Against the Logicians, Books VII-VIII of Against the Learned Section 145

Ὧδε μὲν καὶ ὁ Πλάτων’· Σπεύσιππος (fr. 29 Lang) δέ, ἐπεὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τὰ μέν ἐστιν αἰσθητά, τὰ δὲ νοητά, τῶν μὲν νοητῶν κριτήριον ἔλεξεν εἶναι τὸν ἐπιστημονικὸν λόγον, τῶν δὲ αἰσθητῶν τὴν ἐπιστημονικὴν αἴσθησιν. ἐπιστημονικὴν δὲ αἴσθησιν ὑπείληφε καθεστάναι τὴν μεταλαμβάνουσαν τῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἀληθείας.

Such was Plato's view. Speusippus, since some things are perceptible and others intelligible, said that scientific reason is the criterion of intelligible things, and scientific perception the criterion of perceptible things. He regarded scientific perception as perception that participates in truth according to reason.

Voilà pour Platon. Speusippe (fr. 29 Lang), puisque certaines choses sont sensibles et d'autres intelligibles, déclara que le critère des intelligibles est la raison scientifique, et celui des sensibles la sensation scientifique. Il entendait par sensation scientifique celle qui participe à la vérité conforme à la raison.