On Anger Chapter 26

" Non possum," inquis, " pati; grave est iniuriam sustinere." Mentiris ; quis enim iniuriam non potest ferre, qui potest iram ? Adice nunc quod id agis, ut et iram feras et iniuriam. Quare fers aegri rabiem et phrenetici verba, puerorum protervas manus ? Nempe quia videntur nescire quid faciant. Quid interest, quo quisque vitio fiat imprudens ? Imprudentia par in omnibus patrocinium est. " Quid ergo ? " inquis, " impune illi erit ? " Puta velle te, tamen non erit ; maxima est enim factae iniuriae poena fecisse, nec quisquam gravius adficitur quam qui ad supplicium paenitentiae traditur. Deinde ad condicionem rerum humanarum respiciendum est, ut omnium accidentium aequi iudices simus ; iniquus autem est, qui commune vitium singulis obiecit. Non est Aethiopis inter suos insignitus color, nec rufus crinis et coactus in nodum apud Germanos virum dedecet. Nihil in uno iudicabis notabile aut foedum, quod genti suae publicum est ; et ista, quae rettuli, unius regionis atque anguli consuetudo defendit. Vide nunc, quanto in iis iustior venia sit, quae per totum genus humanum vulgata sunt. Omnes inconsulti et improvidi sumus, omnes incerti, queruli, ambitiosi, - quid lenioribus verbis ulcus publicum abscondo ? - omnes mali sumus. Quidquid itaque in alio reprenditur, id unusquisque in sinu suo inveniet. Quid illius pallorem, illius maciem notas ? Pestilentia est. Placidiores itaque invicem simus ; mali inter malos vivimus. Una nos res facere quietos potest, mutuae facilitatis conventio. " Ille iam mihi nocuit, ego illi nondum." Sed iam aliquem fortasse laesisti, sed laedes. Noli aestumare hanc horam aut hunc diem, totum inspice mentis tuae habitum ; etiam si nihil mali fecisti, potes facere.

You say, “I cannot endure it: injuries are hard to bear.” You lie; for how can any one not be able to bear injury, if he can bear to be angry? Besides, what you intend to do is to endure both injury and anger. Why do you bear with the delirium of a sick man, or the ravings of a madman, or the impudent blows of a child? Because, of course, they evidently do not know what they are doing: if a man be not responsible for his actions, what does it matter by what malady he became so: the plea of ignorance holds equally good in every case. “What then?” say you, “shall he not be punished?” He will be, even supposing that you do not wish it: for the greatest punishment for having done harm is the sense of having done it, and no one is more severely punished than he who is given over to the punishment of remorse. In the next place, we ought to consider the whole state of mankind, in order to pass a just judgment on all the occurrences of life: for it is unjust to blame individuals for a vice which is common to all. The colour of an Aethiop is not remarkable amongst his own people, nor is any man in Germany ashamed of red hair rolled into a knot. You cannot call anything peculiar or disgraceful in a particular man if it is the general characteristic of his nation. Now, the cases which I have quoted are defended only by the usage of one out-of-the-way quarter of the world: see now, how far more deserving of pardon those crimes are which are spread abroad among all mankind. We all are hasty and careless, we all are untrustworthy, dissatisfied, and ambitious: nay, why do I try to hide our common wickedness by a too partial description? we all are bad. Every one of us therefore will find in his own breast the vice which he blames in another. Why do you remark how pale this man, or how lean that man is? there is a general pestilence. Let us therefore be more gentle one to another: we are bad men, living among bad men: there is only one thing which can afford us peace, and that is to agree to forgive one another. “This man has already injured me,” say you, “and I have not yet injured him.” No, but you have probably injured some one else, and you will injure him some day. Do not form your judgment by one hour, or one day: consider the whole tendency of your mind: even though you have done no evil, yet you are capable of doing it.

« Je ne puis, dis-tu, m’y résigner : souffrir une injure est trop pénible. » Mensonge que cela : qui donc ne peut souffrir l’injure, s’il souffre le joug de la colère ? Ajoute qu’en agissant ainsi, tu supportes l’une et l’autre. Pourquoi tolères-tu les emportements d’un malade, et les propos d’un frénétique, et les coups d’un enfant ? C’est, n’est-ce pas, qu’ils te paraissent ne savoir ce qu’ils font . Qu’importe quelle misère morale nous aveugle ? L’aveuglement commun est l’excuse de tous. - Quoi ! l’offenseur sera impuni ? - Non ; quand tu le voudrais, il ne le sera pas. Car la plus grande, punition du mal, c’est de l’avoir fait ; et la plus rigoureuse vengeance, c’est d’être livré au supplice du repentir . Enfin il faut avoir égard à la condition des choses d’ici-bas pour en juger tous les accidents avec équité ; et ce serait juger bien mû que de reprocher aux individus les torts de l’espèce. Un teint noir ne singularise point l’homme en Éthiopie, non plus qu’une chevelure rousse et rassemblée en tresse ne messied au guerrier germain . Tu ne trouveras étrange ou inconvenant chez personne ce qui est le cachet de sa race. Chacun des exemples que je cite n’a pour lui que l’habitude d’une contrée, d’un coin de la terre ; vois donc combien il est plus juste encore de faire grâce à des imperfections qui sont celles de l’humanité. Nous sommes tous inconsidérés et imprévoyants, tous irrésolus, portés à la plainte, ambitieux. Pourquoi déguiser sous des termes adoucis la plaie universelle ? nous sommes tous méchants. Oui, quoi qu’on blâme chez autrui, chacun le retrouve en son propre cœur . Pourquoi noter la pâleur de l’un, la maigreur de l’autre ? la peste est chez tous. Soyons donc entre nous plus tolérants : méchants, nous vivons parmi nos pareils. Une seule chose peut nous rendre la paix : c’est un traité d’indulgence mutuelle. Cet homme m’a offensé, et ma revanche est encore à venir ; mais un autre peut-être l’a été par toi, ou le sera un jour.