Moral Letters to Lucilius Section 47

Si eiusmodi sententiae familiariter in animum receptae formant eum, cur non haec pars philosophiae, quae talibus sententiis constat, idem possit? Pars virtutis disciplina constat, pars exercitatione; et discas oportet et quod didicisti agendo confirmes. Quod si est, non tantum scita sapientiae prosunt, sed etiam praecepta, quae adfectus nostros velut edicto coercent et ablegant.

» Maxime qui, disait-il, l’avait rendu excellent frère, excellent ami. Si des sentences de ce genre, devenues familières à l’âme, la forment au bien, pourquoi cette portion de la philosophie, dont elles sont l’essence, n’en ferait-elle pas autant ? La vertu consiste, partie dans la doctrine, partie dans l’exercice : il faut apprendre, et confirmer par l’action ce qu’on a appris. S’il en est ainsi, non-seulement les décrets de la sagesse sont utiles, mais encore ses préceptes, véritables édits qui répriment nos passions et qui les enchaînent.

He held that he himself became the best of brothers and the best of friends by virtue of this saying. And if proverbs of such a kind, when welcomed intimately into the soul, can mould this very soul, why cannot the department of philosophy which consists of such proverbs possess equal influence? Virtue depends partly upon training and partly upon practice; you must learn first, and then strengthen your learning by action. If this be true, not only do the doctrines of wisdom help us but the precepts also, which check and banish our emotions by a sort of official decree.