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Baruch Spinoza
Spinoza’s Correspondence: Spinoza-Authored Letters, English Manifestation Section section-0058
Section 58 of 114
Canonical reference section-0058
English
R. H. M. Elwes
Lastly, as to your third question, it assumes a contradiction, and seems to me to be, as
though one asked: If it agreed better with a man’s nature that he should hang himself,
could any reasons be given for his not hanging himself? Can such a nature possibly
exist? If so, I maintain (whether I do or do not grant free will), that such an one, if he
sees that he can live more conveniently on the gallows than sitting at his own table,
would act most foolishly, if he did not hang himself. So anyone who clearly saw that,
by committing crimes, he would enjoy a really more perfect and better life and
existence, than he could attain by the practice of virtue, would be foolish if he did not
act on his convictions. For, with such a perverse human nature as his, crime would
become virtue.
As to the other question, which you add in your postscript, seeing that one might ask a
hundred such in an hour, without arriving at a conclusion about any, and seeing that
you yourself do not press for an answer, I will send none.
I will now only subscribe myself, &c.
LETTER_BOUNDARY
LETTER XXXVIII. (XXVII.)
French AI-generated translation, non-official
Codex gpt-5.6-sol · Non-official working translation · 2026-09-11
Enfin, quant à votre troisième question, elle suppose une contradiction et me semble revenir à demander : si se pendre s’accordait mieux avec la nature d’un homme, pourrait-on donner quelque raison pour qu’il ne se pendît pas ? Une telle nature peut-elle exister ? Si elle le peut, je soutiens, que j’accorde ou non le libre arbitre, qu’un tel homme, s’il voit qu’il peut vivre plus commodément au gibet qu’assis à sa propre table, agirait fort sottement s’il ne se pendait pas. De même, quiconque verrait clairement qu’en commettant des crimes il jouirait d’une vie et d’une existence réellement plus parfaites et meilleures que celles auxquelles il pourrait parvenir par la pratique de la vertu serait insensé de ne pas agir selon ses convictions. Car, pour une nature humaine aussi perverse que la sienne, le crime deviendrait vertu.
Quant à l’autre question que vous ajoutez dans votre post-scriptum, puisque l’on pourrait en poser cent semblables en une heure sans parvenir à une conclusion sur aucune, et puisque vous-même n’insistez pas pour obtenir une réponse, je n’en donnerai aucune.
Je me bornerai maintenant à me dire, etc.
LIMITE_DE_LETTRE
LETTRE XXXVIII. (XXVII.)
Concepts in this passage
Attribute
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Ether and field
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Family
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Freedom
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Mode
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Nature
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Necessity
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Philosophical training
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Reason
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Substance
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Virtue
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