On Fate Passage 39

Ac mihi quidem videtur, cum duae sententiae fuissent veterum philosophorum, una eorum, qui censerent omnia ita fato fieri, ut id fatum vim necessitatis adferret, in qua sententia Democritus, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Aristoteles fuit, altera eorum, quibus viderentur sine ullo fato esse animorum motus voluntarii, Chrysippus tamquam arbiter honorarius medium ferire voluisse, sed adplicat se ad eos potius, qui necessitate motus animorum liberatos volunt; dum autem verbis utitur suis, delabitur in eas difficultates, ut necessitatem fati confirmet invitus.

For my part, it seems to me that, whereas the ancient philosophers held two views, one belonging to those who thought that everything happened by fate in such a way that fate imposed the force of necessity, a view held by Democritus, Heraclitus, Empedocles, and Aristotle, and the other belonging to those who thought that the voluntary motions of minds existed without any fate, Chrysippus wished, like an honorary arbitrator, to strike a middle course. Yet he inclines more toward those who wish the motions of minds to be freed from necessity. While using his own terminology, however, he slips into such difficulties that he unwillingly confirms the necessity of fate.

Il me semble que, face aux deux doctrines des anciens philosophes, l’une soutenant que tout arrive par un destin qui impose la force de la nécessité, doctrine de Démocrite, Héraclite, Empédocle et Aristote, l’autre estimant que les mouvements volontaires de l’esprit échappent à tout destin, Chrysippe a voulu, tel un arbitre honoraire, adopter une position moyenne. Il se rapproche pourtant davantage de ceux qui veulent affranchir les mouvements de l’esprit de la nécessité; mais lorsqu’il emploie son propre vocabulaire, il glisse dans des difficultés telles qu’il confirme malgré lui la nécessité du destin.