Against the Logicians, Books VII-VIII of Against the Learned Section 2

Ὅτι μὲν μηδενὸς ὄντος σαφοῦς κριτηρίου κατ’ ἀνάγκην συναδηλεῖται καὶ τὸ ἀληθές, πᾶσιν ἤδη φανερόν ἐστιν· ὅμως δὲ καὶ ἐξ ἐπιμέτρου παρέσται διδάσκειν, ὅτι κἂν μηδὲν ἄντικρυς πρὸς τὸ κριτήριον λέγωμεν, ἡ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς διάστασις ἱκανή ἐστιν εἰς ἐποχὴν ἡμᾶς καταστήσασθαι, καὶ ὃν τρόπον μηδενὸς ὄντος ἐν τῇ

It is already evident to everyone that if there is no clear criterion, the truth too is necessarily rendered non-evident. Nevertheless, we can also show by way of supplement that even if we say nothing directly against the criterion, the disagreement about truth itself is sufficient to bring us to suspension of judgment. And just as, if there were nothing in the nature of things that was straight or crooked, there would be no rule to test them, and if there were no heavy or light body the construction of the balance would also be abolished, so if there is nothing true, the criterion of truth disappears as well. That, so far as the Dogmatists’ arguments are concerned, nothing is true or false may be learned by first setting out their disagreement on this subject.

Puisqu’il n’existe aucun critère clair, il est déjà manifeste pour tous que le vrai devient nécessairement obscur avec lui. On pourra néanmoins montrer en supplément que, même si nous ne disions rien directement contre le critère, le désaccord relatif au vrai lui-même suffit à nous établir dans la suspension du jugement. De même que, s’il n’existe dans