On the Firmness of the Wise Person Chapter 16

Quodsi Epicurus quoque, qui corpori plurimum indulsit, adversus iniurias exsurgit, qui id apud nos incredibile videri potest aut supra humanae naturae mensuram ? Ille ait iniurias tolerabiles esse sapienti, nos iniurias non esse. Nec enim est, quod dicas hoc naturae repugnare. Non negamus rem incommodam esse verberari et impelli et aliquo membro carere, sed omnia ista negamus iniurias esse ; non sensum illis doloris detrahimus, sed nomen iniuriae, quod non potest recipi virtute salva. Uter verius dicat videbimus ; ad contemptum quidem iniuriae uterque consentit. Quaeris quid inter duos intersit ? Quod inter gladiatores fortissimos, quorum alter premit vulnus et stat in gradu, alter respiciens ad clamantem populum significat nihil esse et intercedi non patitur. Non est, quod putes magnum, quo dissidemus ; illud quo de agitur, quod unum ad vos pertinet, utraque exempla hortantur, contemnere iniurias et, quas iniuriarum umbras ac suspiciones dixerim, contumelias, ad quas despiciendas non sapiente opus est viro, sed tantum consipiente, qui sibi possit dicere : " Utrum merito mihi ista accidunt an inmerito ? Si merito, non est contumelia, iudicium est ; si inmerito, illi qui iniusta facit erubescendum est." Et quid est illud quod contumelia dicitur ? In capitis mei levitatem iocatus est et in oculorum valitudinem et in crurum gracilitatem et in staturam. Quae contumelia est quod apparet audire ? Coram uno ali- quid dictum ridemus, coram pluribus indignamur, et eorum aliis libertatem non relinquimus, quae ipsi in nos dicere adsuevimus ; iocis temperatis delectamur, immodicis irascimur.

Now if even Epicurus, who made more concessions to the body than any one, takes a spirited tone with regard to injuries, what can appear beyond belief or beyond the scope of human nature amongst us Stoics? He says that injuries may be endured by the wise man, we say that they do not exist for him. Nor is there any reason why you should declare this to be repugnant to nature. We do not deny that it is an unpleasant thing to be beaten or struck, or to lose one of our limbs, but we say that none of these things are injuries. We do not take away from them the feeling of pain, but the name of “injury,” which cannot be received while our virtue is unimpaired. We shall see which of the two is nearest the truth; each of them agree in despising injury. You ask what difference there is between them? All that there is between two very brave gladiators, one of whom conceals his wound and holds his ground, while the other turns round to the shouting populace, gives them to understand that his wound is nothing, and does not permit them to interfere on his behalf. You need not think that it is any great thing about which we differ; the whole gist of the matter, that which alone concerns you, is what both schools of philosophy urge you to do, namely, to despise injuries and insults, which I may call the shadows and outlines of injuries, to despise which does not need a wise man, but merely a sensible one, who can say to himself, “Do these things befall me deservedly or undeservedly? If deservedly, it is not an insult, but a judicial sentence; if undeservedly, then he who does injustice ought to blush, not I. And what is this which is called an insult? Some one has made a joke about the baldness of my head, the weakness of my eyes, the thinness of my legs, the shortness of my stature; what insult is there in telling me that which every one sees? We laugh when _tête-à-tête_ at the same thing at which we are indignant when it is said before a crowd, and we do not allow others the privilege of saying what we ourselves are wont to say about ourselves; we are amused at decorous jests, but are angry if they are carried too far.”

Ne dis point que cela répugne à la nature. Nous ne nions pas qu’il ne soit pénible d’être frappé, maltraité, de perdre quelque membre ; mais nous nions que dans toutes ces choses il y ait injure ; nous leur ôtons, non pas leur aiguillon douloureux, mais le nom d’injures, qui ne peut être admis, sans que la vertu s’amoindrisse. Laquelle des deux sectes dit le plus vrai, nous le verrons ailleurs ; quant au mépris de l’injure toutes deux s’accordent. Quelle est donc entre elles la différence ? La même qu’entre deux gladiateurs intrépides, dont l’un presse de la main sa blessure et se tient ferme, et dont l’autre, se tournant vers le peuple qui s’écrie, fait signe que la sienne n’est rien et ne souffre pas qu’on intervienne pour lui. Il ne faut pas croire qu’entre les deux écoles le dissentiment soit grave. Ce dont il s’agit, l’unique chose qui nous intéresse, deux autorités t’y convient : méprise les injures et ce que j’appellerais des ombres, des soupçons d’injures, les offenses. Pour dédaigner l’offense, il n’est pas besoin de toute la fermeté d’un sage ; il ne faut que voir juste et pouvoir se dire : « Ai-je mérité ou non ce qui m’arrive ? Si je l’ai mérité, ce n’est pas offense, c’est justice ; dans le cas contraire, c’est à l’auteur de l’injustice à rougir. Et qu’est-ce enfin que l’on nomme offense ? On a plaisanté sur ce que j’ai la tête chauve, ou les yeux malades, ou les jambes grêles, ou la taille défectueuse : quelle offense y a-t-il à s’entendre dire ce qui frappe tous les yeux ? Devant un seul témoin tel mot nous fait rire, qui devant plusieurs nous indigne ; et nous ne laissons point aux autres le droit de répéter ce que nous-mêmes disons journellement de nous. Modérée, la raillerie amuse, à dose plus forte elle irrite. »