipsum, quo gratiam refert, beneficium det ? Quomodo enim discernere poteris, utrum det sibi beneficium an reddat, cum intra eundem hominem res geratur ? Liberavi me periculo : beneficium mihi dedi. Iterum me periculo libero : utrum do beneficium an reddo ? Deinde, ut primum illud concedam dare nos nobis beneficium, quod sequitur, non concedam; nam etiam si damus, non debemus. Quare ? Quia statim recipimus. Accipere beneficium me oportet, deinde debere, deinde referre ; debendi locus non est, quia sine ulla mora recipimus. Dat nemo nisi alteri, debet nemo nisi alteri, reddit nemo nisi alteri. Id intra unum non potest fieri, quod totiens duos exigit.

"It is our duty," argues our adversary, "to bestow benefits upon ourselves, therefore we ought also to be grateful to ourselves." The original axiom, upon which the inference depends, is untrue, for no one bestows benefits upon himself, but obeys the dictates of his nature, which disposes him to affection for himself, and which makes him take the greatest pains to avoid hurtful things, and to follow after those things which are profitable to him. Consequently, the man who gives to himself is not generous, nor is he who pardons himself forgiving, nor is he who is touched by his own misfortunes tender-hearted; it is natural to do those things to oneself which when done to others become generosity, clemency, and tenderness of heart. A benefit is a voluntary act, but to do good to oneself is an instinctive one. The more benefits a man bestows, the more beneficent he is, yet who ever was praised for having been of service to himself? or for having rescued himself from brigands? No one bestows a benefit upon himself any more than he bestows hospitality upon himself; no one gives himself anything, any more than he lends himself anything. If each man bestows benefits upon himself, is always bestowing them, and bestows them without any cessation, then it is impossible for him to make any calculation of the number of his benefits; when then can he show his gratitude, seeing that by the very act of doing so he would bestow a benefit? for what distinction can you draw between giving himself a benefit or receiving a benefit for himself, when the whole transaction takes place in the mind of the same man? Suppose that I have freed myself from danger, then I have bestowed a benefit upon myself; suppose I free myself a second time, by so doing do I bestow or repay a benefit? In the next place, even if I grant the primary axiom, that we can bestow benefits upon ourselves, I do not admit that which follows; for even if we can do so, we ought not to do so. Wherefore? Because we receive a return for them at once. It is right for me to receive a benefit, then to lie under an obligation, then to repay it; now here there is no time for remaining under an obligation, because we receive the return without any delay. No one really gives except to another, no one owes except to another, no one repays except to another. An act which always requires two persons cannot take place within the mind of one.

« Il faut, dit-on, se faire du bien, et partant s’en avoir gré. » Le principe dont cette conséquence est tirée n'est pas vrai. On ne se fait pas du bien ; on obéit à sa nature qui inspire à l'homme l'amour de soi, d'où lui vient cet extrême soin d'éviter le nuisible, de rechercher l'utile. Ainsi n'est point libéral quiconque ne donne qu'à lui-même ; n'est point clément qui se pardonne; n'est point compatissant qui s'émeut de ses propres maux. Ce qui, fait pour autrui, est libéralité, clémence, compassion, fait pour nous-mêmes est instinct de nature. Le bienfait est un acte volontaire : or, se servir est une nécessité. Plus on a répandu de bienfaits, plus on est bienfaisant. Qui jamais a été loué pour s'être secouru, pour s'être arraché aux mains des brigands? On ne s'accorde pas plus un bienfait que l'hospitalité ; il n'est pas plus possible de se faire un don qu'un prêt. Si chacun s'accorde des bienfaits, il le fait toujours et sans cesse : il n'en peut calculer le nombre. Quand donc s'acquitterait-on, puisque c'est par où l'on s'acquitte que l'on s'obligerait? Comment, en effet, démêler si l'on s'oblige ou s'acquitte? C'est dans l'intérieur du même homme que tout se passe. Je me suis tiré d'un péril : me voilà obligé par moi-même; je me tire d'un second péril : est-ce m'obliger ou m'acquitter? Et puis, quand j'accorderais le premier point, qu'on est le bienfaiteur de soi-même; la conséquence, je ne l'accorderais pas. Car ici on a beau donner, on n'est pas redevable. Pourquoi? Parce qu'on recouvre au même instant. Il faut d'abord recevoir un bienfait, puis le reconnaître, enfin le rendre. 11 n'y a pas lieu à reconnaître dès qu'on recouvre incontinent. On ne donne qu'à un autre; on ne doit qu'à un autre ; on ne rend qu'à un autre. Comment s'opéreraient chez un seul ces trois actes dont chacun exige deux personnes?