On Leisure Chapter 8

Adice nunc, quod e lege Chrysippi vivere otioso licet ; non dico, ut otium patiatur, sed ut eligat. Negant nostri sapientem ad quamlibet rem publicam accessurum ; quid autem interest, quo- modo sapiens ad otium veniat, utrum quia res publica illi deest, an quia ipse rei publicae, si non ubivis futura res publica est? Semper autem deerit fastidiose quaerentibus. Interrogo, ad quam rem publicam sapiens sit accessurus. Ad Atheniensium, in qua Socrates damnatur, Aristoteles, ne damnetur, fugit ? in qua opprimit invidia virtutes ? Negabis mihi accessurum ad hanc rem publicam sapientem. Ad Carthaginiensium ergo rem publicam sapiens accedet, in qua adsidua seditio et optimo cuique infesta libertas est, summa aequi ac boni vilitas, adversus hostes inhumana crudelitas, etiam adversus suos hostilis ? Et hanc fugiet. Si percensere singulas voluero, nullam inveniam, quae sapientem aut quam sapiens pati possit. Quodsi non invenitur illa res publica, quam nobis fingimus, incipit omnibus esse otium necessarium, quia quod unum praeferri poterat otio, nusquam est. Si quis dicit optimum esse navigare, deinde negat navigandum in eo mari, in quo naufragia fieri soleant et frequenter subitae tempestates sint, quae rectorem in contrarium rapiant, puto hic me vetat navem solvere, quamquam laudet navigationem.

Add to this that, according to the doctrine of Chrysippus, a man may live at leisure: I do not say that he ought to endure leisure, but that he ought to choose it. Our Stoics say that the wise man would not take part in the government of any state. What difference does it make by what path the wise man arrives at leisure, whether it be because the state is wanting to him, or he is wanting to the state? If the state is to be wanting to all wise men (and it always will be found wanting by refined thinkers), I ask you, to what state should the wise man betake himself; to that of the Athenians, in which Socrates is condemned to death, and from which Aristotle goes into exile lest he should be condemned to death? where virtues are borne down by jealousy? You will tell me that no wise man would join such a state. Shall then the wise man go to the commonwealth of the Carthaginians, where faction never ceases to rage, and liberty is the foe of all the best men, where justice and goodness are held of no account, where enemies are treated with inhuman cruelty and natives are treated like enemies: he will flee from this state also. If I were to discuss each one separately, I should not be able to find one which the wise man could endure, or which could endure the wise man. Now if such a state as we have dreamed of cannot be found on earth, it follows that leisure is necessary for every one, because the one thing which might be preferred to leisure is nowhere to be found. If any one says that to sail is the best of things, and then says that we ought not to sail in a sea in which shipwrecks were common occurrences, and where sudden storms often arise which drive the pilot back from his course, I should imagine that this man, while speaking in praise of sailing, was really forbidding me to unmoor my ship . . . . Virg. “Aen.” ix. 612. Compare Sir Walter Scott, “Lay of the Last Minstrel,” canto iv.: - “And still, in age, he spurned at rest, And still his brows the helmet pressed. Albeit the blanched locks below Were white as Dinlay’s spotless snow,” &c.

Ajoute à cela que d’après la loi de Chrysippe on peut vivre dans le repos, je ne dis point par résignation, mais par choix. Notre école nie que le sage doive entrer dans aucune sorte de gouvernement. Mais qu’importe comment il arrive au repos, soit que la chose publique ne veuille pas de lui ou qu’il ne veuille pas de la chose publique ? Si elle repousse tout le monde, (or jamais elle n’accueillera ceux qui sont tièdes à venir à-elle,) je demande à quel ordre de choses le sage pourra participer. À la démocratie d’Athènes, où Socrate est condamné, d’où Aristote fuit pour ne pas l’être, où l’envie opprime les vertus ? Non, diras-tu : le sage ne se mêlera pas d’un tel gouvernement. S’en, ira-t -il donc à Carthage, où l’anarchie est permanente, la liberté hostile à tout mérite, le juste et si souverainement méprisés, où l’on traite ses ennemis avec la dernière inhumanité, et ses concitoyens comme ses ennemis ? Il fuira aussi une pareille cité. Si je les passais toutes en revue, je n’en trouverais pas une qui pût souffrir le sage, ou que le sage pût souffrir. Or donc si cette république que nous rêvons pour nous ne se rencontre pas, le repos nous devient à tous une nécessité, dès que la seule chose qu’on pouvait lui préférer n’existe nulle part. Que l’on prétende qu’il est très bien de naviguer, et qu’ensuite on dise qu’il ne faut pas s’embarquer sur une mer où les naufrages sont communs, où fréquemment de soudaines tempêtes emportent le pilote à l’opposé de sa destination, c’est là, je crois, me défendre de quitter le port tout en louant la navigation…. Le reste manque.